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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS IN MACROECONOMIC HISTORY
SEPTEMBER 2014
J. W. MASON
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Robert Pollin
Following Minsky, an economy can be understood as a set of units linked to each
other by flows of money payments and by the commitments to future payments re-
flected on balance sheets. This dissertation offers three accounts of the historical
evolution of the US economy, conceived of a network of balance sheets, over the
course of 20th and early 21st century. The first essay looks at changes in the pattern
of payment flows between nonfinancial corporations and financial markets associated
with the “shareholder revolution” of the 1980s. It argues that the shift in payouts
to shareholders from a quasi-fixed stream of dividends to a claim on every dollar ac-
tually or potentially available to the firm, has had important effects on the behavior
of aggregate investment; in particular, it has weakened the link between corporate
investment, on the one hand, and earnings and credit conditions, on the other. The
second essay looks at household debt. It argues that that the evolution of household
vii
debt-income ratios must be understood as a monetary phenomenon and not merely
the reflection of developments in “real” expenditure and income. Decomposing the
changes in household debt since 1929 using an appropriate accounting framework
shows that changes in household behavior account for only a small part of the tra-
jectory of household leverage over the past 80 years. The third essay applies this
same broad perspective to the historical evolution of interest rate spreads. It argues
that from a Keynesian perspective that regards interest as fundamentally the price of
liquidity, there is no conceptual basis for picking out the difference in yield between
money and a short-term government bond as “the” interest rate; there are many
other pairs of asset yields the difference between which is determined on the same
principles, and may have equal macroeconomic significance. This perspective helps
make sense of the increasing gap between the policy rate and the interest rates facing
most private borrowers.
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INTRODUCTION
While formally independent, these three essays share more than a common focus
on the historical evolution of financial and macroeconomic variables in the United
States. They share a common vision and, to a large extent, a common methodology.
The starting point for all three essays is the observation of Hyman Minsky (1993)
that we do not need to think of an economy as a system in which scarce goods are
exchanged on the basis of relative prices. As Minsky says, a network of markets
is not the only way that economic interrelations can be modeled. Every
capitalist economy can be described in terms of interrelated balance sheets
... The entries on balance sheets can be read as payment commitments
(liabilities) and expected payment receipts (assets), both denominated in a
common unit. ... In this structure, the real and the financial dimensions
of the economy are not separated. There is no “real economy” whose
behavior can be studied by abstracting from financial considerations.
For Minsky, as for Keynes, the money payments and money commitments that
constitute what we call the economy are an activity in themselves and must be un-
derstood on their own terms. They are not simply a reflection of an underlying
non-monetary production and exchange of goods.1 Balance sheets, on the one hand,
and concrete productive activity, on the other, shape each other in far-reaching ways.
But they are nonetheless two distinct systems. And both systems are composed of
relationships between socially embedded human beings, not between commodities
1It’s worth noting that both Keynes’ General Theory and Hicks’ review of it that introduced the
IS-LM diagram were written exclusively in nominal terms, reflecting a deliberate choice to describe
the economy in terms of money flows rather than underlying “real” quantities. (Barens and Caspari,
1999)
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conceived of as physical objects. To put it another way, production is not the alloca-
tion of a fixed stock of means between a known set of alternative uses, but a social
activity carried out by human beings. Money and credit play a strategic role in this
activity, allowing production a wider scale by coordinating the activities of productive
units in the absence of central authority and other social ties. The dark side of this
coordinating function of the monetary system is the disruptions to real production
that occur when the network of money payments for any reason breaks down, and the
power exercised through the money system over our collective and individual choices.
It was these kinds of considerations that led Keynes, when he spoke of being part
of a revolution in economic thought, to describe it as a shift from conceiving of the
economy in terms of “real exchange” to conceiving of it in terms of “monetary pro-
duction.” (Leijonhufvud, 2008) As the compound nature of these terms suggests, this
revolution – which is still to be accomplished – involves a double shift in perspective.
First, one must see the network of money flows and commitments on its own terms,
as an autonomous system. And second, one must look for the ways in which that
autonomous system shapes and is shaped by concrete productive activity. All three
of these essays, each in their own way, are attempts to perform this double shift.
The first essay, “Disgorge the Cash: From Funding Constraints to Rentier Con-
straints on Corporate Investment,” brings this Minskyan or “money view” (Mehrling,
2010) perspective to corporate finance. The essay looks at the changing pattern of
payment flows between nonfinancial corporations and financial markets, and asks
what the implications are for fixed investment. From an orthodox “real exchange”
perspective, the question of what ownership rights are exercised over a corporation
and how its profits are disposed of, should be entirely independent of the “real” out-
comes of output and investment. This is the essence of the famous neutrality result
of Modigliani and Miller (1958). But from the monetary production perspective of
Keynes and his successors, investment and other forward-looking business decisions
2
can only be understood in terms of the patterns of cash payments and cash receipts
associated with them. A firm’s investment behavior cannot be understood in isolation
from its financial position.
In this essay, I argue that there has been a fundamental shift in the relationship
between sources and uses of funds for large nonfinancial corporations, reflecting a
transformation of the relationship between the shareholders and managers. During
much of the 20th century, access to funds was a major constraint on investment for
US corporations, and investment was the main purpose of credit-market borrowing.
In many cases, managers sought the highest level of investment for which funds were
available. This was reflected in a strong correlation between fixed investment and
cashflow from operations and borrowing, respectively. But since the “shareholder
revolution” of the 1980s, shareholders exercised an effective claim on every dollar
actually or potentially entering the corporation. Under this new regime, instead of
trading off returns on investment against the cost of external funds, managers inde-
pendently trade each of these off against the opportunity cost of increased payments
to shareholders. As a result, the correlations of investment with cashflow and bor-
rowing have become weaker, while the correlations of payouts to shareholders with
cashflow and borrowing have grown stronger, especially at business-cycle peaks. This
change can be observed in both aggregate and firm-level data.
The dissertation’s second essay, “The Dynamics of US Household Debt, 1929-
2011,” applies the money view to the historical evolution of household debt-income
ratios in the United States. While the first essay explores on way in which the system
of balance sheets shapes concrete productive activity, here the emphasis shifts to the
ways that the balance-sheet system may evolve independently of concrete production
and consumption decisions.
A central methodological claim in this essay is that we cannot describe changes
over time in the debt-income ratio without using an appropriate accounting frame-
3
work. The conventional division of household payment flows between consumption
and saving is not suitable for this question. It is necessary, instead, to use an ac-
counting framework that isolates net credit-market flows to a unit or sector from
other sources and uses of funds, and to take account of changes in the debt-income
ratio resulting from nominal income growth as well as from borrowing. To understand
the implications of changing household income and expenditure flows for aggregate
demand, it is necessary to distinguish expenditures that contribute to demand from
expenditures that do not. Adapting the standard decomposition of public debt to
household sector debt, I show that changes in income growth, interest and inflation
rates explain, in accounting terms, a large fraction of the changes in household debt-
income ratios observed historically. The rise in household leverage over the past three
decades cannot be understood primarily in terms of increased household borrowing.
For both the decade of the 1980s and the full post-1980 period, rising household debt-
income ratios are mainly explained by the rise in nominal interest rates relative to
nominal income growth. The rise in household debt after 1980 can be thought of as
a debt-disinflation, analogous to the debt-deflation of the 1930s. In other words, it is
fundamentally a monetary phenomenon.
The third essay, “Loose Money, High Rates: Interest Rate Spreads in Historical
Perspective,” turns to the complex of market interest rates and their evolution over
recent decades. Interest rates, I argue, cannot be understood as the price of current
in terms of future production, but only as the price of liquidity – which is to say,
the terms on which a unit can generate cash income as needed to meet its cash
commitments. This is especially true when we consider the difference in yields, or
spreads, between different assets, since these cannot be understood even in principle
as the terms of exchange between the same real goods at two different dates. Nor
in general can spreads be understood in terms of risk, where risk is understood as
stochastic variation in the size of some bundle of real goods. Rather, liquidity – the
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terms on which an asset can be used to make payments as needed – is central to the
determination of spreads between yields, and interest rate spreads in particular.
Over the past 50 years interest rate spreads have widened substantially, both
between longer and shorter maturity loans and between loans to riskier and less risky
borrowers. In much of economic theory, the determination of interest rate spreads
is analytically distinct from the determination of the overall level of interest rates.
But from a Keynesian perspective that analyzes interest rates in terms of liquidity
preference and conventional expectations, the overall level of interest rates and the
variation in rates across different forms of debt are explained in the same ways. In this
essay, I argue that this Keynesian perspective is particularly useful in explaining the
rise in interest rate spreads, and that both conventional expectations and stronger
liquidity preference appear to have played a role. The rise in the term and credit
premiums is important for policy, because they mean that the low policy rates in
recent periods of expansionary policy have not been reliably translated into low rates
for private borrowers.
While the focus of this essay is, again, on the relative autonomy of the monetary
system, the motivation for it, as for the other two, is a desire to understand how the
evolution of that system shapes productive activity and concrete social outcomes. The
explanation of high interest rate spreads may be found in the money system, rather
than in production possibilities and consumption choices. But that does not diminish
its importance for the conduct of monetary policy, the distribution of income, and
the organization of productive activity through the credit system. If the structure of
market rates is determined by the same financial factors as the overall level of interest
rates, that is an argument for replacing or supplementing traditional monetary policy,
with its focus on a single interest rate, with a “credit market policy” in which the
authorities manage liquidity conditions more generally. (Pollin et al., 2011)
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CHAPTER 1
DISGORGE THE CASH: FROM FUNDING
CONSTRAINTS TO RENTIER CONSTRAINTS ON
CORPORATE INVESTMENT
1.1 Introduction and Overview
In this essay, I suggest that the “shareholder value revolution” of the 1980s can
help make sense of changes in the relationship between sources and uses of funds for
the US corporate sector.
From the establishment of the modern corporation in the 1920s until the 1980s,
decisions about corporate borrowing, investment and payments to shareholders were
made by autonomous management. Corporate cashflow in excess of fixed (at least in
the short run) dividend payments were at the disposal of management and served as
low-cost funding for fixed investment or other corporate purposes. Meanwhile, the
partitioned lending market and binding reserve requirements of the post-New Deal
financial system meant that even creditworthy borrowers often faced credit rationing.
In combination with generally high investment demand during this period, the result
of these institutional features was that fixed investment was strongly constrained by
financing. In this regime, profitability was important not only for investment demand,
but also for its financing.
The various institutional changes in corporate governance and the financial sys-
tem of the 1980s changed these relationships. Now shareholders exercised an effective
claim not just on a firm’s long-run profits, but on all flows of cash available to it.
Higher earnings no longer increased the pool of funds preferentially available for cor-
porate purposes, since the decision to retain incremental funds rather than pay them
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out had to be acceptable to the financial claimants who would otherwise receive them.
At the same time, financial deregulation left creditworthy corporate borrowers fac-
ing a more elastic credit supply than in the postwar era. Together, these changes
weakened the link between the supply of funds to corporations and their level of
investment. In the new rentier-dominated regime, this relationship is increasingly
replaced with a link between the supply of funds and the level of payouts to share-
holders. This transformation of the corporate financing decision, I argue, can help
explain a number of important recent macroeconomic developments, including the
puzzling absence of evidence for direct links from the financial crisis of 2008 to the
fall in corporate investment over 2008-2009.
The essay is organized as follows. The opening section presents the argument
that for large corporations, the marginal use of funds has increasingly shifted from
fixed investment to shareholder payouts. The next section motivate the analysis by
offering a brief discussion of credit constraints in the Great Recession. The next
section presents the institutional and historical context, arguing that the changing
place of shareholder payouts in the firm’s financing decision can only be understood in
the context of owner-manager conflict and the increasing dominance of shareholders
as a result of a variety of political and institutional changes after 1980. Then in
Section 1.4, I suggest a simple analytic framework for thinking about the change in
the corporate financing decision, updating Hyman Minsky’s well-known model of the
corporate financing decision for the era of rentier dominance. Section 1.5 then offers
quantitative evidence for the change in the corporate financing decision described
in the previous section. Using both aggregate time-series data from the Flow of
Funds, and firm-level data from Compustat, I show that the relationship between
corporate cashflow from operations, borrowing, investment and shareholder payouts
has changed in ways consistent with the analysis presented in earlier sections. The
correlations between investment and borrowing and cashflow respectively have grown
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weaker, with a clear regime change in the first half of the 1980s. Meanwhile, the
correlations between shareholder payouts and borrowing and cashflow, respectively,
have grown stronger, especially at business cycle peaks. The final section suggests
some implications for policy, and concludes.
1.2 From Funding Constraints to Shareholder Constraints
1.2.1 Investment and Finance: A Review of the Literature
Prior to the 1970s, studies of business investment generally started from the
premise that internal and external funds were not perfect substitutes.1 To early
writers on business investment, it seemed clear that changes in financial conditions
played a central role in investment fluctuations. The deep falls in investment asso-
ciated with recessions were largely or entirely explained, in this framework, by the
fall in internal funds associated with declining sales, combined with more restricted
access to external funds. (Gurley and Shaw, 1956; Meyer and Kuh, 1966) Internal
funds were assumed to be cheaper, from the point of view management, than bor-
rowed funds, which in turn were cheaper than new equity issues. And except for the
largest firms, the supply of external funds to the firm was assumed to be inelastic
and, and absolutely rationed above some ceiling, with the marginal cost of external
funds normally greater than the market interest rate. On a theoretical level, a number
of explanations were suggested for this wedge. Raising external funds might involve
significant transaction costs, or result in less favorable tax treatment, for instance due
to higher taxation of dividends than capital gains. Use of external funds might be
limited by the costs associated with bankruptcy or financial distress. External finance
might create or exacerbate agency problems between shareholders, bondholders and
management, or involve moral hazard. If managers were faithful agents of sharehold-
1There is a good survey of this literature in Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
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ers, for example, they would seek to take on excessive leverage from the point of
view of bondholders; thus bonds typically include covenants limiting a firm’s leverage
or requiring it to maintain a minimum cushion of working capital. Or, asymmetric
information between managers and external lenders might create a “lemons” problem
in which lenders’ inability to distinguish between the quality of investment projects
leads to even “good” firms getting credit-rationed. (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss,
1984)
However they arose, financing constraints were presumed to be important for all
except the largest firms, and financial capacity appeared to be an important constraint
on business investment. Because of the wedge between the prevailing interest rate
and the borrowing cost facing firms, internal funds served as the preferred source of
investment finance; credit would be sought only once internal funds were exhausted,
and equity funds would be raised only once the firm’s borrowing capacity was ex-
hausted in turn. This was the “financing hierarchy” or ”pecking order” of investment
finance. (Myers and Majluf, 1984) Shareholders were paid a conventional dividend,
which was adjusted only slowly in response to changes in the flow of earnings. So
retained earnings could be allocated to fixed investment or other purposes at the
discretion of management. Thus, early work on investment finance often treated fi-
nancing as an important factor in variation in business investment across firms and
over time.
One can identify two major strands within this literature, based on the treatment
of management’s investment decision. The larger strand explicitly gives management
an objective function of maximizing shareholder wealth, despite the fact that this sits
uneasily with the assumptions of asymmetric information, principal-agent problems
or moral hazard that often motivate the existence of financing constraints in the
first place. (Whited, 1992; Fama and French, 2005) A smaller but influential strand
starts instead from the premise that management pursues growth, prestige, or some
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other objective that is at least potentially in conflict with shareholder wealth. (Berle
and Means, 1991; Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) Post Keynesian and
heterodox writers can be found on both sides of this divide; see the essays collected
in Pollin (1997b) and Davidson (1993) for a good sample of heterodox thought on
these issues. Unlike Berle and Means and Jensen and his coauthors and followers,
heterodox writers who see distinct objectives for management vis-a-vis shareholders
do not assume that the interests of the latter have a stronger claim on either normative
or efficiency grounds. Heterodox writers are also more likely to frame these questions
in terms of a historical process.2 For the first strand of investment-finance literature,
the market failure was, in effect, the high cost of external funds relative to internal
funds; with managers seeking to maximize shareholder wealth, the latter represents
the true social opportunity cost of investment. For the second strand, the market
failure was the low opportunity cost assigned by management to internal funds; from
this point of view, the relevant opportunity cost was the cost of external funds and if
internal funds were used to carry out investment projects that would not have been
undertaken with external funds, that was a form of “managerial waste.”
Empirical work on the “pecking order” hypothesis continues to be well repre-
sented in the finance literature. But in economic theory, the idea of finance as a
binding constraint on investment was increasingly displaced from the 1970s by the
Modigliani-Miller hypothesis that capital structure is irrelevant for firms’ decisions
about production and investment. The demonstration that, under certain conditions,
investment decisions would be independent of the structure of a firm’s liabilities,
opened the way for a reassertion of the neoclassical investment function, in which
investment is simply the solution to an intertemporal optimization problem defined
2A noteworthy exception to the tendency of non-heterodox writes to pose their question in terms
of the behavior of firms and markets in general, is Brown and Petersen (2009)
10
by the cost of capital, the production function, and any adjustment costs associated
with changes in the capital stock. (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967)
The result was a curious bifurcation of the literature on corporate investment.
On the empirical side, the role of credit constraints in investment continued to be
an active research program. A new wave of empirical studies came in the 1980s,
including notably Whited (1992) and Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), both
of which identified credit constraints using variation across classes of firms in the
correlation between investment and cashflow from operations. Both papers found
strong evidence for credit constraints and attracted many imitators. The papers had
somewhat different theoretical frameworks, with Whited (1992) motivating the exis-
tence of a cashflow-investment correlation on the basis of an otherwise neoclassical
firm maximizing shareholder wealth in the presence of unspecified financial frictions,
while Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) was much more engaged with the ear-
lier, more eclectic literature on corproate finance. But for both papers, the critical
assumption was a significant wedge between the cost of investment financed out of
retained earnings and the cost of investment financed externally. Later papers (in-
cluding subsequent papers by Fazzari and coauthors) generally followed Whited and
derived their tests for credit constraints from a formal model of intertemporal opti-
mization – “management” was simply shorthand for the first-order condition for the
maximization of shareholder net worth.
The financial crisis of 2008 launched a new round of sophisticated empirical work
on credit constraints and business investment. This latest round of empirical credit-
constraint research is more divided in its results. Unsurprisingly, many studies do find
evidence of a reduced credit supply after the Lehman failure in fall 2008. (Adrian,
Colla and Shin, 2012; Becker and Ivashina, 2011; Erel et al., 2011) The role of bank
distress in the post-crisis fall in business investment is more controversial. A number
of studies do find a substantial role for credit constraints in the sustained decline in in-
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vestment after 2008. (Almeida et al., 2009; Amiti and Weinstein, 2013; Duchin, Ozbas
and Sensoy, 2010; Edgerton, 2012). But others offer more ambiguous evidence, find-
ing that credit spreads narrowed during the recession (Montoriol-Garriga and Wang,
2011), that borrowers were effectively able to substitute away from bank credit to
sources of external finance less impaired by the crisis (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010;
Campello et al., 2011; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013), that the real
effects of reduced credit supply appear to have been limited to the smallest firms
(Greenstone and Mas, 2012; Chodorow-Reich, 2012), or that the effects of reduced
credit supply appear too short-lived to explain the sustained fall in investment (Ra-
haman and Sun, 2012). A few studies reject outright a macroeconomically important
role for credit supply in the post-2008 fall in business investment.3 (Kahle and Stulz,
2013; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013)
But there has been no theoretical equivalent of this rich empirical literature. There
has been little systematic analysis of why firms might be finance-constrained, what
explains the existence (and size) of the wedge between the perceived costs of in-
ternal and external funds. Indeed, the empirical literature seems to actively avoid
these questions: A typical study suggests that “what is special about credit crises is
that financial markets are arguably less than frictionless during those times,” without
committing itself to any particular account of those frictions. (Almeida et al., 2009)
Other empirical studies entirely abandon the specific role of credit as investment fi-
nance, treating credit instead as an input to current production. (Duygan-Bump,
Levkov and Montoriol-Garriga, 2010; Chodorow-Reich, 2012; Greenstone and Mas,
2012) Some recent theoretical work does address the generic issue of liquidity con-
straints in an interesting way. (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 2011;
Tirole, 2011) But compared with the psychologically complex, institutionally specific
3A more general argument that reduced credit supply played only a limited role in the recession
of 2008-2009 and subsequent slow recovery is made by Mian and Sufi (2014).
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accounts offered by Keynes and the first generation of his successors, recent systematic
treatments of the investment-finance nexus are thin. The question of why managers
might pursue some goal other than maximization of shareholder wealth, and, if so,
what that might be, is if anything even less explored. This question is difficult to
pose in the context of the “rational expectations revolution,” which excludes these
more sociological questions from the domain of economic analysis. The possibility
of conflicts between a firm’s managers and its notional owners has been much more
thoroughly explored by sociologists and legal scholars than by economists.
1.2.2 Alternative Views of the Investment-Finance Nexus
in this subsection I describe some alternative approaches to these questions, which
I believe will be more productive for motivating the empirical work of the second half
of the paper. There are two issues to consider here. First, how should we think about
corporate finance in relation to the investment decision? And second, how should we
think about the relationship between shareholders (or other financial claimants) and
the firm’s professional managers?
The starting point for critical analysis of the corporate financing decision is Hyman
Minsky’s description of the fundamental problem facing economic units as matching
cash inflows to cash payments over time. That is, “Capitalism is essentially a financial
system.” (Minsky, 1967) The essence of Minsky’s “Wall Street paradigm” is that
“cash flows and the network of financial interrelationships must be examined before
considering issues of production and distribution.” (Pollin and Dymski, 1992) From
this perspective, there is nothing puzzling or in need of explanation about the wedge in
perceived cost between internal and external funds. Obtaining external funds implies
a contractual commitment to future repayment and thus, by definition, reduces a
unit’s liquidity, understood in the Keynesian sense of access to funds relative to
payment commitments. (Beggs, 2012) In the Walrasian paradigm that has dominated
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economics in recent decades, the default assumption is that economic units face an
infinitely elastic supply of credit at the market interest rate. But in the Minskyan
paradigm, debt commitments always involve both “lender’s risk” (of nonpayment,
especially under conditions in which the lender’s liquidity needs are also salient) and
“borrower’s risk” (of loss of control over the financed project, especially relevant for
professional managers). (Minsky, 1980) The existence of an upward-sloping supply
curve for external funds and a hierarchy of finance arise naturally in this framework;
they don’t require any special explanation in terms of information asymmetries, moral
hazard, etc.
While Minsky’s “Wall Street paradigm” remains as relevant as ever, its concrete
application must be specific to the historical and institutional context. Minsky’s
analysis of the dynamics of investment and credit was necessarily shaped by the
financial and corporate-governance arrangements of the postwar period in which it
was developed. His last major work, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, was published
in 1986 but was really still describing the financial universe of the 1960s and 1970s.
“The book took little account of the sea change taking place during the Volcker-
Reagan years, except to deplore it.” (Mehrling, 1999) This is not intended as criticism;
one of Minsky’s great strengths was his attentiveness to the concrete particulars of the
banking system. But this means his vision cannot be carried over straightforwardly
to a different set of financial arrangements.
One important aspect of the Minskyan vision that must be revisited in the light
of that sea change is the relationship between the owners of financial assets and
the management of nonfinancial firms. For much of the 20th century, shareholders’
status as owners or residual claimants was mostly notional; in practice shareholders
were passive income recipients, with management free to dispose of the firm’s funds
once a conventional dividend had been paid. Since the 1980s, however, shareholders
have actively exercised their first claim on all “their” firms’ funds, borrowed as well
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as earned. For now fundamental point is that, unlike the period when Minsky was
writing, firms are under intense pressure to maximize cash payments to shareholders.
At the same time, changes in financial system have resulted in more credit allocation
by price rather than quantitative limits. (Krippner, 2011) The result is that for many
large firms, the financial constraint on investment and other uses of funds is not the
flow of cash into the firm, via earnings or borrowing, but the flow of cash out of the
firm via dividends and stock repurchases.
The key question for the purposes of this essay is how the reassertion of share-
holder power since the 1980s affects the relationship between investment and other
macroeconomic variables. Crotty (1990) suggests that “institutional change in the
past decade has given Keynes’ rentier domination thesis a degree of relevance it previ-
ously lacked. ... the validity of the hypothesis that financial markets dictate ... invest-
ment decisions changes with institutional conditions and historical circumstances.”
While agreeing with the spirit of this remark, I suggest that, counterintuitively, the
shareholder revolution may in fact have left investment less sensitive to conditions in
financial markets.
1.2.3 Managers and Rentiers
To an important extent, managers and owners consist of two differing groups of
people, operating in two different institutional contexts, and on many margins where
the firm makes decisions their preferred choices may diverge. Classic statements of the
importance of the separation of management from ownership of enterprises include
Veblen (1923), Chandler (1977), and Berle and Means (1991). For present purposes,
one particularly important aspect of this separation is that, in a world of absentee
ownership,the wealthy are primarily owners of financial assets, that is, of claims on
production rather than directly of productive assets themselves. In other words, “the
emergence of a bourgeois class more or less separated from the enterprise” created
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a new sociological gulf between the ownership of capital and the management of
production, and “gave the capitalist class a strong financial character.”(?, emphasis
in original)
The distinction between ownership and management has not, in general, played
a large role in modern macroeconomic theory. Most discussions of corporate invest-
ment, borrowing, and other decisions assumes that managers and shareholders are
identical, or that the former are faithful agents for the latter. There is an important
exception, discussed below, in the corporate governance literature, which focuses on
agency problems, but elsewhere the assumption continues to be that the firm can be
adequately theorized as maximizing the present value of shareholder wealth. Even
Keynes, while acknowledging the distinction between wealth-owners and managers
(or “entrepreneurs”), assumed that in conflicts, it was always the rentiers who won.
(Crotty, 1990) While the idea of asset-owner dominance may arguably have described
the bank-centered financial capitalism of the early part of the century, this view was
already obsolete by the mid-1930s when Keynes was writing. Nonetheless this strand
of Keynes’ thought was adopted by most subsequent Keynesian economists, includ-
ing some who in other respects were critical of the postwar consensus. In this view,
when a firm faces a new investment opportunity, “The securities markets appraise
the project, its expected contributions to the future earnings of the company and
its risks.” (Tobin and Brainard, 1977) So all investment decisions are really made in
financial markets; there is no role for autonomous management.
An alternative view, going back at least to Berle and Means, is that the man-
agement of the public corporation pursues its own objectives, largely unconstrained
by financial markets. While autonomous management presumably still places a high
value on profitability, the practical and psychological identification of managers with
their own firm will lead them to make different appraisals than shareholders of the
expected returns and risks of particular projects. In this view, “the primary objective
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of top management is the long-term reproduction, growth and safety of the firm itself.
... For the managerial firm, dividend payments, like interest payments, are a cost of
autonomy from capital market constituents.” (Crotty, 1990) This view of managers
as wholly autonomous reached its high point at mid-century. In the early postwar
period, the exercise of any substantive control by shareholders over “their” corpora-
tions seemed as anachronistic as a feudal nobility – a comparison made explicitly by
management theorist Peter Drucker:
The mass-production revolution has completed the destruction of the
power of the land-owning aristocracy of the ancien regime... But it has
also dethroned the ruling groups of bourgeois society: the merchant, the
banker, the capitalist. ... Where only twenty years ago the bright graduate
of the Harvard Business School aimed at a job with a New York Stock
Exchange house, he now seeks employment with a steel, oil or automobile
company. (quoted in Davis, 2009)
The idea that capitalists had been evicted from the corporation is perhaps as
extreme and one-sided a picture as Tobin’s vision of managers as stenographers pas-
sively taking down financial markets’ instructions. But Drucker presumably expresses
the way many corporate managers saw themselves at the time.
While there was never a consensus on the full economic or political implications
of managerial autonomy, there was broad agreement across a range of perspectives
that a managerial firms will typically pursue a higher level of investment than a
firm following the purely financial criteria suggested by Tobin. For critics of the
shareholder-value revolution (discussed immediately below), this greater willingness
to tolerate the risks of fixed investment (and other projects with large upfront costs
and uncertain, long-term returns, such as research and development) is an important
argument in favor of the managerial firm. (Lazonick, 1992) Again, however, it is
important to stress that while the separation of ownership and control has been a
major topic for historians and sociologists of American business, it has remained a
specialist concern within economics. For the majority of work in macroeconomics and
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finance, the governing assumption is that “managers act on behalf of the stockholders
in order to maximize the value of the firm.” (Whited, 1992)
1.2.4 From Credit Constraints to Rentier Constraints
A number of recent studies of investment finance have found a weaker link between
credit conditions and corporate investment, compared with the earlier period that pro-
vided the data for the first round of empirical studies of the invest finance nexus in
the 1980s. This change has sometimes been ascribed to technological progress in the
financial sector, which has removed the frictions that formerly led to credit rationing.
(Brown and Petersen, 2009) Here I suggest an alternative explanation. Seemingly
anomalous movements of investment, borrowing, shareholder payouts and profits can
be made sense of in terms of the 1980s-era transformation of corporate governance.
This “revenge of the rentiers” (Smithin, 1996) re-established maximization of share-
holder value as a binding constraint on US corporations, with important implications
for the financing decision facing management. Once shareholders were able to effec-
tively exercise their claim on the firm’s cashflow, internal funds could no longer serve
as a low-cost source of investment financing. Shareholders also exercised effective
claims on firms’ borrowing capacity, with firms seen as providing insufficient payouts
coming under pressure to take on additional debt. At a macroeconomic level, these
institutional changes led to higher and more variable payouts to shareholders, and
to higher corporate leverage. At the same time, regulatory and institutional changes
within the financial system meant there was a shift from quantity rationing of credit
to price rationing (via the interest rate), at least for more creditworthy borrowers.
Together, these changes have weakened or even severed the link between corporate
borrowing and corporate investment. Under the rentier-dominated regime of recent
decades, I suggest, corporate finance is decreasingly a system for getting funds into
firms, and increasing a system for getting funds out of them. This is a point some-
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times made with respect to equity financing, but I suggest it applies to borrowing
as well. (Lazonick 2008) During the 1980s, the central problem to be solved by the
financial system shifted away from how to provide capital to borrowers with promis-
ing projects, and increasingly shifted toward “how to motivate managers to disgorge
the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of capital.” (Jensen, 1986). So
while it may still be true that “the most stable and least easily shifted element in
our contemporary economy” is the minimum return “acceptable to the generality
of wealth-owners” (Keynes, 1936), there has been a shift in the point at which this
fundamental constraint operates.
Formal models of investment continue to assume that firm assets are wealth for
the firm’s “owners,” and that dividend payments and share repurchases are, in effect,
simply moving money from one pocket to another. In this framework, there is no
reason in the absence of specific tax or regulatory distortions for households to prefer
to hold their wealth directly rather than indirectly as corporate assets. But actual
wealth holders do not appear to see things this way. Converting wealth within the firm
to wealth in the form of money is evidently highly valued by holders of financial claims
against corporations, and a central source of conflict between them and corporate
management. Because the notion of a “rentier constraint” on the corporate finance
decision is somewhat novel, it is worth quoting from the business press at length to
establish the salience of this constraint for corporate managers.
• “Corporate treasurers are shoveling investment-grade bonds out the door to
raise money to buy back shares.”
• “An increasing number of US companies are doing buy-backs because the eco-
nomics of such a move have probably never been better, according to bankers.
Debt has become a cheaper source of capital, and this has helped to fund the
biggest year for buy-backs since 2007. ... ‘I don’t think buy-backs are going
to slow. There’s so much cash on the sidelines that shareholders want,’ said
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Robert Leonard, managing director of the special equity transactions group at
Citigroup.”
• “US blue-chip companies from Philip Morris to AT&T are taking advantage of
cheap debt to finance share buy-backs and mergers and acquisitions activity at
an accelerated pace.”
• “Marianne Lake, chief financial officer, told analysts the company could reach
the new target faster but wanted to be able to also do ‘capital distribution to
you guys’, by releasing profits rather than retaining them.”
• “Issuing debt to buy equity has become more attractive in recent months due to
bold central bank action, which has pushed bond yields to record lows. ... Last
year, Apple announced $10bn of share buybacks and said it would return $100bn
to investors over the next three years, funded in part by a $17bn corporate bond.
... Companies are also using cheap money from the bond markets to fund special
dividends. The discount warehouse club Costco, for example, borrowed $3bn
from the markets late last year to fund a special dividend.”
• “An activist hedge fund has thrown down the gauntlet to Apple, pushing it to
consider new ways to return billions of dollars to shareholders ... Apple said it
would consider the idea... ‘Apple’s management team and board of directors
have been in active discussions about returning additional cash to shareholders,’
the company said in a statement.”
• “The biggest US companies may have as much as $2tn in cash available to spend
in 2012, powering a potential surge in share buy-backs and dividend payments,
[thanks to] a combination of cash on the books plus low levels of leverage and
strong expected profits... Amid a struggling global economy, US companies in
most industries have been hesitant to launch major new investments or complete
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large acquisitions, and have been primarily using cash to repurchase their shares
and pay dividends. ‘If more firms were optimistic about the future and seeing
new opportunities, this money could go to investment,’ said Marc Zenner, head
of Corporate Finance Advisory at JPMorgan. ‘Doing share buy-backs is a less
risky option, especially when valuations are low. It shows capital discipline and
enthusiasm about the stock’s future, and can also fend off activists.’”4
For present purposes, there are three key claims in stories like these, all of which
are explicitly made in the final passage above. First, US corporations are “primarily”
using available cash for dividends and share repurchases. Second, using funds for
payouts is an alternative to using them for investment, where adequately profitable
opportunities continue to be seen as limited. And third, one reason to make large
payouts to shareholders is to “fend off activists.” An additional point often made
in the business press is that payouts are often limited by a firm’s borrowing capac-
ity. Corporations engaged in stock buybacks are often described as seeking to issue
the maximum quantity of bonds that will not trigger a ratings downgrade. While
business-press articles do not put it this way, in analytic terms this is clearly describ-
ing an upward-sloping credit-supply curve.
The fact that a number of high-profile companies are described in the business
press as issuing new debt to fund shareholder payouts rather than increased fixed
investment is not, in itself, establish that there has been a macroeconomically impor-
tant shift in the relationships between these flows. But it does give such a shift some
prima facie plausibility and is an argument for investigating the possibility more sys-
tematically. The argument of this paper is that, in fact, the picture of the corporate
4All quotes from The Financial Times: “Investors Hanker after the Old Normal,” January 28,
2013; “Low Bond Yields Fuel Corporate Buy-backs,” December 7, 2011; “Blue Chips Borrow to Fund
Buy-backs,” May 11, 2011; “Jamie Dimon Cautions on Loan Profits,” July 12, 2013; “Executives
Cash in as Cheap Debt Funds Buybacks,” May 21, 2013; “Apple under Pressure on $137bn cash
pile,” February 7, 2013; “US Groups Have $2tn to Play with This Year,” January 5, 2012.
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financing decision presented in articles like these is consistent with the scholarly lit-
erature on the transformation of corporate governance over the past 30 years. If we
take this picture seriously, we need to modify our macroeconomic theory accordingly.
1.3 The Transformation of Corporate Finance
1.3.1 The Rise of “Shareholder Value”
During much of the 20th century, the picture painted by Drucker of a “dethroned”
capitalist class had, if exaggerated, an important element of truth: Managers enjoyed
a substantial degree of operational autonomy from shareholders and other financial
claimants, and often conceived of their role as extending beyond maximizing returns
to shareholders. But since 1980, there has been a transformation in the relationship
between owners of financial assets and their agents in finance, on the one hand, and the
management of corporations, on the other. Initially, this transformation had a strong
element of conflict, with organized shareholders coercively asserting their control over
a distinct group of managers. Over time, this conflictual aspect receded – though it
has never disappeared – and rentier control came to be asserted more through the
adoption by managers themselves of “shareholder value” as their overriding goal.
There were a variety of dimensions of this rentier reassertion:
1. Intellectual. The idea that corporations exist solely to maximize shareholder
wealth is as old as the corporation itself, and in the early part of the cen-
tury it was accepted legal and economic doctrine. But it largely receded from
view during the middle of the century. The idea that the stock market could
could enforce this principle by offering a “market for corporate control” was
reintroduced by Manne (1965), but it initially had little impact on either the
theory or practice of corporate governance. It was the work of Michael Jensen
and coauthors that brought the idea of takeovers and restructurings as tools
for compelling management to put the interests of shareholders above those of
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other corporate stakeholders. (Jensen, 2000, 1986, 1993; Jensen and Meckling,
1976) Over time, the ideas that shareholders are substantively the owners of
the corporation, that maximizing returns to shareholders is the only function
of the corporation, and that pursuit of other goals by management is a serious
problem that needs to be solved by appropriate institutions, including a mar-
ket for corporate control, came to dominate much economic and legal thinking
about corporate governance.
2. Legal. A number of legislative and administrative reforms made it more feasible
for shareholders to assert their notional power over management. Among these
were legal challenges to laws limiting hostile takeovers of corporations, including
the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE striking down Illinois’
anti-takeover law and similar laws in other states. (Davis, 2009) Also important
was the revision of anti-trust regulations by the Reagan Justice Department,
also in 1982, which relaxed the limits on concentration within industries. This
opened up new possibilities for intra-industry mergers and undermined logic of
conglomerates, the major initial target of hostile takeovers. (Roe, 1996)
3. Institutional. As discussed below, financial market changes made takeovers and
other changes of control more feasible; one dimension of this was a broadening
of the funds available to finance changes in corporate control, as the rules on
the classes of investments permissible by various institutions funds were pro-
gressively relaxed, starting with pension funds in the 1970s and S&Ls in the
early 1980s. (Lazonick, 2008) This also broadened the market for corporate
bonds, contributing to the flattening of the credit-supply schedule described in
Section 1.3.2. Somewhat later, the generalization of stock options and related
compensation practices, plus much greater inter-firm mobility of top manage-
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ment, changed the incentives and worldview of top executives, to be closer to
that of shareholders.
4. Ideological. The idea that the creation of shareholder value is the sole purpose
of corporation, and of economic life in general, has been widely adopted in the
business press and culture at large. Combined with this was a decline in the idea
of the corporation as a social organism or institution with an autonomous social
purpose and with stable relationships with its employees, customers and suppli-
ers, and communities where it operated. Indeed, this shift extended beyond the
corporation throughout social life. The breadth of this vision suggested that
America was becoming a “portfolio society” dominated by the “capital fiction,”
in which all social relationships are evaluated as income-yielding assets. (Davis,
2009)
During the 1980s, the central front in the shareholder revolution was the hostile
takeover and related changes in corporate control. Blair (1993) gives a good summary,
which probably reflects the most broadly-held view of this period:
Takeovers and financial restructurings were devices ... used to disci-
pline corporate managers and pressure them to increase cash flows and
pay out more money to shareholders and other investors. ... [During
the early 1980s, falling profits] at many firms ... triggered a dispute over
whether these companies should retain cash for reinvestment or speed up
the rate at which they paid it out to investors.
In the early part of the decade, tender offers, hostile takeovers, and
leverage buyouts emerged as the weapons of choice... Potential target
firms often fought off unwanted takeovers by embarking on stock buyback
programs or otherwise providing improved payouts to shareholders. Some
firms financed these payouts with current cashflows, but many others used
borrowed money.
... early empirical work showed that shareholders of target firms were,
in fact, made wealthier by takeovers. ... In many cases improved re-
turns could be achieved only by obtaining concessions from suppliers or
customers, reducing the amount of taxes paid, extracting wage conces-
sions.... Or they could come from reducing investment. In other words,
the improved returns to shareholders had to be achieved at the expense
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of other social goals of the corporations. ... the specific sin of man-
agement that the financial markets were eager to correct was
managers tendency to ... overinvest. (emphasis added)
As Blair emphasizes, while takeovers, LBOs and mergers were often justified on
the grounds of increasing efficiency, the most important grounds of the conflict were
not the profitability of current operations, but the disposition of the profits they
generated.
The takeover movement was quantitatively large, comparable to the previous great
merger waves of the turn of the century and the 1960s. Nearly half of US corpora-
tions received takeover offers at some point during the decade, and in several years
acquisition volume reached the historically high level of 10% of total stock market
capitalization. (Holmstro¨m and Kaplan, 2001) Among Fortune 500 companies, 28
percent were the object of takeover attempts, the majority hostile and the majority
successful. (Davis, 2009) These takeovers were clearly understood as efforts by the
owners of financial assets to “discipline” their agents, the managers of nonfinancial
corporations. (Scharfstein, 1988)
The era of hostile takeovers did not extend past the 1980s; KKR’s takeover of
RJR-Nabisco was the last major deal of its kind. By the mid-1990s only 5% of tender
offers were contested, compared with as many as 40% a decade earlier. (Holmstro¨m
and Kaplan, 2001) The decline of the hostile takeover was the result of both declining
performance of these deals in the later 1980s, and a less favorable legal and regulatory
environment, symbolized by Michael Milken’s conviction for scurities fraud in 1990.
By the end of the 1980s, more than 40 states had passed new anti-takeover laws.
In Delaware, where the bulk of large American corporations are incorporated, the
state Supreme Court ruled in Paramount Communications v. Time Inc. that boards
had broad latitude to refuse a takeover offer. Twenty-nine other states had explicitly
granted boards this authority by state law. (Blair, 1993)
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The disciplinary aspect of the rentier-management relationship was now more
likely to take the form of shareholder activism, with large outsider investors publicly
pressuring management to increase payouts and adopt “value-enhancing” policies,
pushing for seats on the board, sponsoring resolutions and threatening to sell their
shares en masse. Coordination between activist shareholders was significantly eased
by a 1992 SEC rule change that eliminated onerous disclosure requirements for com-
munication between shareholders. (Holmstro¨m and Kaplan, 2003) Combined with
behind-the-scenes pressure, this kind of shareholder activism acted as a nontrivial
constraint on managerial autonomy. (Henwood, 1998) Initially, public pension funds
were the leaders in this form of rentier activism, along with a few individual activist
investors. But other classes of institutional investors have since adopted the tactic of
acquiring large stakes in corporations and then using them to pressure management
into adopting more shareholder-friendly policies. Hedge funds, for example, made
only 10 13D filings in 1994, the first year for which records are available. (13Ds are
the legally required disclosures investors must file with the SEC when they acquire a
stake of 5% or more in a publicly-trade corporation.) In 2007, hedge fund 13D filings
peaked at 272. (Bebchuk, 2013) As with the earlier takeover movement, while the
rhetoric of shareholder activism might highlight productive efficiency, the substance
of the conflict was the division of the funds available to the firm between internal
uses and distribution to shareholders. A recent examination of shareholder activism
does find significant positive excess returns to shareholders at corporations targeted
by activists, but adds: “We did not see evidence that targets’ financials improved...
The targets’ leverage and payout, however, did seem to increase, suggesting that the
activists are unlocking value by prompting management to return additional cash
to shareholders.” (Zhao and Wang, 2013) Note that here, as in the earlier takeover
movement, “unlocking shareholder value” does not simply mean redistributing exist-
ing cashflows, but also more fully utilizing the firm’s borrowing capacity.
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Increasingly after 1990, adversarial relationship was replaced by acceptance of
maximizing shareholder value as “holy writ” by managers themselves. (Davis, 2009)
By 1997, the repudiation of managerialism was sufficiently thorough for the Busi-
ness Roundtable – representing the CEOs of the 200 largest American companies
– to change its position on business objectives (after years of opposition) to read
“the paramount duty of management and the board is to the shareholder and not
to...other stakeholders.” (Holmstro¨m and Kaplan, 2003) One reason for this reorien-
tation of management priorities was the change in executive compensation practices
that began in the 1980s but came into its own in the 1990s. Executive pay both
rose steeply in absolute terms and increasingly took the form of stock options; by the
mid-1990s, options accounted for half of the compensation of CEOs at large US corpo-
rations. (Lazonick, 2008) Less dramatic than the growth of stock-based executive pay
but arguably just as important was the change in the career trajectory of successful
managers: They were now less likely to reach executive positions through promotion
within a given firm, which necessarily entailed a certain identification with the firm as
an institution and the formation of social ties with others connected with it. instead,
top executives were more likely to be recruited from outside the firm, as managerial
turnover increased, the cult of the individual “superstar CEO” took hold and boards
became more inclined to hire outsiders for top positions. (Kaplan and Minton, 2012)
Given that LBOs did not, as early advocates had predicted, herald a shift away from
the corporate form, but a device to redistribute claims on a firm whose legal and orga-
nizational structure remained essentially unchanged, simply switching the personnel
at the top was a more straightforward way of reorienting the firm toward shareholder
value than the more disruptive process of changing ownership. (Bhagat et al., 1990)
As one critic of the takeover boom presciently remarked, “rather than a market for
corporate control that involves buying and selling the capital of the company, we need
a market for corporate management.” (Gilson, 1993)
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While hostile takeovers have largely disappeared since the 1980s, owner-management
conflict and pressure from shareholders have not. But it seems clear that the overt
conflicts of the 1980s helped produce a lasting change in norms; that, combined with
the new compensation practices, increased executive mobility between firms, and the
fact that top managers can themselves expect to become members of the wealth-
owning class, have made managers more responsive to the desires of shareholders.
So the disappearance of the overtly coercive tactics of the 1980s does not indicate
a return to the managerial autonomy of the mid-20th century. As ? summarize
these developments, “During the 1980s the disciplinary aspect of the new relation-
ship between the capitalist and managerial classes was dominant,” but “after 2000,
... managers had become a pillar of Finance.” Today, the “financial facet of manage-
ment tends to overwhelmingly dominate” and “a process of ‘hybridization’ or merger
is under way.”
The bottom line is, there was a reassertion of shareholder power and secondly,
a primary purpose to which that power was exercised was to increase the level of
payouts from the firm to shareholders. That the latter was true is clear from the
language used by the academic and policy advocates for the shareholder revolution,
and from the course of specific incidents of takeover threats and pressure from activist
shareholders. An increase in payouts is invariably both a demand of the outsiders,
and a central part of the strategy adopted by management to placate them. And
as I show below, the era of shareholder dominance has coincided with much higher
payouts in general.
Admittedly, there is a puzzle here. Shareholder rhetoric focuses on value, not
payouts as such. Shareholders naturally want “their” companies to be more prof-
itable, but why should they want a higher share of those profits to leave the company
as payments to themselves? If the stock market is efficient, resources owned by the
corporation should be fully incorporated into the stock price, so paying them out
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should not enrich shareholders. If there are financial frictions – either in payouts,
such as taxes, or in borrowing by the corporation – then leaving funds in the corpo-
ration should be more efficient than having them corporation pay them out and then
borrow them back. From this point of view, it’s unclear why firms pay dividends at
all – the well-known “dividend puzzle.” (Black, 1976) The argument is often made
that payouts should be high when the company faces limited growth opportunities;
but this superficially plausible argument invites the question of why, if better invest-
ment opportunities are available to shareholders, those same opportunities cannot
be taken directly by the firm itself, avoiding the intermediate step of payouts, with
its associated fictions. The standard neoclassical model of the firm simply assumes
an exogenously fixed set of investment opportunities available to the firm, but this
is hard to justify, especially from a perspective that otherwise treats the firm as a
veil without economic significance. (?) Others suggest that financial markets are
(now) better judges of potential projects than management, so the capital allocation
function should be performed by financial market participants rather than within the
firm. Undoubtedly this is how many financial market participants see things, but it is
even harder to reconcile with conventional economic theory, which normally assumes
that the true expected returns on all possible projects are known by all. The critical
point, perhaps, is the one stressed by Lazonick (2008): The dispute is not so much
about the division of a known, fixed stream of income, as about control over the firm’s
resources in the face of unexpected contingencies.
1.3.2 The Weakening of Credit Quantity Constraints
Logically independent of the shift to rentier dominance but happening at roughly
the same time and connected to the same broad political-economy currents, were
a series of changes in credit markets that broadened the channels by which funds
could flow to corporate borrowers. Corporations became less dependent on bank
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loans, and lenders became less dependent on a fixed pool of deposit funding. These
developments, largely though not entirely the result of various measures of financial
deregulation, meant that the supply of credit to corporations became more elastic
after 1980. While in the postwar decades, binding reserve requirements and strict
limits on the types of funding available to lenders could result in absolute constraints
on the quantity of credit, with even high-quality borrowers rationed, since the 1980s
banks have been able to create essentially unlimited credit for eligible borrowers
willing to pay the market interest rate. (Krippner, 2011) This shift may be seen as
part of a broader process of “financial deepening” that has progressively relaxed the
savings constraint at an economywide level, leaving the supply of credit highly elastic
at a given interest rate. (Pollin, 1997a) (The extent to which the market interest
rate can be said to be determined by monetary policy is the subject of another essay
in this dissertation.) In this new environment, individual firms still typically face
an upward-sloping credit supply curve, if only because the probability of financial
distress rises with leverage. But it is likely to be shallower than in the old regime
of deposit-constrained lenders, and high-quality borrowers are unlikely to encounter
the absolute ceilings on borrowing that were previously common. This change is not
essential to the argument of this essay, which is focused on the relationship between
firms and shareholders, not firms and lenders. But as I discuss below, the difference
between the financing decisions of the managerial and rentier-dominated firm will be
more noticeable when the credit supply is elastic.
1.4 Two Models of the Financing Decision
The change in the corporate financing decision is well illustrated by the contrasting
views of shareholders taken by two successive CEOs of General Electric. For Owen
Young, “the stockholders are confined to a maximum return equivalent to a risk
premium. The remaining profit stays in the enterprise, is paid out in higher wages,
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or is passed on to the customer.” For his successor Jack Welch, on the other hand,
“regarded the shareholder as king – the residual claimant, entitled to the [whole] pot
of earnings,” while employees had no claim on the company at all. (Davis, 2009)
We can illustrate this change schematically by updating Minsky’s well-known
depiction of the firm’s financing decision. A version of his original figure is shown as
Figure 1.1.
1.4.1 The Managerial Firm
Figure 1.1: The Financing Decision Under Managerialism
The figure schematically shows demand for funds for investment (and for acquisitions, con-
tinuation of money-losing operations, etc.) and supply of funds, at various cost of funds
facing management, including borrower’s risk, in a regime where the firm’s funds can be
freely disposed of by management once a conventional dividend has been paid.
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For mid-20th century managerial firm:
1. The demand for funds curve reflects the subjective expected return of the
marginal project.
2. The supply of funds curve combines two segments: a horizontal internal funds
segment, and an initially flat and then upward-curving supply of credit segment.
3. Payout to shareholders (in the form dividends) is exogenously fixed, at least
in the short run. Cashflow in excess of fixed payout (“retained earnings”) are
available to management for payments to stakeholders or as low-cost pool of
investment finance. In the models of the corporate financing decision that
underlie much of the empirical credit-constraint literature, the firm does not
make payouts to shareholders until it has exhausted investment opportunities
with an expected yield in excess of the interest rate. Thus a given firm may
either borrow or pay dividends, but not both. (Whited, 1992)
4. A firm with internal funds in excess of investment opportunities will not accu-
mulate cash indefinitely. Either the firm will eventually increase its dividend
payments; or else it will eventually lower prices and raise wages, reducing inter-
nal funds, lower its hurdle rate for new projects. These latter possibilities were
emphasized by both defenders and critics of the managerial firm.
5. From the perspective of management, the cost of internal funds is set by the
interest rate available to the firm on its liquid assets, i.e. the riskfree short-
term rate, plus the marginal benefit of having an additional dollar of liquid
assets available for unforeseen contingencies. In general, a firm will undertake
projects with an expected return greater than this rate until internal funds are
exhausted, after which the hurdle rate for new projects rises discontinuously to
the firm’s long-term borrowing rate. This discontinuous jump is represented by
the dotted vertical segment of the cost-of-funds curve.
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6. The interest rate paid by the firm is higher than the rate available on its cash
both because the firm must borrow long-term and because its borrowing rate
incorporates lender’s risk. The effective rate from the point of view of man-
agement is higher still, because there is also borrower’s risk on borrowing as
perceived by firm management.
7. Since both lender’s risk and borrower’s risk rise with the level of debt, the firm
does not face a perfectly elastic supply of credit, but rather increasing costs
(especially taking borrower’s risk into account) and often eventually a hard
quantitative limit. (The latter is more likely in contexts where lenders depend
on deposit financing, and so themselves face an inelastic or quantitatively con-
strained supply of funds.)
8. As a result of the points above, the firm has hierarchy of finance: first internal
funds, then borrowing, then new equity issues (not shown in the figure.) Each
is exhausted before firm turns to the next.
9. When the supply of funds is low relative to demand, more firms will find them-
selves on the steeply upward sloping part of the supply of funds schedule, where
changes in cashflow (which shift the supply of funds schedule horizontally) will
affect investment. On the other hand, when the demand for funds schedule in-
tersects the retained earnings or the flat part of the borrowing schedule, changes
in cashflow will not affect investment, except insofar as changes in current cash-
flow are correlated with expected returns on new projects.
1.4.2 The Rentier-Dominated Firm
The financing decision of the rentier-dominated, or shareholder value-maximizing
firm, is different in an important respect. Since shareholders are now able to impose
sanctions on management that provides an insufficient flow of payments, shareholders
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must be satisfied that any corporate use of a dollar other than paying it out as
dividends or share repurchases has at least as great value to them as a dollar of
cash in their own hands. In effect, then, this latter value is the opportunity cost
for any corporate decision to increase current expenditure, and also for any decision
not to increase current cash receipts by sale of assets, issuance of new liabilities, etc.
I call this value – the discount rate of a dollar in the firm relative to a dollar in
the rentier’s hands – the rentier opportunity cost (ROC). Note that the ROC is not
simply the “true” expected return from alternative projects available to shareholders.
Nor is it even shareholders’ subjective beliefs about such returns, though those must
be a factor in it. Rather, it is the minimum effective return that shareholders are
able to enforce on management, through whatever combination of external coercion,
compensation practices and shareholder value norms are making management act as
agents for shareholders.
In the ideal world of neoclassical theory, the cost of external funds to the firm,
the effective cost of internal funds, and the ROC all lie along the same horizontal line
at “the” interest rate. In such a world it would make no difference if firms financed
projects internally, financed them by borrowing, or paid out all their internal funds to
shareholders and then borrowed them back. The same projects would be undertaken
in any case. Much of the literature on business investment and finance continues to
treat this as the default, with a significant difference between the effective costs of
internal and borrowed funds regarded as a “corner case” that can usually be safely
ignored. (Bayoumi, 1997)
The reasons why we should expect an important wedge between internal and
borrowed funds are discussed in Section 1.2.2. But why should the rentier opportunity
cost lie above the managerial firm’s cost of internal funds? There are several reasons.
One reason is agency problems. Even in the rentier-dominated firm, managers
retain a significant degree of autonomy. If, for whatever reason, there are differences
34
of interests or opinion between managers and rentiers over the best use of a dollar,
as long as the dollar is within the firm the view of the managers will likely prevail.
Whereas if the dollar has already been paid out to the rentiers, then of course the view
of the rentiers will. For advocates of the corporate governance changes of the 1980s,
the main goal of strengthening shareholders was “to force corporate assets out of the
hands of managers who could not or would not use them efficiently.” (Holmstro¨m
and Kaplan, 2003) Changes in executive hiring and compensation practices have
reduced the probability that managers will prioritize the growth of the firm and
obligations to its stakeholders over shareholder value, or that they will overestimate
the growth prospects of their own firm. But as long as it remains greater than zero,
shareholders will want a premium for leaving money within the firm. Furthermore, the
weakening of managers’ identification with the firm and the replacement of intrinsic
motivation with financial incentives can create new agency problems of its own. While
in economic theory or even sometimes in law, managers may owe a duty only to
shareholders, sociologically shareholders remain just one of many constituencies with
which managers must deal. Evacuating all these other relationships of any sense of
duty or moral obligation, while leaving it undiminished in this one case, is a difficult,
probably insurmountable, institutional and ideological challenge. It is more likely
that a corporate culture that discourages responsibility to employees, customers and
the broader public will discourage responsibility to shareholders as well. (Greenwood,
2004) So a diminishing premium to compensate for the risk of corporate soulfulness
may be accompanied by an increasing premium for the risk of “Enronitis.”
Related to this, even if the owners are perfectly faithful agents, funds within the
firm may be more vulnerable to capture by other constituencies, such as governments,
organized consumer groups, or labor. It’s clear that for many critics of the managerial
firm, the potential claims of workers especially were a major danger of leaving too
many resources within the corporation. For Berle and Means (1991), an important
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danger from the loss of shareholder power was that firms may “maintain labor stan-
dards above those required by competitive conditions.” Similarly, Jensen, defending
the view that the pubic corporation was becoming obsolete, gave this list of forces
that made capital allocation within the firm no longer viable: “striking Eastern Air-
lines pilots, Pittston Coal miners, [and] New York Telephone employees, who seem
perfectly content to destroy or damage their employer’s organization while attempting
to serve their own interests. Ralph Nader’s consumer activist organization is another
example.” (quoted in Henwood, 1998) Jensen was writing here for a general audience,
but within the economics literature we can find similar claims that when firms’ pools
of internal funds get too big, there is a danger they will be claimed by organized work-
ers. For instance, it has been argued that the sharp increase in steelworkers’ wages
in the 1970s “was a rational response to ... workers recognizing that the industry
was in irreversible decline. In this model, wages increased when the union adopted
an endgame strategy aimed at increasing labor’s share of the remaining quasi-rents.”
(Deily, 1998) Note that in this argument, the danger of appropriation of corporate
resources by workers is greatest at firms that have high cashflow but poor investment
prospects – the same ones targeted by the takeover specialists and activist investors.
A third reason is liquidity. The stock market has, since its inception, been pri-
marily a tool, not for raising capital for investment, but for rendering the long-lived
assets required by modern production liquid from the point of view of individual
wealth-owners. In large part, it achieves this goal – shares are vastly more liquid
than direct ownership of productive assets. But they are still not as liquid as money,
or as relatively more money-like assets such as bonds from safe issuers. Rentiers, like
other economic units, face a survival constraint. At some point they will face an un-
expected fall in income, or increase in desired expenditure, and there is no guarantee
that their claim on the firm will be mobilizable at that moment. Even if the “true”
present value of a project was sufficiently high, this may not be reflected in the price
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of the firm’s stock when it is needed. In some cases, there is the additional problem
of disposing of large blocks of shares without moving the market price. So even if
shareholders believe that the investment opportunities facing the firm have higher
expected returns than their own next best option, that managers are perfectly faith-
ful agents, and there is no danger of appropriation of corporate resources by other
constituencies, they still will want a premium for leaving “their” money in the firm.
While these considerations may always have made shareholders prefer higher pay-
outs to retention of funds within the firm, they did not become operational constraints
on management until the institutional transformation described in the previous sec-
tion. The effect of this change on the corporate financing decision is shown in Figure
1.2.
For the rentier-dominated, or shareholder value-maximizing, firm:
1. Demand for funds and the credit supply curve are the same as for the managerial
firm.
2. The rentier opportunity cost is the minimum expected return a use of funds
must have for rentiers to accept leaving funds in the firm in that purpose. Note
that the rentier opportunity cost is the minimum return that shareholders (and
other financial claimants) are actually able to enforce on the firm, not necessarily
their subjective discount rate on retained vs. paid-out funds.
3. Because the rentier opportunity cost is greater than the riskfree interest rate
(for reasons discussed above), there is no longer a separate lower-cost category
of internal funds or retained earnings.
4. Payout to shareholders are higher than in the managerial firm, for a given mix
of investment opportunities, internal funds, and borrowing costs; payouts vary
strongly with the availability of funds. It is important to distinguish between
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Figure 1.2: The Financing Decision Under Rentier Dominance
The figure schematically shows demand for funds for investment (and for acquisitions,
money-losing operations, etc.) and supply of funds, at various cost of funds facing manage-
ment, including borrower’s risk, in a regime where shareholders exercise effective first claim
on all funds entering the firm.
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payouts that are fixed in the short run, as in the managerial firm, and addi-
tional payouts that depend on the difference between the cost of funds to the
firm and the opportunity cost of leaving funds in the firm, from the point of view
of shareholders or rentiers. It is often convenient to think of the fixed part of
payouts as corresponding to dividends and the variable part to stock buybacks.
However, this division may be becoming less useful as firms shift from dividends
toward repurchases even for the less cyclical component of payouts. (Dittmar
and Dittmar, 2002) In any case, the distinction between dividends and repur-
chases is irrelevant for the empirical analysis below, which treats shareholder
payouts as a single category.
5. The hurdle rate for new investment may be either the rentier opportunity cost
or the subjective interest rate (that is, incorporating borrower’s risk) facing the
firm. When investment demand is high, and credit is limited, the firm’s demand
for funds curve will cross the supply-of-funds curve above its intersection with
the rentier opportunity cost. In this case the firm faces the same financing
decision as the managerial firm. But compared with the case of the managerial
firm, this will happen less often, since some of the upward sloping part of the
credit-supply curve lies below the ROC.
6. When the expected returns on investment are lower, or credit is more freely
available, the demand for funds curve will cross the ROC curve above the supply
of funds curve. In this case, the decision facing management is not, “Is the
return on this project higher than the cost of financing it?”, but rather, “Is the
return on this project high enough to justify keeping the required funds within
the firm rather than paying them out to shareholders?”
7. Most importantly, for a firm in the position shown in Figure 1.2, the investment
and borrowing decisions are unrelated. The firm invests up to the point where
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the expected return on the marginal product equals the ROC. Independently, it
borrows until the marginal cost of additional debt equals the ROC. So a change
in the investment demand curve does not affect borrowing, while changes in
profits and in the supply of external funds do not affect investment. Instead,
shifts in either of these schedules show up as changes in the variable part of
payouts. This is the key prediction of our analysis.
8. However, since expected returns are still correlated to some extent with current
profits, there will still be some correlation between cashflow and investment,
even if it no longer operates through the financing channel.
9. Finally, if there is important variation in rentier opportunity cost, this will have
opposite effects on borrowing and investment. (This is easy to see in Figure 1.2
by envisioning a vertical displacement of the ROC curve.)
The modification of corporate governance represented here is not the only change
in the corporate financing decision to be considered. As noted above, there were
also institutional and regulatory changes in financial markets over this period, which
tended to make the credit supply more elastic. So the upward curve in the supply-
of-funds schedule is shallower than in the earlier period, meaning that a larger share
of firms – at least among creditworthy ones – will find their demand-for-funds curve
crossing the ROC.
1.4.3 Operationalizing the Model
Our hypothesis is that during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, US corporations were
in general well-described by the managerial model. During the 1980s, there was a
widespread (though not universal) shift toward the rentier-dominance model. Very
high expected returns at many firms during the late 1990s probably increased the
share of firms at which the funds-demand curve crossed the funds-supply curve, but
40
since the end of the tech bubble, investment demand has been relatively low. The past
decade has also seen further generalization of the “shareholder value” norm, including
in sectors, such as information and high-tech, where it was previously weaker.
This hypothesis leads to six concrete predictions.
1. There will be a strong correlation between borrowing and investment in the
earlier period, but this relationship will weaken or vanish entirely in the later
period.
2. There will be a strong correlation between cashflow and investment in the earlier
period. This relationship will also weaken in the later period.
3. There will be no correlation between borrowing and payouts in the earlier pe-
riod, but a strong relationship in the later period.
4. There will be some correlation between payouts and cashflow in the earlier
period, but this relationship will grow stronger in the later period.
5. The changes in the borrowing correlations will probably be sharper than the
changes in the cashflow relationships, because there are also non-financing chan-
nels linking profits to payouts and investment.
6. Within each of the two periods, the relevant relationships will show opposite
cyclical dynamics. The correlation between cashflow and investment of the
early period will be strongest when credit is tight, so that the demand-for-funds
curve is more likely to cross the steeply upward-sloping part of the supply-
of-funds curve. The correlations of the later period, of cashflow with payouts
and of borrowing with payouts, will be strongest in periods of high profits and
abundant credit, when the demand for funds curve is more likely to cross the
ROC curve.
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It is worth developing the last point a bit more. Under the managerial model,
the credit supply curve only matters when the supply of funds is low relative to
demand. Thus, the association between investment and borrowing should be stronger
among firms facing, and in periods of, tighter credit constraints. Under the rentier
dominance model, by contrast, firms are always on the credit-supply curve. That
is, rentiers demand that ”their” corporations take full advantage of their borrowing
capacity in order to increase payouts. Because payouts are residual, i.e. lowest priority
use of funds, this constraint only matters when firms have access to funds beyond
those needed for high-expected-return investment and other internal uses. This is
most likely at times when cashflows from operation are high, and credit is cheap and
abundant. In periods of falling profits and tighter credit constraints, by contrast, it is
more likely that the demand for funds curve will cross the supply of funds curve and
variable payouts will go to zero. Thus the correlation between payouts and borrowing
will be weaker in periods of tight credit constraints and among firms facing more
restricted credit supplies. So while I hypothesize that in general there will be clearer
links of borrowing and cashflow with payouts under rentier dominance, over shorter
horizons expect that the strength of these links will show strong procyclical variation.
By the same logic, the strengthening of the payout relationships will be strongest
among larger firms and in general those with the greatest borrowing capacity.
1.4.4 Dividends and Repurchases
In this paper, I am combining dividends and share repurchases into a single mea-
sure of shareholder payouts. This is consistent with the great majority of the literature
on corporate governance and payout policy. But it is worth asking if these two flows
are really equivalent.
Both dividends and repurchases are payments from firm to shareholders. They
equally reduce resources available to the firm, and, at a sufficient level of abstraction,
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provide equal income for shareholders. It is well-known that, in simple models of
share valuation based on the present value of expected future dividends, the value of
shares does not change when firms substitute repurchases for dividends. (Fama and
French, 2001)
Nonetheless, as Evans (2001) persuasively argues, there are contexts in which it
is important to distinguish dividends and stock buybacks. In principle, he agrees,
“profits can just as easily be distributed through repurchases” as through dividends.
And historically, there is a strong relationship between stock valuations and repur-
chases, suggesting they do reliably function as income for shareholders. But there are
important differences between the two kinds of payment. For one thing, equity prices
should mainly reflect expected future payments. Since firms are reluctant to change
dividends, current dividends are informative about future payments. But repurchases
are less persistent, so they carry less information about future flows. So a rational
investor should give less weight to repurchases than to dividends in valuing a share.
Second, repurchases are often financed by new debt:
While there are several reasons why firms might borrow funds to re-
purchase equity, none of them justify an increase in share valuations...
There is a limit to the amount of debt a corporation can take on, and
therefore if the market is a precise discounting machine it should not
impute additional value to the shares of corporations who decrease the
amount of their equity through increased leverage. After all, if it were
uncovered that firms were borrowing to make dividend payments, they
would be accused of Ponzi financing, warranting a decline in stock prices.
(Evans, 2001, p. 167, emphasis in original)
Similarly, to the extent that repurchases come at the cost of lower investment,
they reduce the flow of future profits, and so shouldn’t increase a rational investor’s
valuation of its stock. For these reasons, Evans suggests that while both dividends and
repurchases positively related to stock prices in practice, they should be understood
as operating through two fundamentally different mechanisms. Dividend payments
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increase the fundamental value of shares, but repurchases raise their price only by
reducing their supply.
In the context where it is being made – explaining equity price movements, and
in particular the long bull market of the 1980s and 1990s – Evans’ argument is con-
vincing. But in the context of the corporate financing decision that is the focus of
this paper, the two forms of payments look more equivalent. not so obvious that
they should be treated differently. After all, both payments to shareholders out of
corporate treasury. The degree to which shareholder payouts constrain corporate
decision-making does not depend in any obvious or straightforward way on the the
response of stock prices to those payouts. It’s enough that shareholders want them
to happen.
But this invites the question, why do shareholders place such a high priority on
payouts? Evans says that rational investors should not value shares more if payouts
come at expense of lower investment or higher debt. This is true in the models of
rational investors and efficient markets that he is responding to. But it does not
take into account owner-manager conflict that is focus of the present paper.5 Where
managers and shareholders have conflicting goals, reducing investment may be pre-
cisely the goal of shareholder activism. For Holmstro¨m and Kaplan (2001), the great
accomplishment of the takeover wave of the 1980s “was to force corporate assets out
of the hands of managers who could not or would not use them efficiently.” When
management is undertaking fixed investment for purposes other than maximizing
shareholder value, using funds for repurchases rather than for investment does indeed
leave shareholders better off. A similar argument applies to debt. It is undoubtedly
true that through much of the history of public corporations, a company that bor-
rowed to increase dividends would be regarded as engaging in unacceptable Ponzi
5This is not meant as criticism – we always have to abstract from some questions to focus on
others.
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finance. But norms change. Today, it is not surprising to open the Wall Street Jour-
nal and find a demand that Apple should not only start “handing back [its cash
holdings] to stockholders through dividends ..., but also start borrowing, and hand
that money back, too.”6 Evidently shareholders place a higher value on an additional
dollar in their own hands than an additional dollar of assets, or a dollar less of debt,
on the books of “their” firm.
Some reasons why this is so are discussed in Section 1.4.2 above. Indeed, the same
question applies to dividends as well as repurchases. If shares reliably reflect true ex-
pected value of firm profits, and are highly liquid, it is impossible for shareholders to
be made better off by any payments from firm – dividends as much as repurchases are
just moving money from one pocket to another. Even if the firm lacks good invest-
ment opportunities, why can’t it lend its excess funds directly to a firm with better
opportunities, and skip the intermediate step of paying them out to shareholders?
After all, payouts – whether dividends or repurchases – have substantial transaction
costs. In the Walrasian world of modern macroeconomics, it is unclear why they
should happen at all.
Evans himself provides what may be the best answer to this dilemma. The con-
ventional view of shares as representing the ture expected value of all future corporate
profits is simply not coherent. The purpose of shares – of financial markets in general
– “is to provide liquidity to asset holders.” (Evans, 2001, p. 112) But liquidity is of
value only in a world where future income flows are uncertain. If all agents knew
the true expected returns from any investment project, there would be no need for
a liquid market in corporate equities. Claims on all future income from production
could be freely sold or hypothecated without any need for a special additional class
6“What Steve Jobs Really Should Be Unveiling,” June 10, 2010. “Tech” companies like Apple
are among the most visible targets of this kind of shareholder pressure today precisely because
managerial autonomy has been more persistent there than in other sectors.
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of tradable claims on firms. (Crotty, 1992) Conversely, in a world where liquidity
does matter, there is nothing strange about shareholders placing a higher value on a
dollar under their direct control than a on a dollar inside the firm, and demanding
a correspondingly higher return from the latter. By the same token, Evans’ supply
and demand framework for understanding stock prices makes more sense than the
discounted dividend model that dominates the literature. The actual decision facing
investors is not optimizing income flows over infinite future time, but allocating their
portfolio in the present. Thus, the same considerations that favor distinguishing div-
idends and share repurchases in his study of equity prices, favor combining them for
the questions being asked here.
It is standard practice in critical discussions of shareholder payouts to use negative
net share issuance as a measure of total funds transferred to shareholders by share
repurchases. (Lazonick, 2008) This is the convention followed here. However, it is
important to keep in mind that net share issuance is the sum of three gross flows: New
share issues, minus share repurchases, minus cash purchases of shares in corporate
acquisitions. It is appropriate to group these three flows together with dividends
as payouts, since together these flows represent total cash payments received from
the corporate sector by virtue of share ownership But treating negative net share
issuance by the sector in the aggregate as exactly equivalent to share repurchases by
an individual firm can be misleading, since the three component gross flows are of
comparable magnitude: in recent decades, repurchases vary from about 1 to about
3.5% of corporate assets, and cash acquisitions from about near zero to about 1.5%,
both with a strong cyclical pattern.7 Total new share issues are more stable between
7Share issue and repurchase figures from Compustat, and refer to the nonfinancial sector. Ac-
quisition expenses reported in Compustat range from 1 to 3% of corporate assets, but these include
some noncash acquisition expenses, such as assumption of the acquired firm’s long-term debt. So ac-
tual cash payments to shareholders as a result of corporate acquisitions will be lower than this. The
range given in the text is derived from the gap between net repurchases as reported in Compustat
and net negative issuance shown in the Flow of Funds.
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1 and 2% of corporate assets. unlike the other two flows, repurchases also have a
clear positive trend; only since 2001 have aggregate repurchases consistently exceeded
aggregate new issues. Before then, firms were not in the aggregate net purchasers of
their own shares; negative net share issuance would not be observed in the 1980s and
1990s in the absence of cash acquisitions. It appears that little if any of these new
share issues represent new funds being raised by the firm; rather, they are the result
of the exercise of stock options. (Stothard, 2013) Leary and Roberts (2010) assume
that new share issuances of less than 5% of firm assets represent option exercise
rather than equity finance; issuances greater than this threshold account for less than
20% of firm-year observations of new stock issues. It is not entirely obvious that it
is appropriate to simply net shares issued as a result of option exercise from share
repurchases; in part because they are often exercised at prices well below the current
market price of the share, and in part because there is some conceptual question
about the economic nature of the payments. Are stock option grants simply part of
the firm’s labor costs, or are the top executives who receive most stock option grants
better regarded as members of the capitalist class, whose payments from the firm are
a form of profit rather than wage income?
In this paper, I cannot pursue these important issues further. For my purposes, it
is sufficient that shareholders place a high priority on current payouts and have the
institutional power to force managers to take that priority into account in their invest-
ment and borrowing decisions. I take it as a historical fact that an effect of increased
rentier dominance has been greater pressure on firms to use any increase in available
funds to raise shareholder payouts rather than investment or other uses internal to the
firm. And since both the academic literature on takeovers and shareholder activism
and the self-reports of the activists themselves suggest that shareholders regard div-
idends and repurchases as approximately equivalent, I treat them as equivalent here.
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1.5 Empirics
Below, I empirically investigate the predictions of the hypothesis of a shift from
a managerial financing decision to a rentier-dominated financing decision. I examine
two sources and two uses of funds: cashflow from operations, net borrowing, fixed
investment, and payouts to shareholders (including net share repurchases).8
While this section is based on regression analysis, the goal is not primarily to
test for a causal relationship from the right-hand to the left-hand side variables. The
question is not, e.g., whether an exogenous increase in borrowing is associated with
higher investment but rather, to what extent borrowing and investment have sim-
ilar distributions across time periods or across firms. More precisely, the question
is whether there was a change, sometime int he 1980s, in the degree to which the
two variables have similar distributions. Testing for causality is inappropriate since
our hypothesis does not describe causal relationships between the various sources
and uses of funds. The two models make predictions about the correlations between
the four variables, not about causality between them. In the managerial mode, an
easing of credit conditions leads to higher borrowing and higher investment; in the
rentier-dominance model, it leads to higher borrowing. But in neither case are we
claiming that causality runs from borrowing to investment/payouts, or from pay-
outs/investment to borrowing. So some common identification problems are less of a
concern here.
In the remainder of this section, I ask whether the data is consistent with the
hypothesis that the shareholder revolution as moved US corporations from a financing
decision in which investment and borrowing are set jointly so that the marginal cost
8The two other main sources/uses of funds for the sector in the aggregate are net acquisition of
financial assets and net foreign investment. At the firm level, acquisitions are another important
use of funds. Note that for the corporate sector as a whole, cash-funded acquisitions are equivalent
to share repurchases, and show up identically in the Flow of Funds as a subtraction from net new
equity issuance. While I have not done so here, there is a case for also treating cash acquisitions as
a form of shareholder payouts in the firm-level data. (Leary and Roberts, 2010)
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of funds equals the marginal return on investment; to a world where investment
and borrowing are adjusted independently so that their marginal return and cost,
respectively, each equals the effective value to shareholders of an additional dollar of
payouts. Another way of asking the question is, is there a clear difference between the
two periods in the extent to which additional funds flowing into the corporate sector
remain there, financing fixed investment and other corporate expenditures, versus the
extent to which they quickly pass through and flow out to shareholders. The leakier
are corporate buckets (or perhaps better, the more easily they overflow), the less
difference the economy-wide supply of liquidity will make to the amount of activity
inside them.
For the aggregate payout measure from the Flow of Funds in the next section,
I measure payouts as dividends minus net share issuance. For firm-level payouts
discussed in the following section, I use dividends plus share repurchases minus new
share issuance.
1.5.1 Time Series Data
First, I use quarterly time series data from the US financial accounts prepared by
the Federal Reserve (the accounts formerly known as the Flow of Funds) to test our
predictions for the US nonfinancial corporate sector in the aggregate. Investment is
gross fixed investment. Payouts are dividends less net equity issuance.9 Borrowing is
the annualized quarterly change in credit-market liabilities. Cashflow is profits after
tax plus capital consumption allowance.
Figure 1.3 shows the four flows over the past six decades. Corporate cashflow
from operations (the heavy gray line) fluctuates with the business cycle; through
most of the period it was stable around 10 percent of corporate assets, but there has
9The arguments for and against including net share buybacks with dividends are discussed in the
Appendix.
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Figure 1.3: Sources and Uses of Funds, US Corporate Sector, 1952-2012
Source: Flow of Funds, author’s analysis.
The figure shows 4-quarter moving averages of of gross fixed investment, shareholder
payouts (dividends less net new equity issues), cashflow (aftertax profits plus depreciation
allowances) and net new borrowing for the nonfinancial corporate sector, as a fraction of
trend GDP.
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ben a sustained increase since 2000. (This recent increase is entirely due to higher
pretax profits, not to depreciation or corporate taxes.) Corporate investment shows
a similar cyclical pattern, but with sharper peaks. The late-1990s expansion is the
one period in the data in which aggregate corporate investment exceeded aggregate
corporate cashflow; but investment since 2000 appears to show a declining trend. The
1980s business cycle stands out in both series since neither shows a noticeable peak
in the late 1980s. Corporate borrowing (the solid black line) shows fluctuations with
increasing amplitude over time. In the first 20 years of the series, the fluctuations of
borrowing over the cycle are comparable in magnitude to fluctuations in investment
and cashflow, but in the past few cycles they have been noticeably larger – 6-7 points,
compared with 2-3 points for investment and 3-4 points for cashflow. The same is
true to an even greater extent for shareholder payouts, which display essentially no
cyclical pattern for the first 20 years of data but rise and fall by six points over the
most recent business cycle. Notably, the second half of 2007 – the peak of the last
cycle – is the only period in which aggregate payouts exceed aggregate investment.
It is evident that, apart from a brief period at the end of the tech boom, corporate
cashflow has always comfortably exceeded corporate investment; in the aggregate, the
corporate sector does not require financing. This does not preclude the possibility
that many individual firms face investment opportunities that exceed their available
funds.; in general, theory gives little guidance about the distribution of investment
opportunities across firms. (Gordon, 1992) But while one should not dismiss the
importance of external funding, especially for new, small, noncorporate firms, it the
top two lines of Figure 1.3 ado offer striking visual evidence that, with respect to the
corporate sector at least, the financial system is doing something other than financ-
ing investment. Visual examination also suggests that since the mid-80s, shareholder
payouts have been higher, more variable, and more closely correlated with borrowing.
The immediate pre-Great Recession period stands out particularly dramatically. No-
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tably, both payouts and borrowing hit their high for the full sixty-year period at the
same point, at the end of 2007. More broadly, all of the series except cashflow seem
clearly to exhibit different behavior before and after the mid-1980s.10 The question
is whether these visual impressions are valid. Are there statistically verifiable differ-
ences in the associations between these four variables between the earlier and more
recent periods?
Or again, and more fundamentally: The question is, at an economy-wide level,
are higher corporate earnings and borrowing associated with higher investment, or
with higher payouts to shareholders?
With respect to the exact dating of the shift from a managerial to a rentier-
dominated financing decision, there is no single breakpoint. The shift was a socio-
logically complex, contested process that was not fully accomplished in one step. It
seems likely that a substantial minority of the corporate sector – especially in growing
sectors – continues to function under a basically managerial regime, though it is under
continuous pressure from the rentiers. A striking recent example of this pressure is
Apple’s decision, under fire from activist shareholders, to use its cash holdings – pre-
viously reserved for strategic acquisitions – to begin paying dividends for the first time
in 17 years and to devote $30 billion per year to stock repurchases. Dividends and re-
purchases together totaled $41 billion in 2013, slightly above the company’s reported
earnings of $37 billion and approximately triple its combined budget for fixed invest-
ment ($8 billion) and research and development ($4 billion).11 So in an important
sense, the shareholder revolution is ongoing. While the intellectual underpinnings of
the shareholder value revolution were laid in the late 1970s, the critical institutional
changes that made it the operational principle of corporate finance clearly took place
10If we divided cashflow into profits and depreciation, we find that profits declined from the 1950s
to the 1980s, while depreciation increased more or less in tandem. Since then, neither series shows
any trend.
11Data from Apple’s 10-K filings, accessed at http://investor.apple.com/sec.cfm.
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in the first half of the 1980s. With respect to share repurchases – which drive most of
the changed behavior of shareholder payouts – the critical change was the adoption
of Rule 10b-18 by the SEC in 1982, which made large scale share repurchases legal
for the first time. (Grullon and Michaely, 2002) The leveraged-buyout era – the coer-
cive phase of the reassertion of the rentiers – effectively came to an end after KKR’s
1989 hostile takeover of RJR Nabisco. But by then it had clearly achieved its goals,
and the carrot of stock-based compensation could largely function without a stick.
The decisive transition was clearly complete at that point. The bulk of the historical
material suggests a dividing line near the middle of the decade, or perhaps a year or
two earlier. The exact year is arbitrary, but only within modest limits. With respect
to the regression results reported in Section 1.5.1, a Chow test for structural breaks
is consistent with a line anywhere in the 1980s; we reject the null of stable coefficient
values if we divide the two periods in any year between 1981 and 1989. But for both
regressions, the test statistic is greatest if we end the first period at 1984. Since that
is consistent with the historical evidence, I use that dividing line in the econometric
tests that follow.
Of interest here are four flows for the nonfinancial corporate sector: investment,
shareholder payouts, borrowing, and cashflow from operations. Investment is gross
fixed investment; at the time the work here was done, historical investment figures
had not been updated to include research and development or intellectual-property
spending. Shareholder payouts are total dividends minus net equity issues. This
means that, as defined here, payouts include cash acquisitions as well as payouts.
Distinguishing cash acquisitions from buybacks is not possible in the aggregate data
but, arguably, combining these payments is conceptually appropriate since, at the
aggregate level, both are payments from the corporate sector to shareholders. Bor-
rowing is net change in credit market liabilities. Cashflow from operations is aftertax
profits plus depreciation. All variables are normalized by the corporate sector’s total
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asset stock. I have chosen to use total corporate assets as the scaling variable partly
to maintain consistency with the cross-sectional results reported in the section below,
and partly because it seems more natural to measure corporate sources and uses of
funds relative to the size of the corporate sector, rather than relative to the size of
the economy as a whole. The same regressions using trend GDP rather than total
corporate assets to normalize the flows yield almost identical results.
The means and standard deviations of the four ratios for each period are shown
in Table 1.1. As the table shows, of the four ratios only payouts had a significantly
different average value in the two periods – 1.5 percent of total corporate assets
annually in 1952-1984, compared with 2.5 percent of total assets in 1984-2013. All
of the variables showed greater variance in the second period, but the difference
was largest for payouts, followed by borrowing. It may be surprising that corporate
borrowing was somewhat lower on average in the second period than in the first,
given the widely held view that this has been a period of rising private debt.12 The
statistical fact of no long-term increase in corporate borrowing can be reconciled
with the general perception in two ways. First, corporate borrowing has been much
more variable since the mid-1980s, with periods of high borrowing alternating with
periods of corporate deleveraging. (Each of the past three recessions saw at least
one quarter in which net corporate borrowing was negative, something that never
occurred between 1950 and 1990.) Second, the genuine rise in corporate debt –
measured either relative to assets or GDP – is sometimes mistaken for an increase
in corporate borrowing. In fact, the acceleration of corporate debt ratios after 1980
is the result of lower inflation, which implies a higher debt ratio for any given level
12If we normalize by trend GDP rather than by corporate assets, corporate borrowing is essentially
the same between the two periods – 2.6 percent of GDP annually in the first period, and 2.7 percent
of GDP in the second.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics, Nonfinancial Corporate Sources and Uses of Funds
Investment Payouts Borrowing Cashflow
Period 1: 1952 - 1984
Mean 5.6 1.5 1.7 6.8
St. Dev. 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4
Period 2: 1985 - 2013
Mean 5.0 2.5 1.5 6.1
St. Dev. 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.7
Source: Flow of Funds; author’s analysis. All flows are expressed as percentages of nonfi-
nancial corporate sector total assets. See text for variable definitions.
of borrowing.13 In any case, while the hypothesis proposed here does require the
observed increase in payout ratios, it does not imply any other change in the average
level of the variables. Rather, it predicts a change in their relationships – a weakening
of the association of investment with cashflow and borrowing, and a strengthening of
the association of payouts with cashflow and borrowing.
Like most macroeconomic variables, these flows show significant autocorrelation.
The hypothesis of white-noise residuals is rejected at the 0.0001 level for all four
variables. A Dickey-Fuller test rejects the hypothesis of a unit root at the 0.0001
level for borrowing and at the 0.018 level for payouts. But the test just fails to
reject a unit root for cashflow (p=0.056). And it clearly fails to reject a unit root for
investment, with p=0.31. So regressions using levels are not appropriate. I therefore
first-difference the variables.14 While the residuals are still not white noise with first-
differencing, the autocorrelation coefficients are all well below 1 and the Dickey-Fuller
test rejects a unit root at the 0.0001 level for all four variables.
Regressions results on the time-series data are reported in Table 1.2. These are
bivariate regressions of the year-over-year differences in each use on each source, all
13The similar behavior of household debt ratios is discussed in the second essay of this dissertation.
See also Mason and Jayadev (2014).
14In order to avoid introducing spurious correlations due to variation in the denominator, I take
the difference first and then divided by initial-period total assets.
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Table 1.2: Regression Results, Aggregate Investment, Payouts, Borrowing and Cash-
flow, US Nonfinancial Corporations
Regression 1952 - 1984 1985 - 2013
Coefficient r2 Coefficient r2
Investment on Borrowing 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.22
(0.03) (0.03)
Investment on Cashflow 0.48 0.28 0.22 0.07
(0.07) (0.08)
Payouts on Borrowing 0.16 0.17 0.49 0.30
(0.03) (0.07)
Payouts on Cashflow 0.25 0.09 0.78 0.11
(0.07) (0.21)
Source: Flow of Funds; author’s analysis. Note that quarterly FoF data begins in 1952.
The table reports the coefficient and r2 for bivariate regressions of the year-over-
year differences in the variables shown, for the US nonfarm nonfinancial corporate sector.
Observations are quarterly and seasonally adjusted. Investment is gross fixed investment.
Borrowing is net change in credit market liabilities. Cashflow is profits after tax plus
capital consumption allowance. Payouts is dividends minus net equity issues. All values
are normalized by total corporate assets. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The table shows that the relationship of investment with borrowing and cashflow
from operations has grown weaker since 1985, while the relationship of payouts to
shareholders with borrowing and cashflow from operations has grown stronger.
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normalized by total corporate assets. Since the left hand variable in each regression
is a use of funds and the right hand variable is a source of funds, one natural way
to interpret these results is as a description of the disposition of the marginal dollar
entering the corporate sector. The results may be interpreted as suggesting that in
the postwar decades, of each incremental dollar of income to the corporate sector,
nearly half went to fixed investment and only a quarter was paid out to shareholders.
Since 1985, those proportions have reversed, with 22 cents of each incremental dollar
of income invested and all the rest paid out to shareholders. Similarly, in the postwar
decade, of each additional dollar borrowed by the corporate sector, 20 cents were
spent on fixed investment and 16 cents were paid out to borrowers. But since 1980,
half of each additional dollar borrowed by the corporate sector has been been paid
out to shareholders, while only 15 cents have been invested.
These results are clearly consistent with our predictions. The relationships of
investment with both borrowing and especially cashflow is notably weaker in the
post-1985 period than before 1985. The coefficients of payouts on borrowing and
cashflow, on the other hand, are both much greater in the post-1985 period, as is the
share of variance explained by the payout-borrowing regression. For the nonfinancial
corporate sector as a whole, the hypothesis of a structural change in the financing
decision seems consistent with the data. Most importantly, it strongly appears that
in the aggregate, fixed investment is no longer the primary use of funds borrowed by
corporations, in the way that it was in earlier decades.
The prediction that is not borne out in the data is a larger change in the cor-
relations of investment with borrowing, than with cashflow. In fact, the relative
weakening in the cashflow-investment relationship is significantly greater than in the
borrowing-investment relationship. As will be seen in the next section, the same ex-
cess weakening of the cashflow-investment relationship is present in the cross-sectional
regressions. This suggests that some other factor, in addition to more assertive share-
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holders, is holding down investment relative to profits. Three natural alternatives are
chronically depressed demand, “the China price,” and the relative lack of major in-
novations in the past 30 years. Even firms with high current profits will not invest if
their existing capacity is underutilized. Nor will they invest if there is a high probabil-
ity that imports will render their capital uncompetitive before the end of its normal
life. Investment will also be depressed by a relative absence of major innovations
or other “epoch-making” shifts that devalue existing fixed capital while raising the
return on new investment. All these factors introduce a wedge between the marginal
profit rate on new capital, which is what firms try to estimate in making investment
decisions, and the average rate of profit on the existing capital stock, which is what
we see in the aggregate data. Investigating these alternatives is beyond the scope of
this paper. But none of them are inconsistent with the hypothesis advanced here,
and can be regarded as complementary to it.
1.5.2 Corporate Finance in the Great Recession
The most recent investment cycle offers particularly strong evidence for the rentier
dominance hypothesis.
During the Great Recession of 2008-2009, the US experienced a severe financial
crisis, involving record numbers of bank failures, the insolvency of major financial
institutions, seizing-up of interbank credit markets, and steep falls the value of many
classes of financial assets. Over the same period, there was a steep fall in business
investment, including a 25% fall in fixed investment in the nonfinancial corporate
sector.
It is natural to think these two phenomena were related: It is widely accepted by
policymakers and journalists as well as economists that the main factor in the steep
fall in business investment was the disruption in the financial system, which cut off
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the flow of credit to nonfinancial businesses and prevented them from financing new
investment.
The view that credit constraints are directly responsible for the steep fall and
slow recovery of business investment is essential to make sense of the crisis in terms
of New Keynesian theory, which is committed to the view that businesses know the
true, fundamentals-determined expected return on all investment projects, so only
time-varying financial frictions can explain the observed instability of investment.
But it is also a natural view for Post Keynesians, influenced by the the Minskyan
view that firms face an upward-sloping credit supply incorporating both borrower’s
and lender’s risk, which vary endogenously over business cycles. In Minsky’s “financial
theory of investment and investment theory of the business cycle,” shifts in the supply
of external funds must, on some level, be the drivers of booms and busts in business
investment.
There is no question that many businesses did face tighter credit conditions during
the Great Recession. Small, unincorporated businesses may have been especially
vulnerable to the tightening of bank lending standards. But for the corporate sector,
which accounts for 80 percent of business fixed investment, it is less obvious that credit
conditions are the binding constraint on investment, either during the recession or in
general. An argument that an adverse shift in the supply of external funds was the
main direct cause of the fall in corporate investment in the recession would, at least,
have to account for several anomalous facts.
1. The fall in investment occurred across the corporate sector, as opposed to be-
ing concentrated among firms with a higher probability of facing binding con-
straints. In particular, large firms, firms with investment-grade bond ratings,
and firms that entered the crisis with no debt, which should have been less af-
fected by tighter credit conditions, all reduced investment during the recession
by about as much as the corporate sector as a whole. (See Table 1.3.)
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2. As shown in Section 1.5.3, cashflow-investment sensitivity, a standard measure
of credit constraints, does not show any consistent increase during the recession,
either generally or relatively among firms more likely to face credit rationing.
Nor is there an absolute or relative strengthening of cashflow-investment sensi-
tivities during the early 1990s, the last period of severe financial distress.
3. At the same time they were reducing investment, corporations were increasing
cash holdings. Since the purpose of holding cash is to buffer expensive-to-adjust
spending flows, such as investment, against unexpected changes in cash income
or other expenses, we would expect firms to spend down cash reserves in re-
sponse to tighter credit conditions, before reducing investment. Yet during 2009,
when the steepest fall in investment occurred, corporations increased their cash
holdings by $470 billion. This is more than double the $230 billion reduction
in fixed investment in the same period. Cross-sectional evidence also does not
support the idea that firms were spending down cash to buffer against change
in fixed investment, as one would expect if those changes were compelled by
credit conditions. (Kahle and Stulz, 2010)
4. Corporate borrowing did fall steeply in 2008-2009, from about 6% of trend GDP
to −1%, after rising about the same amount over the previous five years. But
payouts to shareholders (i.e. dividends plus net share repurchases) followed
almost exactly the same pattern, rising by a bit over 6 points over 2003-2007
before falling by 6 points over 2008-2009. So the net funds flowing to corpo-
rations through the financial markets, for investment and other purposes, were
essentially flat over the whole cycle.
5. Measured as shares of trend GDP, corporate profits and corporate debt both
passed their pre-recession peaks in 2011. Business fixed investment, however,
has been practically flat through the recovery, and is still 15 percent below its
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Table 1.3: Percent Change in Investment, 2008-2009, US Corporations
Firm Type Count Aggregate Change Median Change
All 4,672 -22 -27
Large 466 -22 -11
High rated 726 -24 -22
Debtless 540 -31 -24
Source: Compustat; author’s analysis.
The table shows the percentage change in total capital expenditure in each class,
and for the median firm in the class, over the recession period of 2008-2009. Large firms
are the largest 10%, by total assets. High rated firms are those with investment-grade
bond ratings (Bbb- and better.) Debtless firms are those that report no debt in the three
years prior to the recession. These firms would be expected to see the least direct effects
from any tightening of credit constraints.
2007 peak. This is a notable departure from the close association of corporate
profits and corporate investment seen in earlier decades. It is also a challenge
for the view that the fall in business investment was mainly due to lack of
financing, i.e. to an unwillingness or inability of the financial system to hold
business liabilities.
None of these points is dispositive; and none speaks to the possibility that the
financial crisis was responsible for the fall in business investment indirectly, for in-
stance by cutting off credit to households, with businesses then cutting investment
spending in response to lower sales.15 But they are hard to reconcile with a story
in which changes in corporate investment are directly driven by shifts in the supply
of external funds. More broadly, they suggest that corporations’ investment and fi-
nancing decisions have changed in important ways since the postwar era described by
Minsky.
15It’s important to note that this channel, while plausible and possibly important , is incompati-
ble with the fundamental New Keynesian commitment to intertemporal equilibrium under rational
expectations. For a critique of this commitment, see Stiglitz (1993).
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This final point is illustrated in Figure 1.4, which plots corporate investment and
shareholder payouts against cashflow from operations and net borrowing respectively.
Again, all four flows are normalized by the total asset stock. (This is the same data
as presented in Table 1.2, but here in levels rather than differences.) Here the series
are broken into three periods: 1952 to 1984, as in the rest of the paper; 1985 to the
business-cycle trough in 2001; and 2002 to 2013. The upper two panels of Figure 1.4
show that the strong relationship between corporate sources of funds and investment
in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s: the points of the scatters fall clearly along
an upward-sloping diagonal, indicating that periods of high corporate earnings and
high corporate borrowing were consistently also periods of high corporate investment.
The time-series relationship between investment and the two sources of funds is still
present, though weaker, in the 1985-2001 period. But in the most recent business
cycle and recovery, the correlations appear to have vanished entirely. The rise, fall
and recovery of corporate cashflow over the past dozen years is not associated with
any similar shifts in corporate investment. Similarly, the very large swings in credit
flows to the corporate sector do not correspond to any similar shifts in aggregate
investment. Conversely, as shown in the lower two panels of Figure 1.4, there appears
to be only a weak relationship between shareholder payouts and the two sources of
funds in the earlier period. Annual net payments to shareholders are stable at between
1 and 2 percent of corporate assets, regardless of whether cashflow from operations
and borrowing are high or low in that quarter. In the most recent period, by contrast,
payouts to shareholders vary much more, and appear more strongly associated with
variation in cashflow and borrowing. 1985-2001 is intermediate between the two.
Because of strong serial correlation in the data, these plots must be interpreted
with care. The regression coefficients reported in Table 1.2 are a more reliable guide
to the change in relationships. But the plots do give visual confirmation of the shift
and a sense of its magnitude. Note that from the plots, it would appear that the
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change in payout behavior came first, and investment behavior changed second, only
after the 2001 recession. (In the upper two panels of Figure 1.4, the black squares lie
more or less in line with the blue circles, while the red triangles have a much flatter
distribution. In the lower two panels, the black squares lie closer to the triangles.)
As we will see in the next section, this particular sequencing is not supported in the
firm-level data, where investment shows a sharp transition in the early 1980s, but
payouts do not. This difference may reflect inconsistencies between the two data
sources. For example, the fact that cash acquisitions show up as shareholder payouts
in the aggregate data but not in the firm level data mean that takeover wave of the
1980s boosts the payout correlations for the middle period here, but not in the firm-
level regressions. The difference may also reflect the fact these plots reflect variation
over time, while the regressions in the next section look at variation across firms. It is
not implausible that these two kinds of variation might behave differently. These are
important issues, to which it will be worth returning in the future. But they do not
affect the basic agreement between the time-series and firm-level analysis on the larger
shift after the early 1980s: toward a weaker relationship between investment and
borrowing and cashflow from earnings, and a stronger relationship between payouts
to share holders and those two flows.
1.5.3 Cross-Sectional Data
Next, I investigate the same predictions using firm-level data from Compustat.
While the underlying hypothesis is the same here as in the time-series tests, the
source of variation is entirely different. Instead of looking at the joint distribution
of investment, shareholder payouts, borrowing and cashflow from operations across
periods, I now look at it across firms in a given period. While my analysis makes
similar predictions in both cases – with certain differences discussed below – there is
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Figure 1.4: Corporate Sources and Uses of Funds, 1952-2014
(a) Investment and Cashflow (b) Investment and Borrowing
(c) Shareholder Payouts and Cashflow (d) Shareholder Payouts and Borrowing
Source: Flow of Funds. The figure shows aggregate quarterly fixed investment spending
and cashflow from operations for US nonfinancial corporations, at annual rates, normalized
by the sector’s total assets. See text for variable definitions. The small circles show 1951Q4
through 1984Q4; the boxes show 1985Q1 through 2001Q3; and the triangles show 2001Q4
through 2014Q1.
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no reason that variation across firms should look anything like variation over time.
So the two sets of results constitute independent tests of my hypothesis.
An important challenge in moving from aggregate for firm-level data is the ex-
tremely skewed distribution of firms. The majority of publicly traded firms are rela-
tively small, but aggregate activity is dominated by the largest firms. The largest 25
percent of firms in the Compustat database for each year typically account for over
90 percent of total assets, investment, borrowing and shareholder payouts, while the
smallest 25 percent account for 1 percent or less. This is not just a question of size:
small firms are systematically less likely to participate in the transactions of interest
here. If we divide firms into size classes by assets for each year, a large majority of
the smallest 25 percent for each year report no payouts to shareholders, and a major-
ity report no credit market borrowing. A significant minority (around 10 percent in
recent years) also report no capital expenditure. By contrast, large majorities of the
largest 25 percent engage in credit-market borrowing and shareholder payouts each
year, and the overwhelming majority (over 99 percent in most years) report some
capital expenditure. So treating large and small firms as independent observations of
the same underlying data-generating process seems treacherous. And to the extent
that there are different relationships between the four flows in small and in large
flows, it is relationships at the large firms that matter for aggregate outcomes.
Furthermore, there are good prior reasons to think large firms are the relevant ones
for my hypothesis. The shareholder value revolution was very much focused on the
largest corporations, where the separation of ownership and control and the autonomy
of management had been most fully developed. Smaller firms are more likely to be
closely held, with less professional management in the first period and less pressure
from external shareholders in the later one. In addition, a large majority of smaller
firms never report positive profits, even in boom years. Others will be rapidly growing
young firms, with strong investment demand. In both these cases, there will not be
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any excess cash to disgorge. Large, mature firms are more likely to have high supplies
of funds relative to demand, which they will have come under pressure to pay out. In
general, the story of the shift away from managerialism is generally focused on the
largest firms.
Finally, as shown in Table 1.4, small firms have greater variance for all four vari-
ables, especially cashflow. In the majority of years, the standard deviation of cashflow
for the smallest quarter of firms is over 10 times the standard deviation for the largest
quarter. This means that if all firms are included in the regression, observations of
small firms will dominate the results. Yet these are the least relevant observations,
both for macroeconomic outcomes and for our hypothesis. It is therefore essential
that we limit our sample to larger firms if we wish to get economically meaningful
results. Accordingly, we limit the sample to the largest quarter of firms from each
year. To the extent that the underlying process are the same among large and small
firms, this will not affect our analysis (except by reducing sample size). To the extent
that the underlying processes are different, the process affecting large firms is the one
we are interested in, both because larger firms are most relevant for the question of
interest here and because large firms dominate macroeconomic outcomes.
Investment is capital expenditure, payouts are total dividends plus stock repur-
chases, net borrowing is the year-over-year change in debt, and cashflow is income
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization.16 All variables are
normalized by firm total assets, and then winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The
sample is limited to the largest 25% of firms, by assets, for each year.
The cross-sectional results are reported in Figures 1.5 through 1.8. These are OLS
regressions of investment and payouts, respectively, on borrowing and cashflow, one
regression for each year. The central line shows the estimated coefficient on each of
16In an alternative specification, I treat research and development as investment, which means
also adding R&D expenditures to cashflow. The results are qualitatively similar.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive Statistics, Firm-Level Data
Investment Payouts Cashflow Borrowing
Period 1: 1952-1984
Large Firms
Mean 8.4 3.0 9.4 2.7
Std. Dev. 6.1 2.1 4.5 6.9
Other Firms
Mean 7.8 2.3 8.5 2.0
Std. Dev. 7.5 2.8 11.5 10.8
Period 2: 1985-2013
Large Firms
Mean 6.4 3.3 7.7 2.0
Std. Dev. 5.5 4.6 8.2 11.0
Other Firms
Mean 6.1 2.2 -4.4 1.2
Std. Dev. 7.2 5.1 48.0 17.8
Source: Compustat, author’s analysis.
Large firms are the top 25% by assets for each year. Other firms are the remaining 75%.
Figures reported are averages of annual averages for each period.
the two right hand side variables. The crosses show a range of two standard errors
above and below the point estimate. Share repurchases are reported only on cashflow
statements, which are not included in Compustat for years before the early 1970s. So
the payout regressions begin in 1973.
These are the key results for the essay’s argument.
As Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show, firm-level variation in investment also suggests a
regime shift in the mid-1980s, consistent with the aggregate variation over time
described in Section 1.5.1. For investment and borrowing, the coefficient averages
around 0.3 for the pre-1985 period, and less than 0.1 in the later period. There is a
sharply defined transition between the two periods and, as can be seen from the confi-
dence intervals, this change in the relationship between the two variables would easily
pass conventional tests of significance. Again, the argument here does not depend
on which way causality runs between investment and borrowing. In the managerial
model of the financing decision, an increase in the supply of funds from the credit
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Figure 1.5: Coefficients and 95% Confidence Interval, Regressions of Investment on
Borrowing
The figure shows the coefficient on borrowing of annual regressions of capital expenditure
on borrowing and cashflow for the largest 25% of nonfinancial corporations by assets, as
reported in Compustat. Variables are normalized by total assets. The crosses show two
standard errors above and below the estimated coefficient.
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Figure 1.6: Coefficients and 95% Confidence Interval, Regressions of Investment on
Cashflow
The figure shows the coefficient on cashflow of annual regressions of capital expenditure
on borrowing and cashflow for the largest 25% of nonfinancial corporations by assets, as
reported in Compustat. Variables are normalized by total assets. The crosses show two
standard errors above and below the estimated coefficient.
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market leads to higher investment, and an increase in investment demand leads to
greater borrowing. So we do not need to worry about isolating exogenous variation in
the independent variable. All that matters is the existence of a strong link between
the two flows in the earlier period and a weaker one in in the later period.
For cashflow and investment, there is also a clear transition in the early 1980s from
a stronger to a weaker relationship, with coefficients averaging 0.4 before 1985 and
0.15 in the later period. Not surprisingly, the relationship is especially weak during
the tech boom years of the late 1990s. The relationship also disappears during 2009,
when the bulk of the most recent fall in investment occurred. This is a problematic
fact for the view that credit constraints were a major factor reducing investment in
the Great Recession, since stronger credit constraints should be associated with a
stronger investment-cashflow sensitivity. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000)
The large decline in investment-cashflow and investment-borrowing sensitivities
after the early 1980s is robust across a range of alternative specifications. When I
consider all firms rather than just large firms, in fact, these relationships simply don’t
exist after the mid-1980s. The weakening or disappearance of the link between in-
vestment and firms’ two main sources of funds is an important macroeconomic shift;
it creates problems in particular for accounts of investment fluctuations that depend
on the direct effects of credit constraints on business investment.(Credit conditions
could still be important indirectly, via changes in households’ ability to finance con-
sumption or residential investment.) In the absence of a strong relationship across
firms between investment and sources of financing, it may be challenging to translate
the “financial theory of investment” that fit the world before the 1980s into terms
that describe today’s corporate sector.
Turning to shareholder payouts, while there is only a decade of data from the early
period, there is still evidence of a regime change. For payouts and borrowing, there is
a clear strengthening of the relationship over time: The coefficient is not significantly
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Figure 1.7: Coefficients and 95% Confidence Interval, Regressions of Payout on Bor-
rowing
The figure shows the coefficient on net borrowing of annual regressions of shareholder pay-
outs on borrowing and cashflow for the largest 25% of nonfinancial corporations by assets,
as reported in Compustat. Payouts are defined as total dividends plus share repurchases.
Variables are normalized by total assets. The crosses show two standard errors above and
below the estimated coefficient.
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Figure 1.8: Coefficients and 95% Confidence Interval, Regressions of Payout on Cash-
flow
The figure shows the coefficient on cashflow of annual regressions of payouts to shareholder
on new borrowing and cashflow from operations for the largest 25% of nonfinancial corpo-
rations by assets, as reported in Compustat. Variables are normalized by total assets. The
crosses show two standard errors above and below the estimated coefficient.
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greater than zero for any year before 1985, but is significantly greater than zero for
two-thirds of the years after 1985.The average coefficient value is very close to zero
for the pre-1985 period, and around 0.05 in the later period. In the 2000s it reaches
0.1. The relationship also shows a cyclical pattern, weakening in 1994 (after the end
of the official recession, but while corporate borrowing was still falling), in 2001, and
in 2008.
For payouts and cashflow, there is little evidence of a secularly strengthening rela-
tionship, but we do see increasingly large cyclical variation in it. The most dramatic
feature of Figure 1.8 is how much the cashflow-payout relationship weakens in each of
the last two recessions, and how much it strengthens in each following recovery. This
strongly cyclical behavior is exactly as predicted with our hypothesis. Recall that in
Figure 1.2, variation in internal funds (i.e. horizontal shifts in the supply of funds
curve) only generates variation in payouts when the supply of funds curve crosses the
ROC to the right of the demand for funds curve. When profits and borrowing capac-
ity are low, it is more likely that the supply of funds curve will cross the demand for
funds curve above the ROC. In this case, there will be no correlation between internal
funds and payouts. Put another way, the Jensenian injunction to ”disgorge the cash”
applies only to funds in excess of the firm’s (rentier-approved) requirements. Given
that firms’ financing needs do not vary too much over the cycle, a much larger share
of funds will be excess in the boom than in the slump. So the boom is when we
should expect to see the strongest relationship between cashflow and payouts.
Another view of the changing relationship between sources and uses of funds across
firms is shown in Table 1.5. Here I have used the average value of each flow over the
previous three years, instead of just one, for 1960, 1975 and 2005. These results
can be seen as snapshots of the financing decision across firms before and after the
shareholder value revolution.
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Table 1.5: Firm-Level Regression Results, Selected Years
Coefficient
Dependent Variable Borrowing Cashflow r2
1960
Investment 0.76 0.48 0.27
(0.09) (0.07)
1975
Investment 0.44 0.35 0.22
(0.03) (0.03)
Payout -0.02 0.16 0.19
(0.01) (0.01)
2005
Investment 0.06 0.20 0.08
(0.02) (0.02)
Payout 0.13 0.40 0.25
(0.02) (0.02)
2010
Investment 0.11 0.19 0.07
(0.02) (0.02)
Payout 0.11 0.36 0.22
(0.02) (0.02)
The table shows the results of cross-sectional regressions of gross fixed investment and cor-
porate payouts (dividends plus net share repurchases) on borrowing and cashflow (income
before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and amortization.) All variables are normal-
ized by the total asset stock. Standard errors in parentheses. Because stock repurchase
data only begins in 1972, payouts are not reported for 1960.
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As Table 1.5 shows, in the early period, knowing the size of the main flows of funds
into a firm is sufficient to predict is level of investment with a reasonable degree of
precision. When we look across the large corporations in a given year, we can say
with confidence that the ones that are borrowing much more than average, are also
investing much more than average. Similarly, we can confidently say that investment
is concentrated at the firms with the largest flows from operations. Crudely, it appears
that 50-75 cents of each dollar of additional borrowing goes to investment, and 35-50
cents of each additional dollar of cashflow. Shareholder payouts, by contrast, are
unrelated to borrowing. This is not surprising – in standard models of corporate
investment, a given firm is either borrowing or making payouts to shareholders, but
never both at once. And while payouts are also higher at firms with high cashflow,
the link is noticeably weaker than the cashflow-investment link. So a story in which
investment is the most important use for additional funds available to the firm, and
conversely where the availability of funds is a major constraint on investment, is
broadly consistent with the data.
In the later period, there is very little joint variation of investment with cashflow
and borrowing. Unlike in 1960 or 1975 that a firm’s recent earnings and borrowing are
unusually high does not allow us to predict with much confidence that its investment
will also be high. On the other hand, there is now a clear relationship between
sources of cash and payouts to shareholders. In particular, there is a large, positive
relationship between borrowing and payouts, which did not exist at all in the earlier
period. So the statement that “firms borrow to fund investment” was a reasonable
shorthand description of the financing decisions of large corporations in the 1950s,
1960s, or 1970s. But today, it would be more accurate to say,“firms borrow to increase
payouts to shareholders.”
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1.6 Conclusions
This paper argues that the increasing power of rentiers over corporate management
since the 1980s has important macroeconomic implications. The new pressure on
corporations to payout “free cashflow” to shareholders reduces fixed investment in
absolute terms, but also makes it less sensitive to changes in financing conditions,
since for most large corporations fixed investment is no longer the marginal use of
funds. In the simple picture presented in Section 1.4, under managerialism the firm
financing decision took the form of adjustment along a single margin – investment
demand against the effective marginal cost of external funds. In the rentier-dominated
firm, by contrast, when investment demand is not too high relative to the supply of
funds, the decision takes the form of independent adjustment on two separate margins,
investment and borrowing respectively against rentiers’ opportunity cost for leaving
funds in the firm. In the latter case, since the main immediate effect of a fall in
cashflow from operations or in credit availability is to reduce payouts to shareholders,
fixed investment is in effect buffered or insulated against changes in credit conditions.
One important implication of this argument is that it is hard to explain the large
fall in corporate investment in 2008-2009 as the direct effect of the disruptions in
credit markets as a result of the financial crisis. But in a world where managers
know the true expected return on investment projects, and where demand-driven
fluctuations do not affect the economy’s long-run growth path, the current level of
economic activity should not have a large effect on fixed investment in the absence of
changing credit constraints. So to sustain the New Keynesian account of the recession,
it is essential that the large fall in business investment be directly attributable to a
lack of credit. (Hall, 2010)
If we reject the idea of credit constraints as the main proximate cause of the fall
in corporate investment in 2008-2009 (and in previous recessions), some other story
is needed. A natural alternative is the idea of inherently unstable demand dynamics,
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along the lines of the multiplier-accelerator models of cycles developed by the first
generation of Keynesian economists. (Harrod, 1939; Kaldor, 1940) If income adjust-
ments dominate price adjustments, then multiple and unstable equilibria are possible
and we do not need credit constraints to explain investment fluctuations. Fazzari
et al. (2013) is an interesting recent example of this type of model. An advantage
of this approach is that it naturally accommodates the case – not really possible in
the New Keynesian framework – where tighter credit constraints restrain spending by
households and small businesses, and the resulting fall in aggregate demand leads to
reduced investment by unconstrained larger firms, perhaps in a self-reinforcing spiral.
A second alternative is to try to explain investment fluctuations in terms of variations
in the rate of profit. While aggregate profitability is given a relatively minor place
in contemporary macroeconomics, it was a central concern for classical economists.
And it may matter even in the absence of binding financing constraints, since profit
rates affect investment demand as well as the supply of funds. (Glyn, 1997) Attempts
to analyze US business cycles in terms of cyclical fluctuations in the profit rate go
back to Sherman (1979) and Weisskopf (1979); a more recent example is Kotz (2011).
Evaluating the merits of these approaches is beyond the scope of this paper. But if it
is true that credit constraints have become relatively unimportant for investment at
large corporations, then presumably some mix of aggregate-demand and profit-rate
stories will be needed to explain its continued large cyclical swings.
Another implication is that policy interventions that imply raise the aggregate
lending capacity of the financial system may be ineffective at increasing business
investment. The results here suggest that even if measures to strengthen bank balance
sheets (or, as the banks would prefer, regulatory forebearance) did ease the terms on
which corporations could borrow, the majority of the additional funds flowing into
the corporate sector would simply flow out again to shareholders. Both conventional
monetary policy and quantitative easing and related policies target only the terms
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on which financial institutions can fund themselves. This analysis suggests that to
effectively boost demand, policy interventions would instead have to reach further
down the intermediation chain, channeling credit specifically to the smaller borrowers
who may still face binding credit constraints. In other words, monetary policy would
have to be supplemented or replaced with “credit market policy.” (Pollin et al., 2011)
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CHAPTER 2
THE DYNAMICS OF HOUSEHOLD DEBT IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1929-2011
2.1 Introduction
In the wake of the Great Recession there has been a renewal of interest in changes
in the ratio of debt to income and net worth, for private as well as public borrow-
ers. This is not surprising, given that the implications of leverage for macroeconomic
performance are most dramatically evident in periods of financial distress. In most
discussion of changes in leverage, it is assumed that these changes are driven primarily
by changes in borrowing behavior. The starting point of this paper is the observation
that this is not necessarily the case. When there are existing large stocks of debt,
changes in income growth and inflation and nominal interest rates affect the evolu-
tion of debt-income ratios independently of the decisions of lenders and borrowers. In
other words, while we typically assume that interest rates, growth rates, and other pa-
rameters facing economic units are stable enough that the debt stock can be assumed
to be fully adjusted to those parameters, in reality economic units face changes in
these parameters with large stocks of debt incurred in previous periods. This means
that the debt-income ratio cannot always be represented as an equilibrium.
An important early attempt to link these debt dynamics to macroeconomic out-
comes was Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory of depressions. (Fisher, 1933) The
key dynamic in that analysis was that (1) even as households reduced borrowing dur-
ing the crisis, falling prices and incomes led to rising debt burdens. (2) Rising debt
ratios led to cutbacks in expenditure, reducing incomes further and – via bank fail-
ures and general disruptions in the financial system – (3) putting downward pressure
79
on the price level. (4) The fall in incomes, asset values and prices implied higher
leverage, forcing households and businesses to attempt further expenditure cuts, in a
self-reinforcing cycle.
I offer a more general account of step one in that process: a change in leverage
resulting from a change in growth, inflation/deflation, and/or interest rates. This
paper is primarily an exercise in accounting. The main positive claim is that we
must distinguish changes in household debt-income ratios from household borrowing;
periods of rising debt-income ratios need not be periods of higher borrowing, and
historically often have not been. The focus here is on household debt to income
ratios (as opposed to public or business leverage). I argue that “Fisher dynamics”
– understood as the mechanical effects of changes in these three variables on debt-
income ratios independent of borrowing behavior – are an important but largely
neglected factor in more recent changes in leverage of the household sector as well.
I suggest that since it is universally agreed that the rise in household debt-income
ratios between 1929 and 1933 was not chosen by households, but was the result of
unanticipated income declines and deflation, later changes in debt-income ratios might
in principle be explained in similar terms. In particular, the 1980s can be understood
as a slow-motion debt deflation (or debt-disinflation), with the combination of slower
nominal income growth and higher interest rates producing rising debt-income ratios
despite a substantial fall in household spending relative to income. This suggests a
very different understanding of the post-1980 increase in household debt (until the
housing boom of the first half of the 2000s), in which there was no increase in desired
borrowing. Rather, higher nominal interest rates and then disinflation raised the
growth rate of debt at any given level of borrowing; while households did reduce new
borrowing after 1980, they did not do so fast enough to offset these dynamic effects.
The fact that the period between 1980 and 1998 saw an increase in household
leverage despite a substantial reduction in household borrowing, suggests that house-
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hold debt increases between 1980 and 1998 were not the result of an increase in
household credit demand, nor of a failure of households to respond appropriately to
higher interest rate, but rather to the impact of what I am calling Fisher dynam-
ics. From 1999 to 2006, there was indeed a substantial increase in new borrowing by
households. But even in this period, about a third of the rise in leverage arose from
the fact that real interest rate growth on the existing stock of debt was higher than
real income growth for households during this period. Finally, in the period from
2007 and 2011, household borrowing turned sharply negative; despite this, there was
little reduction in leverage ratios since income growth again was low compared to real
interest rates.
Along with ?, this essay appears to be the first complete decomposition of histor-
ical changes in the debt-income ratio for the household sector.1 But the methodology
is familiar for public debt. It is well-known that changes in the ratio of public debt
to GDP can be decomposed changes into the primary balance (i.e new borrowing),
the real growth rate, the nominal interest rate, and inflation as independent deter-
minants of public leverage. (Escolano, 2010) The primary goal of this paper is to
shed light on the causes and consequences of the increase in household leverage after
1980; a secondary goal is to make the case for accounting decompositions as an em-
pirical methodology. This methodology is particularly appropriate for the Keynesian
paradigm, oriented as that is toward the evolution of macroeconomic variables in
historical time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I begin with a consideration
of the renewed focus on private debt as a key macroeconomic variable. I then discuss
the value of focusing on debt levels as opposed to net wealth. The sections that
follow describe the accounting procedure used to model Fisher dynamics, and the
1Barba and Pivetti (2009) describes such a decomposition, but does not carry it out.
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data sources I use for the task. I move then to a description of the evolution of U.S
household debt over the period 1929-2011, suggesting a division into distinct periods
where Fisher dynamics and borrowing behavior respectively have had very different
impacts on overall leverage. I also note the very large fraction of recent deleverag-
ing accounted for by defaults, which has received little attention in either scholarly
or policy-oriented work, and suggest that in the absence of a substantial fall in in-
terest rates and/or rise in inflation, additional write-offs are the most realistic path
to further household deleveraging. I then compare my account to some alternative
explanations of the rise in household debt, and clarify the behavioral assumptions
needed to convert my accounting results into a causal story. Finally, I provide some
simple counterfactual simulations to underline the importance of debt dynamics.
2.2 Motivation
2.2.1 Accounting and History
In examining leverage trends, one is often concerned with the ratio of outstanding
debt to some measure of the capacity to repay debt, typically income. In this paper
we use a measure of income that reflects household’s ability to repay debt, which we
describe more fully later. Using this measure, during the 1960s and 1970s, the ratio
of debt to income for the US household sector was roughly constant. In 1983, the
ratio stood at around 75 percent, the same as 20 years earlier. Then between 1983
and 2008, the ratio doubled, to over 160 percent. Why did household leverage rise
so sharply after 1983, after being stable for the previous 20 years? And what were
the macroeconomic implications of this rise in household debt ratios? Did the rise
in household debt help sustain aggregate demand, in the face of other factors that
tended to hold down demand after 1980?
Any attempt to answer these questions using macroeconomic data must use an
appropriate accounting framework. It is normal to discuss both the evolution of
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household debt and aggregate demand in terms of household savings behavior. The
savings concept in national accounts, however, is not appropriate for either of those
purposes. Savings in the national accounts includes all spending that is not directed
toward current consumption, with mortgage interest payments included in consump-
tion. Dissaving in this concept does not correspond to credit-market borrowing.
While it is natural to suppose that the rise in household debt after 1980 is connected
with the similarly-timed fall in personal savings, in fact there is no direct connection
between the two trends.
At the outset, it is useful to have a sense of the overall trends in leverage in the
economy. Figure 2.1, drawn from the Flow of Funds, shows private and public debt
to GDP ratios for the three main nonfinancial sectors since 1929.2 GDP is used as
the denominator for all three series in order to allow comparisons of the magnitude
of the different sectors’ debt. The first notable feature is the large swings in leverage
in the early period. The large increases in household and business debt relative to
GDP between 1929 and 1933 are especially striking since the nominal value of debt
fell substantially for both of those sectors. The leverage increases during this period
are entirely due to the fall in nominal GDP, which in turn is due in about equal parts
to deflation and the fall in real output. This is a stark reminder that changes in
leverage ratios depend on the behavior of the denominator as well as the numerator.
The second notable feature is the very large increase in federal debt during World
War II; by comparison, the recent increases are relatively modest departures from the
long-run average. Third, in more recent decades we see a long-term upward trend in
overall debt to GDP ratios. Between 1950 and 1980, the ratio of total nonfinancial
debt to GDP was quite stable around 1.3, but over the past three decades it has nearly
2The pre-1950 figures of business debt are from Goldsmith (1955), which gives figures only for
selected years. Since Goldsmith does not provide a category strictly equivalent to credit market
liabilities as reported in the Flow of Funds, I use the sum of payables to financial intermediaries,
mortgages, and bonds.
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doubled, to around 2.5. This trend is common to most OECD countries (Cecchetti
and Zampolli, 2010). Fourth, looking at this same period, while the rise in public debt
is responsible for the largest part of the most increase in leverage over the past five
years, over the longer term increases in business and, especially, household debt have
been more important. Only about a third of the total increase in leverage since 1980
is accounted for by federal borrowing. Fifth, both household debt and nonfinancial
business debt have consistently exceeded public sector debt since the mid 1960s. And
sixth, while in some periods the private and public balances show roughly offsetting
movements (1950-1980, 2008-2010), in others they move roughly together. In the
1980s and 2000s, there are significant increases in all three sectors’ leverage.3 As a
whole, Figure 1 suggests that policymakers have good reason to be concerned with
rising leverage; but also suggests that private leverage should be at least as much a
focus of discussion as public leverage.
2.2.2 The Significance of Private Leverage
Leverage is normally defined as the ratio of debt to either income or net worth; in
this paper, I use the ratio of debt to income. Traditionally, economists have attributed
only a minor role to leverage in the determination of macroeconomic outcomes. Con-
ventional economic analysis had suggested that consumption choices depend on debt
only to the extent that debt affects household net wealth. (Benito and Zampolli,
2007). While a minority of economists going back at least to Fisher have seen lever-
age as an important factor constraining aggregate demand, the predominant view, at
3While it is true that net borrowing must sum to zero across sectors, there is no such adding-up
constraint on gross debt. Increases (decreases) in inflation or income growth rates will lower (raise)
leverage for all sectors simultaneously. Changes in asset positions also can cause one sector’s debt
to change without an offsetting change elsewhere. Increased debt across domestic sectors taken as
a whole can also reflect borrowing from the rest of the world. However, there was no increase in
the gross stock of foreign-owned assets in the United States (measured as a share of GDP) prior to
1990, so at least the first two decades of rising aggregate leverage do not appear to reflect borrowing
from abroad.
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Figure 2.1: Nonfinancial Leverage, 1929-2011.
The lines show the gross nominal debt of the three domestic nonfinancial sectors relative
to nominal GDP. For nonfinancial businesses, pre-1945 data is taken from Goldsmith
(1955), which includes estimates only for selected years.
least until the last few years, was well summarized by Bernanke (2000, p. 215): since
one unit’s liability is another unit’s asset, changes in leverage
represent no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors)
to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal
spending propensities among the groups... pure redistributions should
have no significant macroeconomic effects.
For governments, which are assumed to not have substantial asset positions, gross debt
has long been seen as a central variable.4 But for households and private businesses
it has not generally been considered of first-order importance.
In the wake of the Great Recession, however, there has been a renewed interest
in private leverage, both among macroeconomic theorists and policymakers. Recent
theoretical and empirical work has sought to show that the accumulation of debt
4See Arestis and Sawyer (2009) for a criticism of the usual assumption that the public sector
lacks significant assets.
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in the household sector, and the subsequent behavioral adjustment of heterogeneous
households to shocks in household balance sheets, might be seen to be the key fac-
tor in the prolonged state of depressed demand observed currently in the U.S. and
elsewhere. (Hall, 2011a,b; Eggertson and Krugman, 2010; Guererri and Lorenzoni,
2011; Philippon and Midrigan, 2011) Similar arguments have been made for the Great
Depression (Olney, 1999; Mishkin, 1978) and for the Japanese “lost decades.” (Koo,
2008) In these more recent macroeconomic models, heavily indebted households cut
back consumption in the face of a sudden shock to assets (such as a fall in house val-
ues), but less indebted households do not increase consumption in similar proportion
for various reasons (financial frictions, zero lower bounds), thereby causing a reces-
sion that cannot easily be remedied by traditional monetary policy. Mian, Rao and
Sufi (2011) provide strong empirical evidence on the importance of gross liabilities,
particularly household debt accumulated in the mid 2000s, in depressing consumption
and contributing to the recession of 2007-2009. These papers suggest reasons to care
about the level and distribution of gross private sector debt independent of the net
position of the sector, and offer theoretical justification for a focus on the process of
household leveraging and deleveraging.
A focus on leverage is motivated by the idea that the relationship between current
income and cash commitments matters. In emphasizing the ratio of liabilities to
income, I am following the work of Hyman Minsky:
The fundamental speculative decision of a capitalist economy centers
around how much, of the anticipated cash flow from normal operations, a
firm, household, or financial institution pledges for the payment of interest
and principal on liabilities. (Minsky, 1975, p. 84)
The importance of gross liabilities becomes obvious in periods of financial distress,
when the ability to meet cash commitments through asset sales or emission of new
liabilities may be limited, and a significant fraction of units face difficulties in servicing
their debt. A focus on net wealth by contrast assumes (implicitly or explicitly) that
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assets are always liquid, and can be mobilized (either through sale or as collateral)
to meet debt obligations. But assets cannot always be reliably converted to means
of payment, either because their market value fluctuates, because they are inherently
illiquid, or because they become so in a crisis. Thus leverage, as opposed to net
wealth, matters mainly in the context of liquidity constraints. If units’ assets are not
reliable sources for either funding or market liquidity, then the capacity to service debt
out of current income becomes paramount. (Tirole, 2011) These are the conditions
in which leverage matters.
The need to reduce leverage following a financial crisis may be a large part of
the reason why recovery from such crises has been so slow historically. Because debt
is a stock, its adjustment must take place over time; an economic unit targeting
a substantially lower level of leverage will typically seek to reduce its consumption
relative to its income over a number of periods, producing an ongoing drag on ag-
gregate demand. Unlike other factors depressing output whose effects should not be
expected to persist once the initial cause is removed, a crisis that results in many
units finding themselves with leverage levels that are seen to be “too high” may lead
to a long period of depressed output even after the initial crisis is resolved. Indeed a
key finding of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is that deleveraging recessions are almost
always longer and more painful than others. Put another way, the debt built up in
bubbles, beyond the fluctuations of asset prices themselves, is a major component of
the macroeconomic costs of asset bubbles.
This factor might help explain why the macroeconomic effects of the housing
bubble were so much more severe than those of the dot-com bubble, even though
the loss of wealth at the end of the two bubbles was very similar. The fall in the
value of corporate equity owned by households over 2000-2002 equalled 61 percent of
GDP, compared with 62 percent of GDP for the fall in housing wealth from 2006 to
the present (from Flow of Funds). The idea that debt contributed to the difference
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between the two episodes has been emphasized by policy makers. For example, Joseph
Gagnon:
The harm of a bubble arises almost entirely if it is leveraged. ... The
tech bubble wasn’t leveraged, and when it burst it had little effect. The
housing bubble was leveraged, and it had a major effect. (Gagnon, 2011)
Similarly, Alan Greenspan:
I very much doubt that in September 2008, had financial assets been
funded predominately by equity instead of debt, that the deflation of asset
prices would have fostered a default contagion much beyond that of the
dotcom boom. (Greenspan, 2010)
2.3 Debt Dynamics
Discussions of leverage typically focus on the saving and expenditure decisions of
individual units. It is sometimes insufficiently recognized that such changes in bor-
rowing behavior are only one of several ways in which leverage levels can change.5 It
is true that changes in sectors’ net savings can be important drivers of (de)leveraging
episodes. But in the presence of existing stocks of debt, changes in behavior are not
the whole story; changes in interest rates, growth rates and inflation also play an
important role in the evolution of leverage over time.
To understand the evolution of private-sector leverage over time, I adopt the
accounting framework long used to understand the evolution of public debt. This
framework differs in two essential ways from the standard conventions used for pri-
vate units. First, it focuses on gross liabilities, rather than net wealth. (i.e. rather
than netting out asset purchases from borrowing, it treats them as current expen-
diture.)6 Second, it focuses on the primary balance, or borrowing net of interest
5For example, a recent paper on the causes of“The Rise in U.S. Household Indebtedness” begins
with the sentence, “During the past several decades in the United States, significant changes have
occurred in household saving and borrowing behavior,” without any acknowledgement that this
represents a significant narrowing of the question posed by the title. (Dynan and Kohn, 2009)
6Both Peter Skott and Perry Mehrling responded to early drafts of this paper by suggesting that
a better way of capturing the argument would be to focus on asset-liability mismatch. That is,
88
payments. This framework is clearly not appropriate for all discussions of household
sector financial positions, but it is to the extent that we are interested specifically in
the evolution of the ratio of liabilities to income.7 The primary surplus is related to
conventional savings as follows:
savings = primary surplus + tangible investment + net acquisition of financial assets
- interest payments
This convention allows us to make use of “the least controversial equation in
macroeconomics” (Hall and Sargent, 2011, p. 2), the law of motion of government
debt:
bt+1 = dt + (
1 + i
1 + g + pi
)bt
∆bt = bt+1 − bt = dt + ( i− g − pi
1 + g + pi
)bt (2.1)
in principle one should neither net assets from liabilities completely, as in the conventional savings
measure, nor not at all, as in my primary-balance measure, but partially, to the extent that they
can be readily sold or hypothecated to meet immediate cash commitments. While I agree that,
conceptually, this might be a superior approach, the practical difficulties in assessing the degree
of liquidity of various household assets are formidable. To the extent that the Skott-Mehrling
approach is the ideal one, the primary balance can be seen, in combination with the conventional
savings measure, as bracketing the household sector’s true liquidity position.
7Whether the primary balance or the conventional savings measure is more appropriate depends
on the question we are asking. If we are concerned about saving because we think that is what
releases real resources for investment, then whether saving takes the form of reducing liabilities or
increasing financial assets makes no difference. A household that reduces its borrowing by 1 percent
of income or that increases its net financial asset purchases by the same amount has reduced its claim
on current output by the same amount either way. In such an example, the conventional approach of
treating a net increase in assets and a net decrease in liabilities as equivalent is clearly appropriate.
But insofar as policymakers are interested in the evolution of the liability side of balance sheets
specifically, because of the importance of the debt stock for financial fragility or because leverage is
an important determinant of household and firm behavior, it is necessary to distinguish changes in
assets from changes in liabilities. A unit that increases its assets and its liabilities by equal amounts
has increased its leverage, even though its conventionally measured savings are unchanged.
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where b is the ratio of gross debt to GDP, d is the ratio of the primary deficit – that
is, deficit net of interest payments – to GDP, i is the nominal interest rate, g is the
real growth rate of GDP, and pi is the inflation rate. The key point, well understood
in the context of public debt, is that the evolution of debt ratios is not solely deter-
mined by public-sector borrowing; the primary balance, interest rates, growth rates
and inflation each play an independent role. (Escolano, 2010) The equation itself is
(almost) an accounting identity.8 A common application is to consider the primary
balance that is required for the debt-GDP ratio to converge to a finite value given a
starting debt stock and some values of real growth and interest rates. Another appli-
cation, more interesting for my purposes, is to decompose changes in the debt-GDP
ratio over time, typically into changes due to the primary balance, the real growth
rate, the nominal interest rate, and inflation.9 Similarly, it allows for decomposition
of the divergence between different long-run debt-GDP trajectories. In this latter
case one can also distinguish the contributions of spending from revenue.
Decompositions of the changes in the debt-GDP ratio have been carried out for
various countries and periods, including the US (Hall and Sargent, 2011; Aizenman
and Marion, 2009), the UK (Buiter, 1985; Das, 2011), India (Rangarajan and Sri-
vastava, 2003), and more or less broad sets of countries (Giannitsarou and Scott,
2008; Abbas et al., 2011). Because these are essentially accounting exercises rather
than econometric estimates, there are relatively few major methodological differences
8The equation may not hold exactly because of the existence of government actions that result
in changes in the debt stock but that, depending on accounting conventions, are not reflected in
the primary balance. These include off-budget operations such as privatizations or assumptions
of private debt, as well as default. For countries borrowing in foreign currency, a term capturing
changes in leverage due to exchange rate movements is also needed. Additionally, in practice the
equation will not hold exactly due to measurement errors. This may require the addition of a
stock-flow adjustment (SFA) term.
9The use of the nominal interest rate and real growth rate is standard. It depends on the
uncontroversial assumption that changes in inflation are passed through one for one to nominal
growth (true almost by definition) and the slightly less accepted assumption that changes in the
inflation rate are not passed through one for one to nominal interest rates, at least not immediately.
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between them. Differences that do exist include the reconciliation of stock-flow dis-
crepancies, the correct computation of yields on government debt, correctly netting
out taxes on government interest payments, and accounting for the effect of inflation
on nominal interest rates. Notably, almost all of these studies use nominal interest
rates and an inflation term, allowing for the possibility that changes in inflation move
real interest rates at least in the short run, and are fully passed on to nominal rates, if
at all, only with some delay.10 Only Abbas et al. (2011) includes an explicit stock-flow
adjustment term; it is not clear how the other studies handle divergences between
the observed debt stock and the stock implied by Equation 2.1. A common finding
of these studies is that, while theory may predict a real interest rate that equals or
exceeds the growth rate and that is unaffected by inflation except in the very short
run (Blanchard and Sartor, 1991), in practice we observe a variety of relationships
between these variables. In particular, changes in inflation are not passed through to
nominal rates one for one over even long time horizons, and many countries experience
long periods of real interest rates below growth rates.
To apply the public debt decomposition to private debt, we must replace the usual
concept of sectoral savings with sectoral primary balances, defined by analogy with
the government primary balance. As noted above, this differs from the conventional
savings rate in that it excludes interest payments from current expenditure, but in-
cludes net asset purchases. Since leverage is computed as the ratio of debt to some
measure of repayment capacity – GDP for governments, disposable income for house-
holds, and net worth or total assets for firms – it is also affected by the growth rate of
the denominator. When debt must be periodically rolled over (or carries adjustable
interest rates), changes in interest rates are another independent source of variation
in leverage. The appropriate interest rate here is the effective interest rate, com-
10Other approaches use only real variables and omit the inflation term, implicitly assuming that
the Fisher equation holds strictly over the relevant time frame.
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puted as the ratio of total interest payments to the stock of debt. While continuously
rolled-over debt might or might not be a reasonable assumption for an individual
household, the sector as a whole does not have a lifecycle; its debt is continuously
rolled over, just as with governments. Changes in market interest rates also change
the effective interest rates on fixed rate loans to the extent that they affect refinancing
opportunities.
To the extent that changes in inflation rates are not immediately incorporated into
nominal interest rates, inflation can be an independent determinant of leverage. The
minimum time for unexpected changes in inflation to be passed through to nominal
effective exchange rates is determined by the range of maturities of debt contracts,
but there is good reason to believe that nominal market rates on new loans also do not
fully incorporate changes in inflation, at least over an economically relevant horizon.11
2.4 Decomposing Changes in Leverage
2.4.1 Data and Variable Definitions
Except where otherwise noted, data used for the decompositions is drawn from
the National Income and Product Accounts and their predecessor series. In order
to separate out the contributions of the variables, I write a linear approximation of
Equation 1:
∆bt ≈ dt + (it − gt − pit)bt−1 (2.2)
For the range of values of i, g and pi observed historically (almost never above
0.1 in absolute value, and seldom above 0.05), the approximation is very close. The
variables are defined as follows.
11This is a voluminous empirical literature. A useful and comprehensive summary is provided
by Cooray (2002, p. 10-11), who concludes that “while the majority of studies on the US appear
to suggest a positive relationship between interests rates and inflation, they do not establish a
one-to-one relationship.”
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• Income. I adjust reported disposable personal income first by subtracting
rental income of persons, which consists of the imputed flow of housing services
flowing to the personal sector less the cash and noncash costs associated with
the housing stock; and then by subtracting property taxes. This adjustment
is necessary because the NIPA treatment of housing is inconsistent with the
general NIPA convention of not including non-market transactions. Other tan-
gible goods purchases are treated as outlays in the year they are made, but the
NIPA convention for housing is that “owner-occupants are treated as owning
unincorporated enterprises that provide housing services to themselves in the
form of the rental value of their dwellings.” This means that housing purchases
are not directly counted as consumption at the time they are made, but instead
the BEA imputes both a flow of rental payments (consumption) and rental
income to home-owning households. The stated goal is to make measured con-
sumption and saving invariant to households’ decision to own or rent homes,
but this is not consistent with the procedure followed elsewhere. For exam-
ple, there is no conceptually equivalent effort to make measured GDP invariant
to whether households purchase child-raising or food-preparation services or
provide them domestically, by treating households as implicitly operating un-
incorporated businesses providing those services. Whether this inconsistency
is justified in general is beyond the scope of this paper, but for my purposes
treating the flow of housing services as income is clearly inappropriate. Credit
market borrowing depends on the difference between cash outlays and cash
income; imputed flows of non-market services are irrelevant. Depreciation, sim-
ilarly, besides involving major measurement difficulties, is not a cash expense
and should not be subtracted from income here. Furthermore, the NIPA con-
vention, by treating mortgage interest as a deduction from the income of house-
holds’ unincorporated home-rental businesses, would result in double-counting
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if I did not subtract rental income, since I include mortgage interest as an
independent component of changes in leverage. Property taxes, however, are
appropriately subtracted from disposable income. So since they are treated as
a deduction from rental income in the NIPAs, I must subtract them again if I
subtract rental income.
• Debt. The stock variable b is the end-of-period value of total credit market
liabilities, divided by adjusted disposable personal income. For years prior to
1947, these are taken from the Historical Statistics of the United States.
• Primary balance. Household net borrowing is equal to the change in credit
market liabilities from the previous year. This the same way that standard
credit market series are derived; borrowing is not observed directly in the Flow
of Funds, but computed from the change in liabilities.12 Since flows are not
observed directly (unlike with government borrowing), there is no stock-flow
adjustment term.
The household primary deficit d is calculated as net borrowing minus interest
payments, divided by adjusted disposable personal income. Interest payments
are taken from Table 7.11 of the NIPAs. (Interest payments are gross, not
net; this is appropriate since interest income is included in disposable personal
income.) This is equivalent to the way the primary deficit is calculated for
governments. For households, it is also equivalent to the sum of consumption,
tangible investment and net acquisition of financial assets, divided by adjusted
disposable income, minus one.
12Among other things, this means that defaults show up as lower net borrowing (and more positive
primary balances). Unfortunately, there is no good data on household defaults prior to the 1980s,
so it is not possible account for this for the whole period. I make a correction for defaults for the
more recent period in Section 2.6.
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• Interest, growth, and inflation rates. The effective interest rate i is total
interest payments divided by the stock of debt at the beginning of the period.
In other words, it is not based on observation of market interest rates; it is
the average, not the marginal interest rate. Growth g is the annual change in
adjusted disposable personal income. Inflation pi is the year over year percent
change in the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator. The contri-
bution of i, g and pi to the change in leverage is equal to the variable multiplied
by the previous period’s debt stock.
Figure 2.2 shows the behavior of the three variables over the whole 1929-2011 pe-
riod. There are three distinct periods in the data. Before 1945, nominal growth rates
fluctuate wildly, with periods both well above and well below the effective nominal
interest rate. Between 1945 and 1980, nominal growth and nominal interest rates
are stable and approximately equal. And since 1980, nominal growth is consistently
below the nominal effective interest rate. It’s also worth noting that through World
War II, price and income changes are strongly correlated, while in the later periods
they are not – indeed the relationship is negative. 13 Figure 2.3 summarizes the main
results, showing the respective contributions of net borrowing and debt dynamics to
changes in the ratio of household debt to household income. The primary deficit is
total borrowing minus interest payments, as a fraction of income; the debt dynamics
term is equal to the real effective interest rate minus the real growth rate, time the
start of period stock of debt divided by income. As discussed below, these terms must
sum approximately to the change in leverage. Note that between 1980 and 2000, the
rise in leverage is driven entirely by real interest rates exceeding growth rates.
13This may be due to the larger role of monetary policy in driving income fluctuations in the
postwar period. It also could be interpreted as reflecting a larger role for supply shocks in the later
periods.
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Figure 2.2: i, g and pi for Household Debt, 1929-2010.
The lines show the behavior of the three key Fisher-dynamics variables since 1929.
Adjusted income is calculated as described in the text; nominal income growth is the sum
of real income growth and inflation. The effective interest rates is total household interest
payments divided by the stock of household debt. When the effective interest rate exceeds
nominal income growth, a household primary balance of zero produces rising leverage;
when nominal growth exceeds the effective interest rate, a primary balance of zero
produces falling leverage.
Figure 2.4 compares the effective interest rate with some representative consumer
rates – the 30-year conventional mortgage rate, the new auto loan rate, and the aver-
age credit card rate reported by commercial banks. Not surprisingly, my calculated
effective rate looks like a smoothed, somewhat lagging average of the market rates.
It is worth noting that given that inflation since 1990 has been significantly below
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Figure 2.3: Borrowing and Fisher Dynamics Contribution to Changes in Household
Leverage.
The heavy dotted line shows the annual change in the ratio of household debt to
household income. The red bars and blue bars show the respective contributions to the
change in leverage of net new borrowing and of the interest, inflation and growth rates.
Negative borrowing corresponds to running a primary surplus. See text for data sources.
the postwar norm (averaging 2.5 percent over 1990-2009, compared with 3.9 percent
for the full post-1945 period), the real effective interest rate faced by households was
not unusually low in the period leading up to 2007, contrary to common perceptions.
As Woodford (2010a) notes, focus on the headline interest rates can give a mislead-
ing picture of credit supply given changes in spreads due to shifting conditions of
intermediation.
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Figure 2.4: Selected Interest Rates, 1960-2010.
The heavy black line shows the effective interest rate faced by households, calculated as
total interest payments divided by the stock of debt. The other three lines show market
interest rates as reported by the Federal Reserve. The increase in the effective rate
relative to the market rates is mainly due to the increasing share of household borrowing
accounted for credit cards and similar forms of consumer credit; it may also reflect a
decline in borrower quality.
2.4.2 The Household Primary Balance
Typically, economists do not speak about the “primary balance” of a non-government
unit or sector; the term is normally reserved for the fiscal position of the central gov-
ernment. From an accounting framework, however, the concept is equivalent whether
the borrowing is public or private. Again, for the household sector, the primary bal-
ance is equal to income, minus personal consumption, minus net acquisition of tan-
gible and financial assets; equivalently, the primary surplus equals personal savings,
minus net acquisition of financial assets, plus gross interest payments. The primary
deficit represents net new borrowing by households, or the difference between income
and total expenditure on consumption and investment of all kinds. It is the net flow
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of funds to the household sector from the credit markets. So a primary deficit of zero
corresponds to the maximum level of spending the household sector could sustain
without net borrowing.
The obvious differences between the primary surplus and the conventional personal
savings measure are that the primary balance measure treats net acquisition of assets
as expenditure, and does not treat interest payments as expenditure. An additional
difference is the treatment of housing, as discussed above.14 Most important for the
long-term results is the treatment of interest.
Figure 2.5 compares the personal savings rate as measured by NIPA and the Flow
of Funds as well as the primary surplus. There are some conceptual and measurement
discrepancies that exist between the two measured savings rates that are reflected in
the figure.15 Nevertheless, these track very closely together (the correlation coeffi-
cient is 0.95 over the period). This is not true, however, of the primary surplus.The
thick black line shows the primary surplus over the period as defined above. The
differences in the series are striking. Both the NIPA and FOF savings rate display
the conventional narrative of roughly stable savings rates from the 1950s to the 1980s,
and declining savings from the peaks of the mid 1980s onwards to the early 2000s, fol-
lowed by a recovery in savings rates thereafter. The primary balance however shows
roughly the opposite story. Households ran (modest) primary deficits for most of the
period between 1950 and 1980. Between 1980 and 1998, households ran modest pri-
mary surpluses. From 1999 to 2006-the period of the housing bubble–households ran
large primary deficits, and reversed these equally sharply in the period that followed.
As measured by the primary deficit, American households’ spending was significantly
14In practice, removing the imputed components of disposable income has only a modest effect
and is not important to the qualitative results of the paper.
15A more detailed examination of the conceptual and measurement differences between the two
series is provided at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Nipa-Frb.asp
99
lower, relative to their income, between 1980 and 2010 than during the previous three
decades.16
Figure 2.5: Savings and Primary Surplus as Percentage of Disposable Income, 1946-
2010.
The red and blue lines show two measures of the conventional savings rate. The heavy
black line shows my preferred measure, the household primary balance, equivalent to
negative net new borrowing. The most important differences between the primary balance
and the conventional savings rate are that the household balance includes net acquisition
of financial and nonfinancial assets as household expenditure along with consumption, and
that it does not include interest payments in consumption.
16Among the few mainstream economists to point out that there is no determinate relationship
between conventional savings measures and changes in household debt is Barnes and Young (2003).
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Table 2.1: Factors Contributing to Differences Between Primary Surplus and Savings
Rate.
1946-1979 1980-2010 Change
Primary Surplus − Savings Rate -11.6 -5.5 6.1
Explained By: Interest 3.7 7.4 3.7
Res. Investment -4.8 -3.4 1.4
Nonres. Investment -1.3 -0.8 0.5
Net Acq. Fin. Assets -10.8 -11.4 -0.6
Noncredit Liabilities 1.1 1.6 0.5
The table decomposes the difference between my primary balance measure (here given as
the primary surplus rather than the primary deficit) into the five items that are treated
differently between the two series. Net acquisition of financial assets, at 11 percent of
personal income, accounts for the largest part of the difference, but does not explain why
the primary surplus rises after 1980 while the conventional savings rate falls.
2.5 Results
Figure 6 expands on Figure 3 and decomposes the trajectories of the three key
variables driving Fisher dynamics. The heavy black line shows the annual change in
the household sector’s debt-income ratio, while the other lines show the contribution
of the primary balance, interest, growth and inflation. (Note that interest, growth
and inflation are the respective contributions to the growth of leverage from those
variables, not the variables themselves.) One clearly sees here the extent to which
falling income raised leverage in the early 1930s and in 2009, and how deflation
raised leverage in the 1930s and inflation held it down in the later 1960s and 1970s.
Another striking feature is the large increase in the contribution of interest payments
to leverage in the 1980s, and stability thereafter. The relatively constant interest
contribution over past 25 years reflects fact that interest rates facing households have
declined at about the same rate as debt ratio has increased, resulting in constant debt-
service burden. Another way of looking at this is that while average interest rate has
declined since 1980s, it has declined more slowly than inflation, so that real interest
rates facing households have remained higher than in the pre-1980 decades. In effect,
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the contribution of interest payments to rising leverage after 1990 is a reflection of
the disinflation of the 1980s.
Figure 2.6: Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components, 1929-2010.
The heavy black line shows ∆b, the annual change in the household debt-income ratio.
The other lines show the shares of this change accounted for by the four variables. d is the
household sector primary deficit, i is the effective nominal interest rate on household debt,
g is the real growth rate of household income and pi is inflation. The contributions of the
latter three variables to the change in the debt ratio are equal to the underlying variable
times beginning-of-period leverage (b), and times negative one for g and pi.
2.5.1 A Periodization of Debt Dynamics
A more detailed examination suggests seven distinct periods in the evolution of
household leverage since 1929, as shown in Table 2.2. The numbers in the table
indicate the contribution of each term to the change in leverage, so g, i and pi are not
growth, interest and inflation themselves, but the rates times the stock of debt. (The
four latter terms don’t sum exactly to the change in leverage because of interaction
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effects.) The exact periodization is not based on any formal test, and nothing hinges
on the precise dates chosen; but visual inspection of the figures does suggest a clear
division between periods of rising, stable, and falling household debt-income ratios.
What this table shows is that changes in debt-income ratios are not a good guide to
household borrowing. These periods are also reflected in the vertical lines in Figure
6.
Table 2.2: Average Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components.
Attributable to:
Period ∆b d i g pi
1929 to 1933 0.025 -0.049 0.024 0.023 0.023
1934 to 1945 -0.021 -0.010 0.019 -0.025 -0.008
1946 to 1964 0.028 0.023 0.031 -0.017 -0.009
1965 to 1980 -0.001 0.008 0.055 -0.027 -0.038
1981 to 1999 0.014 -0.015 0.081 -0.025 -0.025
2000 to 2006 0.050 0.033 0.080 -0.038 -0.025
2007 to 2011 -0.020 -0.067 0.079 -0.006 -0.026
This shows the change in the household debt-income ratio in seven distinct periods (first
column) and the contributions to that change of primary deficits, interest, growth and
inflation rates. A negative number represents a component reducing in leverage and a
positive number one increasing it. The sum of the contributions is not exactly equal to the
change in the debt ratio due to interaction effects. The variables are defined as in Figure 6.
Looking at the first two lines of Table 2.2, we see that household debt-income
ratios rose at 2.5 points per year between 1929 and 1933, and then fell at an average
rate of 2.1 points from 1934 through 1945. But this did not imply any shift on the
part of the household sector from deficit to surplus. On the contrary, households were
paying down debt at a rate of 5 percent of income per year over 1929-1933, compared
with a rate of only 1 percent of income per year over 1934-1945. The dramatic shifts
in household debt-income ratios in this period are almost entirely explained by the
large movements in nominal income during this period. Between 1940 and 1945 (not
broken out in the table), household debt-income ratios fell by 19 points, from 0.35 to
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0.16. Yet households did not pay down any debt during this period. Accumulated
primary surpluses totaled 5 points, compared with accumulated interest payments of
9 points. The entire fall in debt ratios was explained by inflation (11 points) and
income growth (16 points). The role of falling incomes and prices in rising debt ratios
in 1929-1932 was emphasized by Irving Fisher and other writers on debt deflation.
But while the gap between the household primary balance and the change in debt
ratios is larger for the early 1930s than for any subsequent period, the same factors
continue to operate.
Moving to the immediate postwar era, we see that the 2.8 point per year increase
in debt ratios in the immediate postwar period was close to the 2.3 point average
primary deficit in this period. This reflects the similar levels of interest and nom-
inal growth rates during this period. The high level of mortgage borrowing in the
1950s presumably resulted from, in addition to pent-up housing demand, a num-
ber of regulatory changes intended to encourage home mortgage borrowing, such as
mortgage guarantees through the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration, and more favorable treatment of mortgage borrowing in the tax code.
(Garriga, Chambers and Schlagenhauf, 2012) The stabilization of leverage after the
mid-1960s reflects lower household expenditure relative to income; but this was not
the most important factor. While household primary deficits were on average 1.5
points lower in 1965-1980 than in 1946-1964, the contribution of accelerating infla-
tion was almost twice as large, reducing debt ratios by 2.9 points more per year in the
second postwar period than in the first. Faster growth also played a role, reducing
debt ratios by 1 points more per year in the second period. This was offset, however,
by a 2.4 point increase in the contribution of interest payments. So while it is true
that household debt ratios rose over 1946-1964 and were stable over 1965-1979, and
that household borrowing was greater in 1946-1964 than in 1965-1980, it would be
wrong to straightforwardly attribute the former fact to the latter.
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A more dramatic divergence between leverage and borrowing appears in the fifth
period, 1981-1999. New borrowing by households in this period averaged 2.3 points
lower than in the previous period – an even larger fall than that between 1946-64
and 1965-1980. This fall in new borrowing was enough to move the household sector
into primary surplus. Yet despite this sharp fall in household borrowing, household
debt-income ratios rose in this period by 1.4 points per year, after remaining constant
in the previous period. This increase in debt took place despite the fact that funds
flowing to households through credit markets amounted to 0.8 percent of income in
1965-1980 and negative 1.5 percent of income in the 1980s and 1990s. The difference
is attributable to higher interest payments, which added 2.6 points more annually to
the ratio than in the preceding period (and 5 points more than in 1946-1963), and by
lower inflation, which reduced debt by 1.3 points less per year than in the previous
period. Stabilization of debt ratios in the later 1990s (not broken out in the table)
owed nothing to any change in borrowing behavior. Both primary deficits and total
borrowing were the same in 1994-1999 as in the post-1980 period as a whole. Rather,
the slower rise in debt ratios in the late 1990s was entirely the result of faster income
growth.
Only the housing bubble and its aftermath do we see something like the conven-
tional story of changes in debt ratios reflecting changes in debt-financed expenditure.
The majority of the 35 point rise in household debt-income ratios during this period
is accounted for by households’ accumulated household primary deficits. In fact, the
swing from surplus to deficit during the housing boom was even greater than it ap-
pears in this table since, as we will see in Section 2.6, defaults were also greater than
in the preceding period. Similarly, the 7 point swing in annual debt ratio growth –
from plus 5 points per year to minus 2 points – after 2006 is still not as large as the 10
point swing in the household primary balance. The dramatic fall in household bor-
rowing (plus a further increase in debt reduction through default) was offset by lower
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inflation and near-zero income growth. So while treating changes in debt ratios and
changes in borrowing as equivalent is more reasonable for the housing boom period
than for the 1980s, it still misses important parts of the story.
Over the full period from 1946 to 2011, household debt-income ratios increased by
104 percentage points. Exactly half this increase – 52 points – occurred between 1946
and 1980, and half occurred between 1981 and 2011. But this superficial similarity
between the two 30-year periods is misleading. In the first period – 1946-1980 – total
borrowing by households exceeded total interest payments by 57 points (as a share
of income.) So the increase in debt was almost exactly equal to the net flow of funds
to households through credit markets, that is, to household expenditure financed by
new borrowing. In the second period, by contrast, total interest payments were 33
points greater than total borrowing (again as a share of income). So in the aggregate,
borrowing was not financing additional household expenditure after 1981. From an
intertemporal perspective, the household sector as a whole was incurring new debt
before 1980 and repaying it afterwards. yet the debt-income ratio rose by an equal
amount in both periods.
So if the goal is to explain the long-term trajectory of household debt, the answer
should not focus on changes in borrowing behavior. This is even more clear if we
focus on the contrast between stable debt-income ratios over 1965-1980, and rising
debt ratios in 1981-1999. In the first period, household expenditure exceeded current
income, and in the second period, expenditure was less than current income. Yet
household debt-income ratios rose in the second period but not in the first. So
any explanation of rising household debt of the form “households borrowed more
because...” does not apply to the historical facts for this period. The growth of
household debt after 1980 is explained by the combination of higher interest payments
and lower inflation. The question is not why households borrowed more after 1980;
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they did not. The question is why the operation of the monetary system increased
the value of already-incurred debt much more rapidly after 1980 than before.
One other striking result of this analysis is the similarity between 2009 and 1930-
33. Over the initial Depression years, the household sector’s primary surplus averaged
5.8 percent of disposable income. But negative growth, deflation, and interest each
raised leverage by 2.5 percentage points annually, resulting in an overall increase. In
Fisher’s view, this was the key to the severity of the Depression. Attempts to reduce
leverage by reducing spending resulted in falling prices and incomes and rising real
interest rates (despite falling nominal rates), leading to higher leverage and intensified
efforts to reduce spending. If units are forced to reduce their debt-income ratios, they
will have to reduce spending; but if unfavorable debt dynamics mean that spending
reductions do not actually lower debt burdens, then the effort to reduce spending may
continue indefinitely. Similarly, in 2009, the household sector had a primary surplus
of 9.5 percent, the highest in the entire series.17 But the combinations of low and
falling inflation, relatively high and stable effective nominal interest rates, and a sharp
fall in output (2.4 percent, increasing the debt-income ratio by 3.1 points) meant that
this primary surplus reduced household leverage by less than one point. If even large
surpluses do not reduce debt-income ratios, then units seeking to deleverage must
continue trying to run surpluses, putting downward pressure on income and prices. If
policy interventions had not prevented outright deflation and restored positive income
growth in 2010, it is easy to imagine how continued efforts to deleverage by households
(and businesses) could have produced a full-fledged debt-deflationary spiral.
17As discussed below, 4 percentage points of that was really defaults, which the Flow of Funds
does not distinguish from reduced borrowing. Some fraction of the household surpluses in the early
1930s must have been accounted for by defaults as well.
107
2.6 Defaults
An important difference between private and public sector debt dynamics is that
for public debt, defaults are discrete events, occurring rarely (never for the United
States, and almost never for other advanced countries in modern times.)18 By contrast
some fraction of private debt is written off by lenders every year. So the law of motion
for private debt should include an additional term on the right-hand side for defaults.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to construct a good series for defaults covering
the full period under consideration. The Flow of Funds does not record defaults; since
net borrowing is computed from the change in debt stock, defaults appear as reduced
borrowing. I have followed this same approach for my main results. However, since
1985 the Federal Reserve has tracked the fraction of loans in various categories written
off by commercial banks.19 Figure 2.7 shows the fraction of loans to households
written off.20 Until 2007, the share of household debt written off annually was always
less than one percent, but in 2009 and 2010 it was over 3 percent. (It has come down
somewhat in 2011, but remains above pre-recession levels.) So while the failure to
distinguish defaults from the primary balance probably does not affect the results for
most of the postwar decades, it may be important for the most recent period.
If we assume the default experience of commercial banks is not systematically
different from other lenders for a given category of loan, we can estimate the total
change in debt due to defaults in each period. So for the past 25 years, we can recal-
culate the results properly distinguishing a movement in household primary balances
18Municipal defaults are more frequent and may play an important role in the evolution of debt
ratios for the state and local government sector. This is a topic I hope to return to in future work.
19The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has a series for bank and thrift charge-offs going
back to the 1930s. But it is not suitable for my purposes, because it does not distinguish borrower
type, and defaults by business borrowers (especially for commercial real estate) are substantially
higher than household defaults, and not strongly correlated with them.
20Note that this is the fraction of loan value charged off, not delinquencies. Charge-offs are
conceptually the correct measure here.
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Figure 2.7: Annual Share of Household Debt Written Off, 1985-2010.
The source is the Federal Reserve’s series on commercial bank writeoffs of mortgage and
consumer debt, which begins in 1985.
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toward surplus from an an increase in defaults. Figure 8 and Table 2.3 show the
results.
Figure 2.8: Average Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components Ac-
counting for Defaults, 1985-2010.
This is equivalent to Figure 6, except that defaults are counted as a separate component
of leverage changes rather than subtracted from the primary deficit.
While the reduction of leverage attributable to defaults is small for the first two
periods, it is substantial in the final one. Indeed, nearly half of the apparent primary
surplus (6.7 percent average over 2007-2010) is actually due to writeoffs rather than
reduced household expenditure. Since the two point increase in the default contribu-
tion almost exactly equals the two point average reduction in leverage over 2007-2010,
even the enormous 8-point swing in household balances toward surplus would have
been insufficient to reduce leverage if default rates had not increased relative to the
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Table 2.3: Average Annual Change in Household Leverage and Components Account-
ing for Defaults.
Attributable to:
Period ∆b d Default i g pi
1981 to 1999 0.014 -0.010 -0.005 0.081 -0.025 -0.025
2000 to 2006 0.050 0.042 -0.009 0.080 -0.038 -0.025
2007 to 2010 -0.020 -0.039 -0.028 0.079 -0.006 -0.026
This is equivalent to the last three rows of Table ??, except that defaults are counted as a
separate component of leverage changes rather than subtracted from the primary deficit.
previous periods. This makes it even less likely that changes in household saving
behavior will be sufficient to reduce leverage in the future.
While it is unlikely that defaults played a major role in household debt dynamics in
the postwar period prior to 2007,21 it has been argued that defaults were an important
factor in the trajectory of household debt in the 1930s. (Olney, 1999) Unfortunately,
we have not been able to produce an estimate comparable to that in Table 2.3 for the
fraction of household primary surpluses in the pre-World War II period that should
be attributed to defaults. But for residential mortgages, at least, the contribution of
default was probably less in the 1930s than in the most recent period. The Federal
Housing Authority publishes data on the fraction of mortgages in foreclosure. In 1926,
the earliest year available, 0.6 percent of nonfarm structures were in foreclosure. That
proportion increased to an average of 1.2 percent over 1931-1935. Mortgage debt was
equal to about 30 percent of household income in this period, so even if the fraction
of debt charged off equaled the share of properties entering foreclosure, this would
have reduced leverage by less than 0.4 points annually, or less than a tenth of the
apparent primary surpluses. This does not mean that defaults were not important,
21They may have been more important for business debt. In particular, the widespread defaults on
commercial mortgages in the late 1980s made a nontrivial contribution to the reduction in business
leverage in that period.
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since consumer debt may have been written down at higher rates. And default may
have been more important for businesses than for households. In any case, for the
most recent period default certainly is a large factor in deleveraging.
2.7 Household Behavior
Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 of this paper focus on clarifying the accounting of the
evolution of household debt. A clear accounting is necessary for a full understanding
of changes in leverage historically. But some additional assumptions are needed to
turn it into a causal story. So in this section I clarify the behavioral claims implicit
in my causal story, and explain what it contributes that is missing from existing
explanations for increases in household debt.
As noted above, I define the household “primary balance” by analogy with the
government public balance, as household expenditures exclusive of interest payments.
This might seem somewhat arbitrary. Why is a change in interest rates any differ-
ent from a change in the price of any other component of consumption? Clearly an
increase in the price of any consumer good or service may tend to lead to higher
levels of household borrowing, if we hold other categories of expenditure constant;
why is interest special? One difference is that interest is not included in the CPI,
so personal income growth will be overstated in periods when households face rising
interest rates. (Nilsson, 1999) Another is that in the short run, interest costs are
perfectly price-inelastic – there is no possibility of substitution between any other
category of expenditure and meeting contracted interest payments. For my purposes,
though, the important difference is that debt, uniquely among household expendi-
tures, compounds. An increase in healthcare or housing costs in one period does
not increase households’ demand for healthcare or housing in future period. But,
assuming that changes are not fully anticipated and households cannot instantly and
costlessly adjust expenditure, an increase in interest costs in one period raises “de-
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mand” for interest payments in subsequent periods. The larger the existing stock
of debt, the stronger this effect is. It is thus possible for a rise in interest costs to
produce a rise in household debt ratios, even if households rationally reduce their
desired borrowing in response to higher interest rates. Such “perverse” adjustment
dynamics are not possible for other components of household expenditure. Both this
and the price-inelasticity of short-run debt payments help explain how what appears
to be a positive shift in demand for credit might really be, in effect, a negative shift
in supply.
2.7.1 A Simple Formalism
Here I present a simple schematic account of how in the presence of preexisting
debt stocks, changes in the Fisher variables (growth, inflation and interest rates)
can produce persistent, seemingly perverse changes in debt ratios even if households
behave rationally.
If leverage is initially stable, and the ratio of debt to income then increases for
any reason, a more positive primary balance will be needed in subsequent periods
to prevent it from continuing to rise. This is why we can say that higher interest
payments drove the increase in debt through the whole post-1980 period, even though
interest rates by the late 90s they had returned to their pre-Volcker levels. By that
point the stock of debt was much higher – due to the previous period of high i – so
that the same level of i, g and pi required a larger primary surplus to keep leverage
constant. Using Equation 2.1, we can see this clearly if we draw a phase diagram in
i-d space, loosely following Taylor (2011)’s phase diagram for public debt.
In Figure 2.9, the interest rate is on the vertical axis and the primary balance is
on the horizontal axis. The diagonal curve running from the upper left to the lower
right is the leverage nullcline – those combinations of i and d for which ∆b = 0, i.e.
where leverage is constant. Above this locus, leverage is rising, below it, leverage is
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Figure 2.9: Leverage Dynamics in i-d Space.
The diagonal nullclines show combinations of primary balance and interest rate that keep
the debt-income ratio constant. Changes in g or pi shift this locus vertically. Increases in
the debt ratio rotate the nullcline counterclockwise. The second panel shows how a
positive shock to interest rates can result in a persistent rise in leverage even if households
respond rationally by increasing their primary surplus, and interest rates subsequently
return to their original level.
falling. Since the diagram is drawn in nominal terms, the dotted line is drawn at
a level equal to the sum of inflation and growth rates. Then the constant-leverage
curve passes through the point where the vertical axis (corresponding to a primary
balance of zero) intersects the growth rate, since a primary balance of zero keeps the
debt GDP ratio constant if and only if i = g + pi. Changes in inflation or growth
shift the leverage nullcline vertically, while changes in the stock of debt rotate the
constant-leverage curve around the point where it crosses the vertical axis. Since
the slope of the nullcline corresponds to the current debt-income ratio, it is obvious
that when leverage is low, it takes only a small change in the household primary
balance to counterbalance a shock to i, pi or g, while if leverage is already high, larger
adjustments to the primary balance will be needed to keep leverage constant. Finally,
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it is evident from this diagram that departures from a constant-leverage path when
we are in the lower right – i.e. when nominal interest rates are less than nominal
growth rates – will eventually result in leverage stabilizing at a new level, since a
position above the nullcline will lead it to rotate upward while a position below the
nullcline will lead it to rotate downward. In the upper-left part of the diagram, on the
other hand, departures from the nullcline lead to leverage running away to (positive
or negative) infinity unless there is some counteracting change. Thus, if households
face an upward shock in interest rates that throw them off the nullcline, even if
they respond rationally by reducing spending, every period that they are above the
nullcline it will rotate counterclockwise. If they can’t adjust spending instantly (or
if they are uncertain about the future path of interest rates), there is no assurance
that they will ever be able to get back to a point of stable leverage. And even if they
do so, it may be at a much higher level of leverage, even if interest rates eventually
return to their old level.
For example, suppose we are initially at a point like a in the left panel of Figure
12, where interest rates slightly above growth rates are balanced by moderate primary
surpluses, yielding stable leverage. Now suppose there is a positive shock to interest
rates, so we jump to point b, as shown in the second panel. In response to higher
interest rates, households reduce their spending, moving left to point c. But that does
not happen instantly, and the time spent above the nullcline increases the debt ratio
from d1 to d2, rotating the nullcline, so that c is now above it. Now say that interest
rates eventually fall back to their old level. If households are still trying to stabilize
debt, we might end up at d; if the fall in interest rates stimulates increased spending,
we might end up at e. Either one is good enough to at least stabilize debt at d2.
But meanwhile, the time spent above the d2 curve has increased the debt further
and rotated the nullcline down to d3, so households still have not stabilized leverage.
Households may continue to reduce spending (if we think they respond to leverage
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and not just to marginal interest rates) but there is no assurance they can do so fast
enough to catch up with the d curve, which continues rotating counterclockwise as long
as the current position is above it. (Alternatively, households may increase spending,
as they did after 1998, moving to the right in the phase diagram, but even then the
rise in debt will be in part accounted for by the earlier interest-rate shock.) This is
the logic by which we can say that a large part of the faster growth in debt in the
2000s as compared with the pre-1980 decades was due to higher interest, even though
interest rates were no higher in the 2000s than in the earlier period. It also makes
clear that the existence of Fisher dynamics does not depend on irrational behavior by
households. It is sufficient that changes in i, pi and g are not fully anticipated, and
that expenditure cannot be adjusted instantly.
A final point is that I have been speaking so far as if households can reach whatever
primary balance they choose by adjusting their expenditure. This is unproblemati-
cally true for an individual household, but for the sector as a whole, it is true only
insofar as some other sector increases spending, or assets are transferred from debtor
to creditor units. If neither of these conditions are met then the reduced expendi-
ture will show up in lower income instead. Thus any attempt to reduce spending
by households will produce a combination of a leftward shift in the current position,
plus a downward shift of the nullcline; the net effect on the change in leverage is in-
determinate, and, as in the 1930s, it may be that attempts to reduce spending result
in higher leverage. This is the second half of the Fisher story; in this paper, I am
interested in the first half, the effect of changes in prices and income (and interest)
on changes in leverage, but this second obstacle to returning to the nullcline from a
position above it is important as well. I won’t discuss it more here, but it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that to the extent that changes in income depend on changes in
expenditure, changes in borrowing decisions explain an even smaller part of changes
in debt-income ratios.
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2.7.2 Alternative Accounts of the Post-1980 Rise in Household Debt
In a framework in which agents behave as if they know the true future values of
interest rates, inflation, and income growth – either because expectations are correct
or because fundamentals persist long enough for behavior to fully adjust – we can
ask why households choose the debt levels they do. But if households are faced with
unanticipated changes in interest rates, income or inflation, debt levels will change
even if households don’t wish them to. This is my claim about the post-1980 increase
in household debt. Faced with higher interest rates and lower inflation, households
with existing debt stocks found their debt-income ratios rising. They did reduce
expenditure, but were not able to do so fast enough to fully offset these “mechanical”
effects of compounding interest and slower nominal income growth.
The question “why did debt levels rise” is only equivalent to “why did households
choose to borrow more” if we assume a baseline in which expenditure adjusts instantly
to changes in interest rates and inflation – i.e. both that adjusting expenditure is cost-
less for households, and that the permanent component of changes in these variables
is correctly perceived. By contrast I am proposing a story in which fundamental vari-
ables are nonstationary and there is considerable inertia to expenditure decisions, so
the former cannot be considered “slow” and the latter “fast”. So we cannot assume
debt levels are fully adjusted; over some period, changes in debt will be dominated by
the effect of unexpected changes in interest rates, income and inflation rather than
borrowing choices. Nor is this necessarily limited to the short run. Because interest
compounds, when interest rates exceed growth rates a unit with above-optimal debt
will be carried further from the optimum. There is no assurance that expenditure
decisions will adjust fast enough to ensure convergence to equilibrium debt levels. In
other words, to the extent that households seek to maintain an optimal or equilibrium
level of debt, I suggest that the increase in debt-income ratios after 1980, exactly like
the increase in debt income ratios after 1929, is best understood as a movement away
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from that equilibrium. In short, this is a specific instance of the general principle
that capitalism cannot be fully understood in terms of equilibrium states; dynamics
matter.
As shown above, the flow of funds to households through the credit markets fell
rather than rose after 1980; households’ noninterest expenditures as a share of income
did not increase between 1980 and 2000, even as debt ratios rose.22 This is what it
means to say that household primary balances were generally negative before 1980
but positive between 1980 and 2000. But we cannot go from this accounting fact
to a causal story without specifying a counterfactual. My preferred story is that
households were slow to change income-expenditure ratios in response to the interest
rate and inflation shocks around 1980, either because rapid changes in expenditure are
costly (due to habit formation, adjustment costs, complementarities among different
components of expenditure, etc.) or because expectations were slow to adjust so that
it took time for households to realize the new, lower ”correct” level of expenditure.
The corresponding counterfactual is that if interest rates had not increased, debt
levels would have remained constant. Logically, however, one might just as well
argue that desired debt levels rose at the same time as interest rates and it just
happened that the new borrowing roughly equalled the increase in interest payments.
In this story, the counterfactual is that if interest rates had not increased, noninterest
expenditures would have. There are several variations on this theme.
The simplest explanation for increased borrowing is a shift in preferences and/or
(perceived) technologies – in simple models of intertemporal consumption smoothing
an increase in either pure time preference or expected rates of income growth would
lead to increased desire to shift income forward, leading to higher debt levels, lower
22This fact is seldom acknowledged in part because of the fall in measured savings. The fall in
measured savings in part is a result of the fact that interest payments are counted as consumption,
along with the anomalous treatment of housing, which is counted as saving but is unambiguously
an expenditure from a financial standpoint. See Table 2.1.
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savings rates and higher interest rates. “Prime candidates for explaining the consump-
tion boom are factors that increase the effective discount rate of the representative
agent.” (Parker, 1999) One obvious problem with an explanation in terms of a shift in
households’ intertemporal discount rate is the ad hoc and unobservable nature of such
a change in preferences. A higher expected income growth is more a priori reasonable,
but seems most plausible for the late 1990s. Alternatively, slower income growth and
greater income inequality, in combination with consumption norms that are inelastic
and/or set according to some higher-income reference group, could increase desired
consumption relative to income for those lower down the income scale. (Pollin, 1988,
1990; Sturn and van Treek, forthcoming) The basic argument is that consumption
preferences are not set in a vacuum, but with respect to some reference level based on
past levels of consumption or some social standard, which is often strongly influenced
by those higher up the income ladder. This doesn’t imply irrational behavior, only
that utility of consumption is endogenous and other-regarding. This second story is
to a large extent complementary to the one proposed here; both hinge on the idea that
consumption or expenditure does not adjust instantly to changes in fundamentals.
There are two versions of the deregulation claim. The more straightforward claim
is that financial regulation before the 1980s excluded large numbers of potential bor-
rowers from credit markets, either directly or via limits on interest rates that made
it unprofitable to lend to borrowers with higher default risk and/or higher interme-
diation costs. The mainstream view on rising household debt in the 1980s is stated
clearly by Large (2004): ”Liberalization of markets has meant new approaches to
lending and new credit instruments, enabling credit to be available to a wider variety
of participants and reducing credit constraints.” More concretely, it is often argued
that “financial liberalization in the United States in the 1980s may have increased
effective credit demand,” while reduced deposit requirements and the changed treat-
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ment of home equity credit under the 1986 Tax Reform Act increased the supply of
credit to households. (Barnes and Young, 2003)
A more subtle version of the argument hinges on the decline in inflation. It is
sometimes claimed that there is a positive relationship between real interest rates
and inflation, so that lower inflation reduces real and not just nominal rates. This
was not the case in the 1980s. However, lower inflation can still boost debt levels in
the presence of liquidity constraints, even if it is associated with constant or rising real
interest rates. If borrowers are limited to a maximum ratio of debt-service payments
to income – as will be the case if either creditors impose such restrictions as a way of
dealing with adverse selection and moral hazard, or if there is a floor on the portion
of current income that must be devoted to current expenditure – then with lower
inflation, feasible debt levels will be higher. This is because with a fixed-interest
loan, higher inflation implies that payments on a loan with a given principal amount
and given real interest rate will be higher relative to income in early periods and lower
in later periods. (Debelle, 2004)
These stories have several implications. First, most of the increase in debt-income
ratios should have occurred among households that were more likely to have faced
credit rationing under regulation, presumably those with lower incomes. Second, we
should see an increase in household assets. Many households hold both assets and
liabilities; while this would not be rational in a world where all assets carried the same
interest payments, in reality households have many arbitrage opportunities where the
return on an asset exceeds the interest rate on a liability – either because assets are
lumpy (like houses), or because there are nonpecuniary returns from asset ownership,
or because of tax treatment or other subsidies, or the borrower believes they can get a
higher return on the asset than is reflected in its market price. In any case households
that wished to engage in debt-financed asset purchases would have been limited in
their ability to do so by regulation, so we should see an increased number of these
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positions if the rise in debt was due to deregulation. Third, most obviously, we should
see a rise in consumption. And fourth, we should see some association of interest rate
increases with default risk and intermediation costs – interest rate increase should
be smaller or nonexistent once these changes in borrower composition are controlled
for. With the partial exception of higher consumption, none of these predictions are
borne out for the 1980s.
More broadly, in the deregulation story the association of higher debt and higher
interest rates after 1980 is neither surprising nor problematic – it is the natural result
of ending an artificial restriction on credit demand. Given a theoretical framework in
which the function of credit markets is to allow people to optimally allocate consump-
tion over time, it is natural to conclude that “the increasing availability of debt is
beneficial. Debt helpfully allows households, companies and even countries to smooth
their spending patterns. ... The rise in debt is a logical response to a more stable
economic environment and the relaxation of credit constraints.” (Large, 2004)
2.7.3 The “Fisher Dynamics” Story Compared to the Alternatives
The fundamental reason I prefer an account of the rise in household debt in the two
decades after 1980 (and a significant part of the rise in debt in the 2000s) that focuses
on the dynamic effects of changes in interest rates, income and inflation rather than
on an increase in household borrowing, is that the net flow of funds to households
from the credit markets was negative for almost this entire period. Like most of
this literature, Sturn and van Treek (forthcoming) treats “decreased saving” and
“increased borrowing” as synonymous, but since most economic units, and all sectors,
have both assets and liabilities, these two concepts need to be distinguished. While
it is true that household savings declined after 1980, this was more than accounted
for by lower acquisition of assets; by contrast the flow of funds to households through
credit markets turned negative after 1980. In other words, it is not the case that
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households increased new borrowing after 1980; rather, they reduced it, but not by
enough to offset the increased interest burden on their existing debt.
During the period between World War II and the Volcker shock, household bor-
rowing exceeded interest payments in almost every year; over the period as a whole,
the gap averaged 1.6 percent of household income annually, and in the immediate
postwar period it was much higher. So for the 1945-1980 period, it is correct to say
that increased household debt financed higher levels of household expenditure. This
relationship reversed at the end of the 1970s - interest payments exceeded borrowing
in 1978 and continued to do so, almost without interruption, until 1998, when the
household sector moved back into primary deficit. In the 1980s and 1990s, annual
interest payments exceeded borrowing by 1.1 and 1.6 percent of income, respectively.
In other words, higher debt was not financing higher expenditure in this period. For
the faster growth of debt in the 20 years after 1980 compared with the 20 years before
to be explained primarily by higher household expenditure (as in any of the stories
above) there would have to be a period in which debt in fact increased the funds
available to households. But there was no increase in debt-financed expenditure by
households before the late 1990s. While this to some extent reflects a choice to reduce
asset holdings rather than increase liabilities, average total nonfinancial expenditure
(i.e. consumption plus purchases of tangible assets) was no higher relative to income
over the 1980-2000 period than over 1950-1980. As a whole, the household sector’s
primary balance did not show any sustained movement toward deficit before 1998.
Besides this general point, I have some more specific concerns with the particular
stories sketched out above. With respect to the deregulation story, the problem is that
for mortgages – representing about 80 percent of both the stock of household debt and
its increase over the period – there is no evidence that credit became significantly more
available before the late 1990s. Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, mortgage
debt as a percent of income rose by about 20 points (about half as much as during
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the housing bubble) and then stabilized until the late 1990s. But this historically
large increase in mortgage debt does not appear to have been a symptom of increased
availability of housing credit. During the 1980s, residential investment was not higher
than in previous expansions; there was no increase in the proportion of families owning
homes; and the average loan-to-value ratio for mortgages did not increase. (See Figure
2.10.) The housing boom of the late 1990s and 2000s, by contrast, was associated with
rising residential investment, rising homeownership rates and (initially) higher loan
to value ratios – exactly what we would expect in conditions of easier housing credit.
Given the absence of these trends in the 1980s, the earlier increase in mortgage debt
seems better explained by higher interest rates and lower nominal income growth,
which meant that the same, or even a lower, level of mortgage borrowing led to a
higher ratio of mortgage debt to income.
Second, more tentatively, the relationship between debt and income doesn’t seem
to fit a story that emphasizes changes in income distribution in explaining rising
debt. Examination of subsets of households is not possible using Flow of Funds
data. However, evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finance does not suggest
that there were sharply differing patterns of leveraging across households. Figure
2.11 shows the trends in median debt to income ratio by income quintile from 1989
to 2007. The solid black line is the median debt to income ratio for the whole
distribution. It roughly parallels the findings from the Flow of Funds, with slow but
steady growth in leverage between 1989 and 2001 and a sharp increase thereafter.
There do not appear to be major differences in the patterns of growth among the
richest four quintiles of the population, all of which follow broadly the same pattern
as the overall trend. The lowest two quintiles were the least leveraged segments while
the third and fourth quintiles have seen sharply rising leverage ratios from 2001-2007.
Note that since both income and debt-to-income ratios are higher in the higher-income
quintiles, that means the majority of increased household debt is accounted for the
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top quintile, and over 90 percent by the top two quintiles. This is not dispositive,
since the change distribution of income over the past 30 years has mostly been in
favor of the top 5 percent or 1 percent or even smaller top fractiles, not the top 20
percent. Still, both the income-stagnation and reference-group accounts of debt being
used to finance increased consumption imply that over some range there should be a
negative relationship between income and debt growth. Further work will be needed
to see if this relationship appears higher in the income distribution.23
2.7.4 Household Behavior: Conclusions
This paper is primarily intended to clarify the determinants of changes of house-
hold debt in an accounting sense, rather than advance any strong claims about house-
hold behavior. Nonetheless, my causal claims do imply some behavioral assumptions.
Specifically, they require that households do not fully anticipate changes to the “Fisher
variables” – inflation, income growth and interest rates – and/or that they are unable
to instantly adjust expenditure decisions in response to such changes. In a model
in which households were always able to choose their preferred level of expenditure
with full knowledge of the future path of inflation, income growth and interest rates,
no causal claims could be inferred from the accounting. I do not believe that such a
model is a good approximation for the conditions under which households make their
expenditure and balance sheet decisions. For instance, I do not find it plausible that
either lenders or borrowers in 1929 were made decisions in expectation of the ex post
real interest rates implied by the deflation of the next four years.
For the purposes of the argument here, we can remain agnostic about what specific
form the “inertia” in household expenditure decisions takes. The simplest story is that
expectations are backward-looking or adaptive, perhaps in combination with a story
23While the Survey of Consumer Finances does not allow for a more disaggregated analysis of the
very high end of the distribution, since income data is topcoded, the IRS Statistics of Income does
potentially do so. I hope to return to this question in future work.
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about endogenous consumption norms or expenditure that is costly to adjust, perhaps
because it is lumpy (like houses). The story here is also compatible with a more purely
behavioral as opposed to optimizing account of household expenditure, as in Cynamon
and Fazzari (2008). All that we need is sufficient stickiness in household expenditure
such that household cannot change their leverage infinitely faster than the Fisher
variables. This is enough to ensure that we cannot assume an equilibrium where debt
is endogenous, or fast, and the Fisher variables are exogenous or slow. While more
empirical work on the micro-level determinants of household borrowing behavior is
certainly needed, I feel confident that in any plausible account this condition will be
met.
More concretely, it seems clear that the accounting is not consistent with any story
that explains the rise of household debt between 1980 and 1998 mainly or exclusively
in terms of households choosing higher expenditure relative to income in this period,
since, given the ex post behavior of the Fisher variables, the actual effect of household
borrowing was to shift purchasing power away from this period.
125
Figure 2.10: Indicators of Mortgage Credit Availability, 1965-2012.
The heavy black line shows mortgage debt as a percentage of adjusted household income.
The thin blue line shows the proportion of families owning their homes, the orange line
with diamonds shows the average loan-to-value ratio for mortgages originated in that year,
and the dotted line shows residential investment as a share of GDP. These latter three
variables should be associated with broader availability of housing credit. Note that while
all three increase sharply in in the late 1990s, none show show any increase in the earlier
period of rising mortgage debt in the 1980s, relative to the pre-1980 period.
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Figure 2.11: Median Debt to Income Ratio by Quintile, 1989-2007.
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances.
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2.8 Counterfactuals
Another way of framing the question is to ask what would have been the trajectory
of household leverage if household primary balances had been the same as in reality
but growth, interest and/or inflation rates had remained constant. The result of
that simple simulation exercise is shown in Figure 2.12. The heavy black line in
the figure shows the actual trajectory of household leverage, while the solid red line
shows what the trajectory would have been if i, pi, and g had been fixed at their 1945-
1980 average levels for the whole period.24 The other three lines show scenarios with
growth, inflation, nominal interest rates and real interest rates (i − pi) respectively
fixed at their average levels while the others vary historically. The main message of
the graph is that for the past 50 years as a whole, household borrowing has made no
contribution to the growth of household debt; if interest rates, inflation and growth
had been constant, then the actual pattern of household borrowing would have led
to roughly stable leverage over the whole period from 1960 to 2010. Second, while
higher growth reduced leverage somewhat in the late 1960s, and very low growth
increased leverage in 2008-2009, the overall picture is basically unchanged in the
constant-growth scenario. The big differences come from interest rates and inflation.
In the constant-inflation scenario, leverage rises rapidly in the 1970s, rather than
the roughly flat trajectory actually experienced as high inflation offset high primary
deficits; then after 1990, the constant-inflation scenario shows a path of leverage that
is flat overall rather than rising, illustrating how the stable prices of the past two
decades led to rising leverage by reducing the “inflation erosion” to which household
debt had previously been subject. In between these two periods, in the 1980s, the
difference between the counterfactual scenario and the actual trajectory is due to
higher nominal rates. So apart from the two great housing booms of 1946-1960
24The scenarios all involve the same total growth from 1945 to 1980 by construction. The lines
do not coincide exactly at 1980 because arithmetic rather than geometric means were used.
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and1999-2005, household debt ratios have been driven by Fisher dynamics. In this
sense, the common narrative of the profligate American household is applicable only
to a fairly short period of sharply increased borrowing in the 2000s (following which
households have cut back more than proportionately).
One possible interpretation of the counterfactual exercise is that if households
form their expectations of average growth, inflation and interest rates in the future by
looking at historical averages over past decades, then they chose the right level of net
borrowing in the 1980s and 1990s to produce a gradual fall in leverage. Alternatively,
the simulation results are compatible with households in the 1980s and 1990s seeking
to maintain a constant level of leverage and gradually updating their expectations
for growth, inflation and interest rates. Either way, the fact that the reduction in
household borrowing after 1980 was insufficient to maintain stable leverage ratios in
the face of the actual trajectories of interest rates and inflation cannot be used to
infer either that households intended to increase their borrowing or that they were
behaving irrationally. Borrowing behavior in this period is broadly consistent with
what one would expect from households attempting to maintain a stable leverage
ratio, given adaptive expectations. Similarly, if households were seeking in 2008-2010
to reverse the debt buildup of 2000-2005, then they chose exactly the right level of
(negative) net borrowing on the assumption of stable income growth. The parallel
with 1929-1933 is striking. The essence of debt-deflation episodes is that when all
agents across the economy attempt to increase their savings simultaneously, their
plans are incompatible; income adjustments then ensure that the ex post increase
in savings is less than that intended ex ante. While the paradox of thrift is usually
treated as a textbook curiosity, it is striking how well it fits the 2008-2010 period.
It was precisely the fall in income (and to a lesser extent prices) due to households’
(and firms’) attempts to simultaneously deleverage, that may have prevented the
deleveraging attempts from succeeding to the extent desired.
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Figure 2.12: Counterfactual Evolution of Household Leverage 1981-2010, Given 1946-
1980 Average Values of i, g, and pi.
The figure shows the result of simple simulation exercises where the real growth rate of
income, the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate respectively are fixed at their
1946-1980 averages, while the other variables and the household primary balance take
their historical values.
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Figure 2.13: Counterfactual Evolution of Household Leverage 2000-2010, Given 1946-
1980 Average Values of i, g, and pi.
This is the same simulation as shown in Figure 2.12, except that the starting point is the
actual debt ratio in 2000. Real effective interest rates remained relatively high after 2000,
contributing approximately one-third of the debt growth in 2000-2007. Low interest rates
after 2007 helped with deleveraging, but were more than offset by the sharp fall in income.
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2.9 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to argue that any analysis of changes in
debt ratios over time must consider the effect of changes in interest rates, inflation
and growth rates on leverage, and not just changes in borrowing. A clear picture
of the relationship between changes in household leverage, household borrowing, and
aggregate demand is obscured by the failure to use appropriate accounting. Conven-
tional savings rates combine changes in the asset and liability sides of balance sheets;
they have no reliable relationship to changes in credit flows to households. A concep-
tually appropriate accounting framework shows that while some of the evolution of
household debt-income ratios since 1929 have been driven by changes in household
borrowing behavior, over much of this period this has not been the exclusive or even
primary factor in changing household leverage. In particular, the rise in household
leverage since the early 1980s is mainly attributable to higher interest rates, lower in-
flation, and lower income growth, in that order; new household borrowing played little
role. Credit-financed expenditure by households, far from rising in line with debt, has
in fact been lower in the three decades since 1980 than in the preceding period. In
this sense, the rise in debt following the “Volcker coup” (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2011) is
appropriately thought of as a debt-disinflation analogous to the debt-deflation of the
1930s.
2.9.1 Debt as a Monetary Phenomenon
It was one of the great insights of Keynes that modern economies cannot be
conceived of only as “real exchange” economies; many important questions can be
answered only in terms of a model of a “monetary production” economy. (Leijon-
hufvud, 2008) After Keynes, the real-exchange vision was reasserted by allowing for
the existence of money as a special asset required for exchange, but ignoring lia-
bilities, an approach sometimes called “Monetary Walrasianism.” (Mehrling, 2013)
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Admittedly, Keynes left the way open for this interpretation by retreating from the
sophisticated account of financial markets in The Treatise on Money to the exoge-
nous money supply assumption of the General Theory. (Bibow, 2000a) But in a world
where liquidity cannot be identified with any particular asset but is essentially a so-
cial relation, analysis of the financial side of the economy requires discussing the asset
and liability side of balance sheets independently, rather than netting them out as
the pseudo asset “net wealth”. (Beggs, 2012). Any discussion of debt, in particular,
must start from the fact that it is a financial liability, and not simply a negative asset
nor an accumulated excess of consumption over income. To understand the evolution
of debt over time and its macroeconomic implications, we need a framework that fo-
cuses specifically on the liability side of household balance sheets. Regarding debt as
merely a counterpart of some broader aggregate like saving, consumption or wealth
mixes it up with payment flows that behave quite differently, and therefore gives a
misleading picture of its evolution over time.
Most economic analyses of debt approach it in terms of real flows. Given the
current political salience of debt, and given concerns about performance of the real
economy, it is natural to look for story that links debt to real economic outcomes in
a straightforward way. In such stories, debt is determined by the intertemporal allo-
cation of consumption, by the level of desired spending on real goods and services,
or perhaps by the distribution of income. But in fact, the financial relationships
reflected on balance sheets and the real activities of production and consumption
compose two separate systems, governed by two distinct sets of relationships. Expla-
nations that reduce debt to the financial counterpart to some real phenomena ignore
the specifically financial factors governing the evolution of debt. The evolution of
demand and production has to be explained in its own terms, and the evolution of
debt and other financial commitments has to be explained in its terms. No simple
story combining the two is likely to be useful or reliably consistent with the facts. As
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we have shown in this paper, this is not merely a theoretical critique. As a historical
matter, the evolution of household debt in the US bears little resemblance to any of
the real variables whose financial counterpart it is imagined to be. They do inter-
act, but they are not tightly linked. While some of the turning points in household
leverage are indeed associated with turning points for production and consumption,
most are not, but are the result of purely monetary-financial factors. Indeed, as a
first approximation, it would be better to imagine household income and expenditure
as evolving according to one set of systematic relationships, and household balance
sheets evolving according to an entirely separate set of relationships. Balance sheets
and real flows do interact, sometimes strongly. But conceptualizing the two systems
independently is an essential first step toward understanding the points of articulation
between them.
2.9.2 Policy Implications
From a policy standpoint, the most important implication of this analysis is that in
an environment where leverage is already high and interest rates significantly exceed
growth rates, a sustained reduction in household debt-income ratios probably cannot
be brought about solely or mainly via reduced expenditure relative to income. Even a
modest increase in household expenditure from its very depressed levels of 2008-2011
would be sufficient to put leverage back on an increasing path, especially if default
rates return to more historically typical levels. There is an additional challenge, not
discussed in this paper, but central to both Fisher’s original account and more recent
discussions of “balance sheet recessions”: reduced expenditure by one sector must be
balanced by increased expenditure by another, or it will simply result in lower incomes
and/or prices, potentially increasing leverage rather than decreasing it. (Eggertson
and Krugman, 2010; Koo, 2008) To the extent households have been able to run
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primary surpluses since 2008, it has been due mainly to large federal deficits and
improvement in US net exports.
I conclude that if reducing private leverage is a requirement of renewed growth,
some combination of higher g, lower i and higher pi will be necessary. While growing
out of debt would be ideal, it would require a large increase in net exports, government
spending and/or private investment, none of which seems plausible for the US at
present.25 So lower nominal interest rates and/or higher inflation is probably essential.
How, or whether, monetary policy could deliver the latter is beyond the scope of this
article; here it is sufficient to point out the central importance of changes in inflation
rates for episodes of (de)leveraging historically. As for the former, there are two
basic approaches. One is to lower market interest rates through some combination of
unconventional monetary policy, direct regulation of interest rates (or more broadly
“financial repression”), and direct public lending to households. The other is to
accelerate the convergence of effective rates to (lower) market rates by facilitating
refinancing of existing debt, as has been proposed on occasion for mortgages and
student loans. Finally, defaults may remain an important part of the deleveraging
process. A recent IMF staff report (Gottschalk et al., 2010) notes that for public
sector debt, defaults are most likely to lead a long-term improvement in the fiscal
position (and have generally occurred historically) in countries with small primary
deficits, or primary surpluses. In such cases unsustainable debt growth is driven by
the interaction of high effective interest rates with a large existing debt stock; a one-
time reduction in the debt stock can change an unsustainable path to a sustainable
one, even if the interest rates on new borrowing rise as a result.26 A similar logic
might apply to private sector debt. If so, some form of systematic debt forgiveness
25For some smaller countries, export-driven growth is a feasible route to deleveraging.
26As Gottschalk et al. (2010) note, if the goal is to stabilize the debt-income ratio, the amount
by which default reduces the required adjustment in the primary balance is directly proportional to
the interest rate-growth differential.
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may be the logical, and eventually unavoidable, solution to the problem of excessive
household leverage.
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CHAPTER 3
LOOSE MONEY, HIGH RATES: INTEREST RATE
SPREADS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
Interest rate spreads in the US have widened over the past 50 years. As shown
in Figure ??, since the 1960s the average rate on 30-year mortgages has increased by
approximately 2 points relative to the current rate on short-term federal debt, while
the rate on typical corporate bonds has increased by 3 points. Relative to ex post
realized policy rates, the increase in spreads is even larger, and takes the form of a
sharp transition in the early 1980s. Despite being quantitatively large, and challenging
to most established theories of interest rate determination, the increase in interest
rate spreads has not received much attention in either the mainstream or heterodox
literature. The goal of this paper is to call attention to the divergence of risky long
rates from the risk free overnight rate, to assess various possible explanations for this
divergence, and to show how this question is well suited to Post Keynesian theory.
The starting point for Post Keynesian analysis of credit markets is that “the rate
of interest [is] determined by ... the terms on which the public desires to become
more or less liquid and those on which the banking system is ready to become more
or less unliquid.” (Keynes, 1937a) If credit markets are analyzed systematically in
terms of liquidity (rather than saving), with the interest rate as the price of liquidity,
then the sharp analytic distinction between the “riskfree” policy rate and the various
market rates loses its salience. We can no longer speak of “the” interest rate but only
the complex of interest rates, with the same interplay between supply and demand
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Figure 3.1: Selected Interest Rate Spreads, 1953-2013
Source: FRED
The figure shows 10-year rolling averages of the difference between the rates shown and
the 3-month Treasury bill. The averages are centered at the year shown on the horizontal
axis; the first observation is for the 10-year period beginning in January, 1953, and the last
observation is for the 10-year period ending in December 2013. Compared with the 1950s
and 1960s, long rates on federal debt have risen by about one point relative to short rates,
and rates on corporate bonds have risen by an additional point relative to long rates on
federal debt.
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for liquidity determining both the spread between individual rates and shifts in the
complex as a whole. Indeed, from a liquidity-preference viewpoint, the policy rate, as
the difference between the yield of overnight interbank loans and the yield of money,
is just one spread among others, and need not have any special importance. From
this point of view, there is also no sharp distinction between conventional monetary
policy, unconventional monetary policy, and financial regulation. A reduction in the
policy rate, a purchase of private assets, and a relaxation of regulatory limits on
lending are all simply ways of increasing the banking system’s readiness to become
more unliquid. The second premise of Post Keynesian theories is that “rational”
expectations are neither coherent logically nor a reasonable approximation empiri-
cally. In any forward-looking transaction – of which long-maturity loan contracts are
a paradigmatic example – the expectations process must be explicitly described, and
inevitably includes an important element of convention. A more critical perspective
on expectations formation, I argue, is an important tool in understanding the historic
behavior of interest rates. Finally, and more concretely, this essay seeks to advance
the discussion of the question posed by Pollin (2008): If we assume
“that the Federal Reserve exogenously sets the Federal Funds rate,
does that also imply that the Fed exogenously controls the full comple-
ment of market rates...? In particular, can the Fed exogenously set the
1953-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2013
Premium over 3-Month Treasury Bill:
10-Year Treasury 1.0 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.1 2.1
Aaa Corporate 1.3 1.0 1.8 2.7 2.9 3.7
Baa Corporate 2.0 1.7 2.9 4.1 3.6 4.8
Mortgage* n/a 1.8 2.5 3.9 3.3 3.9
State/Local 0.7 -0.3 -0.6 0.5 1.2 2.9
* 30-year conventional. Mortgage data starts in 1964.
Table 3.1: Average Interest Rate Spreads by Decade
Source: FRED. The State/Local rate is the average rate reported in the Bond Buyer Go
20-Bond Municipal Bond Index.
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long-term rates that are most important for investment and household
borrowing?”
In this paper, I focus mainly on the 30-year conventional mortgage rate and the
Baa corporate bond rate, but the pattern of wider spreads is broadly shared across
a wide range of debt securities, in the US and elsewhere. Table ?? summarizes the
evolution of interest rate spreads since World War II. As the table shows, the rise in
term spreads (the premium on long term borrowing over short-term borrowing for a
given borrower) was concentrated in the 1980s, while the rise in spreads between rates
facing different borrowers has occurred more steadily, over a longer period. The focus
in the remainder of the paper will be on federal and corporate bonds, since for other
classes of debt it is more difficult to separate changes in interest rates on comparable
loans from changes in teh composition of borrowing. But it is worth noting that while
the broad pattern of an increasing premium over short-term federal debt is shared
by both the other classes of debt here, the specific patterns are slightly different.
Mortgage rates have risen by less than the other classes of private debt. Meanwhile,
rates on municipal bonds have risen by more, going from rates somewhat below short-
term federal debt to 3 points higher. This is due primarily to the diminishing value
of the tax exemption for interest on municipal debt as top income rates have fallen;
municipal borrowers may also face increased risk and/or liquidity premiums. I will
not discuss issues specific to these classes of debt in the remainder of the paper, but
it’s important to include them here to call attention to the changing structure of
interest rates. These changes in spreads mean that the behavior of the complex of
interest rates as a whole is not effectively captured by a single measure of “the” level
of interest rates.
In the remainder of the paper, I review various theories of the determination of
interest rates, and explore their suitability to explain the historical increase in spreads
seen in the US.
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3.2 The Determination of Interest Rates
3.2.1 The Interest Rate as the Price of Saving
Classical writers did not see the interest as a fundamental macroeconomic variable.
It was the profit rate that mattered, both for distribution and for the evolution of the
economic system over time, with interest regarded as a component of (or deduction
from) profits. Classical writers also did not see interest as a monetary phenomenon
– the link between the money supply and interest rates was one of the supposed
errors for which “Mercantilist” economists were criticized. Thornton was one of very
few early-19th century writers to see a systematic link between credit conditions and
the money supply, and to accordingly support what we would now call discretionary
monetary policy by a central bank. Admittedly, classical economists did not adhere
as strictly to the “classical dichotomy” as they are somtimes supposed to have. Hume,
Smith and Ricardo all suggested at points that the substitution of bank notes and
other forms of credit-money for commodity money might affect interest rates and not
just the price level, and that their use could have benefits in terms of increasing access
to credit as well as reducing transaction costs. (Arnon, 2010, see also Taylor (2009),
p. 79-93) And 19th century writers who were more oriented to the language used by
financial practicioners often referred to the interest rate as the “price of money” and
took it for granted that it was determined by the banking system. (Bagehot, 1999,
p. 113-121) But systematic economic theory by and large continued to be developed
on the assumption of pure commodity money and an interest rate determined by
nonmonetary factors.
The consensus against a monetary view of interest hardened with rise of marginal-
ism later in the 19th century. Bohm-Bawerk and Walras treated interest and profit
as two interchangeable terms for the price of substituting consumption between peri-
ods. This approach was developed by the next generation of marginalists, including
Cassel and Fisher. For them, interest was the price of “saving,” meaning deferring
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consumption to a later period, and there was no connection between the rewards for
risk-bearing, for management of the production process and the reward for deferred
consumption as such. In this framework, it is natural to refer to the interest rate as
only the reward for “waiting” or “abstinence” and ignore the variation among market
interest rates as of secondary importance. (Arnon, 2010, see also Dobb (1975), ch. 7)
3.2.2 The Wicksellian Theme: Natural Rate and Market Rate
The innovation of Wicksell (2007, first published 1898) was to refocus attention on
the existence of different rates of return. In his case, the concern was the possibility
of a divergence between the return on investment by business, on the one hand, and
the interest rate set by the banking system, on the other. Wicksell called the optimal
intertemporal rate described by the marginalists as the “natural rate,” and claimed
(for not entirely clear reasons) that the expected rate of return on new investment was
connected to this natural rate. Under credit-money system, however, the market rate
of interest is set by banking system, and there is no mechanism to bring it into line
with the natural rate. This was a revival of the insights of Thornton, who had argued
one hundred years earlier that neither the gold standard nor the real bills doctrine
would produce an automatic growth of credit in line with the needs of real production,
so the monetary system required active management. For Wicksell, the critical issue
was that under a credit-money system, price adjustments would carry interest rate
in the “wrong” direction with respect to price stability. If banks set interest rate
too high or too low, desired expenditure would never converge to productive capacity
and prices would rise or fall without limit. (Leijonhufvud, 1997) But Wicksell did not
have a clear explanation for why the interest rate consistent with price stability must
necessarily equal the interest rate derived from a process of intertemporal exchange
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as described by the marginalists.1 Nor did he have a good explanation of how market
rates would be set in a pure credit economy. He describes a number of factors that
might affect them, having to do with the competitive structure of the banking system,
the mix of intermediation and payments activities carried out by banks, and the
possibility of substitution away from banking system by self-financing entrepreneurs,
but concludes only that “I am unable ... to assess the importance in actual banking
practice of these various factors.” He did not see the question as important; the
critical point was that, however the interest rate was set in a pure credit economy,
there was no reason to expect it to coincide with the natural rate, so in such an
economy the interest rate would have to be set by a public authority. The interest rate
as intertemporal exchange rate still dominates economic theory, with intertemporal
allocation taking place either over an infinite time horizon or a finite lifecycle, as in
overlapping generations models, as popularized by Samuelson.2 Meanwhile, Wicksell’s
approach still dominates practical policy discussions, with the idea the monetary
authority can control the interest rate, and must exercise this control to assure price
stability, coinciding uneasily with a theory of the natural rate that has no place for
monetary policy or inflation. (Smithin, 2006)
One weak point of the Wicksellian framework has always been the absence of a
clear link between the “natural rate” as the rate consistent with price stability, on
the one hand, and as the technology-and-tastes-determined price of a good today in
1In fact, Wicksell is somewhat ambivalent on this point. Initially, he simply asserts that the
natural rate is simply “the rate of interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no
use were made of money.” (Wicksell, 2007, 102) But he later suggests that the natural rate is in
fact somewhat lower than this, since in order for investment to take place “the probability that an
entrepreneur will make a profit must always be somewhat greater than the probability that he will
make a loss.” See also the discussion in Chick (1987).
2It’s worth noting that while Samuelson is often assumed to have shared the marginalist concern
with the optimal rate of intertemporal exchange, the real point of this article is that market interest
rates will not in general achieve the optimal intertemporal allocation, and that a public pension
system may deliver a more efficient distribution of consumption over the lifecycle. See Mehrling
(2013)
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terms of a good tomorrow, on the other. This weak point was highlighted by Sraffa
in his controversy with Hayek over the latter’s adaptation of Wicksell’s argument
in Money and Capital. (Sraffa, 1932a,b) The essence of Sraffa’s argument was this.
Suppose we take pi,j as the price of good i at time j. Then the ratio pi,t/pi,t+1 is the
rate of interest in terms of good i. The problem is that these “own-rates of interest”
will in general be different for each good. Given any two goods, if
p1,t/p2,t > p1,t+1/p2,t+1
then the interest rate measured in terms of good 1 will be greater than the interest
rate measured in terms of good 2. The Walrasian system gives us no basis on which
to choose any particular good as the preferred numeraire, so there is no way to decide
which of these various own-rates corresponds to the money-rate compatible with price
stability. Thus, a unique natural rate of interest is defined only for the case in which
relative prices do not change. Sraffa’s challenge was never successfully answered by
Hayek. (Lawlor and Horn, 1992) Nor does it appear to have been answered subse-
quently, despite the continued salience of the “natural rate” concept. Modern models
of the natural rate normally sidestep the problem by working in terms of a single
commodity. More generally, the natural rate is defined as the interest rate that will
exist when “all markets are in equilibrium and there is therefore no pressure for any
resources to be redistributed or growth rates for any variables to change.” (Archibald
and Hunter, 2001, quoted in Cuaresma and Gnan 2007) There is no obvious way
to map this hypothetical interest rate onto real-world economies in which prices are
changing, nor is it clear how technological change (which typically is included in
models of the natural rate) takes place without any reallocation of resources. Milton
Friedman’s famous assertion that the natural rate is the rate that would be “ground
out by the Walrasian system” in a market system that incorporated “the actual struc-
tural characteristics” of the real economy, including all of its “market imperfections,
stochastic variability in demands and supplies, costs of gathering information..., costs
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of mobility, and so on” is an example of the incoherence that comes from marrying
Wicksellian policy to Walrasian theory. As Gordon (1979) observes, “The world that
Friedman is talking about is not a Walrasian world.”
Woodford (2005) is the canonical effort to rigorously integrate the Wicksellian
policy framework into modern models of intertemporal optimizing in a rigorous way.3
Woodford avoids the confusion embodied in the Friedman quote by explicitly con-
structing a model in which the interest rate that produces price stability is the same
one that would prevail in market without monetary frictions. But this is achieved
only by custom-designing the frictions to produce just this result, as Woodford himself
acknowledges. And it also requires abstracting away from all the “actual structural
characteristics” alluded to by Friedman, including everything related to the concrete
practice of monetary policy. In Woodford’s core model, there are no capital goods or
long-lived assets of any kind, and no private financial contracts; the central bank is
able to control the interest rate because it has a monopoly on all lending and bor-
rowing. (Mehrling, 2006) So the question of how private interest rates are set, and
the extent to which they will move with each other and with the policy rate, cannot
even arise in this model. In a later article, Woodford (2010b) offers a more realistic
picture, explicitly discussing the possibility that spreads between the policy rate and
rates facing nonfinancial borrowers reflect liquidity conditions within the financial
system (what Woodford calls “the supply of intermediation”) and inconsistent expec-
tations, as well as the objective risk properties of loans. Monetary policy, he argues,
“should take into account changes in financial conditions – particularly changes in
interest rate spreads”; furthermore, sufficiently large shifts in financial conditions will
be impossible to fully offset with changes in the policy, and will require the mone-
tary authority to directly target credit conditions for nonfinancial borrowers. This
3It is no coincidence that Woodford’s title echoes Wicksell (2007). Woodford describes his ap-
proach as “neo-Wicksellian” and opens his book with a quote from Wicksell.
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more sophisticated vision of multiple, endogenously determined interest rates finds no
support in Woodford’s preferred theory. It is natural to think that the “supply of in-
termediation” is ultimately rooted in institutional structures, in trust, in uncertainty
about the future, or more broadly in the difficult coordination problems posed by
the reorganization of large-scale production processes. But none of these possibilities
can be addressed within a framework of optimization under rational expectations.
Instead, Woodford ultimately explains the supply of intermediation in terms of the
intertemporal preferences of savers – precisely the factor that would govern interest
rates in a hypothetical world without intermediaries.
3.2.3 The Interest Rate as Liquidity Premium
Keynes offered an alternative basis for theorizing monetary policy by offering an
explicitly monetary account of interest rates. His emphasis on role of banks in setting
the terms of lending is similar to Wicksell’s. The difference is that Keynes saw a
diversity of private rates of return as an essential feature of capitalism, rather than
as a problem that could be eliminated by appropriate policy. In the Treatise on
Money, The General Theory, and inseveral subsequent articles, Keynes developed
a theory of the interest rate that begins from liquidity rather than intertemporal
preferences. Liquidity preference denies that interest is paid in compensation for
waiting – in general, the creation of a new loan does not require anyone to reduce
current consumption. Rather, it is compensation for accepting a less liquid balance
sheet position, meaning a change in one’s assets and liabilities that will make it
more difficult or costly to adjust payments in the future, or that increases the chance
that in some period payment obligations will not be met. In Treatise it is clearer
than in The General Theory that liquidity involves the full range of a unit’s assets
and liabilities. In the latter book Keynes chose for expositional purposes to treat
liquidity as a unique service of one asset, money, the supply of which is exogenously
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fixed. (Bibow, 2005, 2000b) But even in the The General Theory, it is clear that
liquidity is a property possessed in varying degrees by many different assets, and
there is no particular reason to draw the line in one particular place.4 Much of the
argument of The General Theory hinges on the existence of four distinct assets –
money, bonds, equities and tangible assets – and the rejection of the assumption, as
in the Classical and neo-Wicksellian theories, that all four must all have equal returns,
net of defaults. The most important thing for our purposes is that liquidity is not
just the reason for the difference between the rate targeted by the monetary authority
and the rate on money (“the” interest rate); it is an important factor in the relative
prices of all financial assets. Thus, for both the classical and Wicksellian traditions
the determination of the overall level of interest rates is conceptually distinct from the
determination of spreads between different rates – with the latter a detail of secondary
importance – for Keynes they are just two ways of looking at the same problem. In
fact it is a matter of indifference which particular liquidity premium we choose to call
“the” interest rate.
What is meant by liquidity preference? The term liquidity is widely used but not
always consistently defined. Depending on the context, it may refer to: monetary
ease, as reflected in low interest rates and the absence of credit rationing; sufficiently
thick markets for an asset that it can be bought or sold without moving the market
price (transaction liquidity); the extent to which economic units can acquire assets
by issuing new debt (funding liquidity); or the volume of central bank liabilities,
or of reserves held by the banking system. (Tirole, 2011) Keynes’ own usage was
not consistent; in the General Theory, he often treated it as interchangeable with
4“We can draw the line between ‘money’ and ‘debts’ at whatever point is most convenient for
handling a particular problem. For example, we can treat as money any command over general
purchasing power which the owner has not parted with for a period in excess of three months, and
as debt what cannot be recovered for a longer period than this; or we can substitute for three months
one month or three days or three hours or any other period.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 174)
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the quantity of money, which in turn was sometimes defined to include all short-
dated debt contracts and sometimes to include only monetary gold and central bank
liabilities. In the Treatise on Money, by contrast, liquidity was used in a more generic
way to describe a quality possessed in greater or lesser degree by all assets, with more
liquid assets being those “more certainly realisable at short notice without loss.”5
Further confusion arises from the conflation of liquidity preference in the sense of
the desire to be able to make payments in unforeseen circumstances, with the desire
to avoid capital losses.6 Nonetheless, the term has come to acquire a clear meaning
in Keynesian and Post Keynesian Theory: “Liquidity of a balance sheet ... is a
judgement of the adequacy of the liquid assets comprised in it ... to meet the claims,
of whatever kinds, that may be made on them.” In other words, liquidity means the
capacity to make money payments in the future whenever the need arises. The one
amendment more recent work would add is that liquidity is not only a property of
assets. It also depends on the ability to incur new liabilities on acceptable terms. A
unit’s capacity to borrow at short notice is part of its liquidity, even though it is not
formally recorded on the balance sheet. (Beggs, 2012)
From a Keynesian liquidity-centered prospective, there is no special importance
to the policy rate. It is merely one tool among others available to policy makers
to increase or diminish the banking system’s willingness to provide liquidity to the
nonfinancial sector by becoming more illiquid itself. And indeed, historically central
5Hicks (1962) identifies this phrase from the Treatise as Keynes’ first formal definition of liquid-
ity, and argues that the term entered general usage in this sense via Keynes’ contribution to the
MacMillan Report, rather than in the more restricted sense used in the General Theory.
6In the terminology of Robinson (1951), the General Theory has capital uncertainty stand in for
uncertainty of all kinds. As Crotty (2013) notes, “uncertainty as to the future course of the [long]
interest rate is the sole intelligible explanation of ... liquidity preference” offered in the General
Theory. But I would argue that this is a weakness with the way the concept is introduced in that
book, that is the result of the decision to abstract away from the financial system and treat financial
assets as if they were all owned directly by households. Keynes (1937a), which reintroduces the
banking system, makes it clear that liquidity preference describes the desire to retain flexibility in
the face of a variety of future contingencies, not just changes in the long rate.
148
banks have used a wide variety of tools to regulate the pace of credit creation. (Ep-
stein, 2007) As will be discussed below, there is a substantial empirical literature that
suggests that most of the spread between yields on different classes of debt security
are better explained by liquidity premium in the Keynesian sense than by default
risk. Not only is liquidity preference a natural way to integrate discussions of interest
rate spreads with the overall level of interest rates, attention to spreads is essential
to maintaining the usefulness of the liquidity preference framework itself. In a “hor-
izontalist” perspective in which the whole complex of interest rates moves together
and that the monetary authority sets the policy rate, there is no place for liquidity
as an independent factor. (Smithin, 2008)
3.2.4 The Transmission of Monetary Policy
In modern economies, the usual way of thinking about interest rates is to first
identify the policy rate set by the central bank, and then ask to how far other interest
rates lie above the policy rate.The mechanism linking monetary policy to market
rates has evolved historically, with a variety of targets and instruments being used by
central banks to regulate the pace of expansion of the monetary system as a whole. In
the wake of the worldwide financial crisis of 2008, it may be that another major shift
is occurring in the channels through which monetary policy operates, with interest on
reserves replacing open market operations and a wider range of assets being purchased
by central banks. (Friedman, 2014) That said, it is useful to go step by step along the
full chain of the monetary transmission mechanism as it operated (or was understood
to operate) prior to the crisis. First, the central bank changes its policy rate. Second,
this changes the current funding costs of financial institutions. Third, the change in
current funding costs changes expectations of average funding costs over the length
of a given loan. Fourth, a change in expected funding costs changes current risk-free
long rates. Fifth, a change in the risk-free rate at a given maturity changes the the
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rate faced by private borrowers on loans of similar maturities. And finally, sixth,
a change in borrowing rates changes desired expenditure. At each of these steps,
there may be factors that act as wedges, raising the next rate by some more or less
stable amount, and/or that dampen changes in both directions. Most discussions of
interest rates in macroeconomic contexts ignore the intermediate steps and simply
ask whether the policy rate is (or can be, in the case of the zero lower bound) set
at the appropriate level. Many older Keynesian writers did express doubts about the
final step, from borrowing costs to real economic activity.
There are at least three important possible points at which “wedges” can appear
in this chain. First, the relationship between the policy rate and the funding costs
of financial institutions depends on the mix of liabilities on those institutions’ bal-
ance sheets. in particular, access to low-cost deposit funding tended to lower banks’
funding costs relative to the policy rate, and the loss of it has tended to raise them.
Second, there is the issue most emphasized by Keynes, the term structure. For banks
considering a longer loan, what matters is not funding costs today, but the behavior
of interest rates over the life of the loan. The majority of mainstream theory, drawing
on a rational expectations framework, is explicitly committed to the idea that ex-
pectations of economic variables are always an unbiased estimate of those variables’
future values, so the fact that a central bank will be following a certain policy rule
in the future determines market participants beliefs about future rates today. In this
framework, there is no reason for central banks to actively communicate future policy,
since “the public has no difficulty in correctly perceiving the pattern in the central
bank’s actions.” (Woodford, 2005, p. 18) Conversely, if the central bank cannot con-
trol market participants beliefs about future interest rates, it will have little control
over long rates today. Finally, the spread between loans of the same maturity may
vary for reasons beyond the risk of default losses. Probably the most important of
these is the liquidity premium, but market power may also have an effect.
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The distinction between the policy rate and rates facing nonfinancial borrowers is
particularly important in contemporary debates about monetary policy preceding the
Great Recession. The financial system’s failure to translate expansionary monetary
policy into low borrowing costs for end users, especially given its ability to do so
before 1980, raises questions about the extent to which the deregulation and growth
of finance have in fact improved credit provision for the real economy. Higher interest
rate spreads are part of the larger phenomenon described by Phillipon (2012), that
“the unit cost of intermediation is higher today than it was a century ago, and it
has increased over the past 30 years. One interpretation is that improvements in
information technology may have been cancelled out by increases in other financial
activities whose social value is difficult to assess.”
In the remainder of the essay, I consider interest rate spreads from three different
perspectives. We may think of interest rate spreads in terms of maturity, as the
difference between yields on shorter and longer duration loans. We may think about
interest rate spreads in terms of borrower (or project) characteristics, as the difference
between yields on loans to higher quality and lower quality borrowers. Or, we may
think about interest rate spreads in terms of monetary policy transmission – that is,
from the point of view of credit intermediaries, as the difference between the yield
on assets and funding costs. For each of these perspectives, I offer a review of the
empirical evidence and then ask how well it is handled by the Classical-Walrasian
and liquidity approaches.
3.3 Term Spreads and Expectations
Term spreads refer to the difference between interest rates on otherwise similar
loans of different maturities. It is generally assumed that term spreads will be positive,
with higher rates on loans of longer maturities; the opposite case, in which shorter
maturity debt carries higher interest rates than longer maturity, is referred to as a
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“yield inversion” and considered exceptional. (As noted above, in the 19th century
short rates typically exceeded long rates.) Here, I focus on the spread between the
10-year Treasury bond and 3-month Treasury bill as a measure of the term spread.
it is difficult to calculate exact term spreads for other loans since it is not in general
possible to get long and short rates for the identical population of borrowers.
If the interest rate is an intertemporal price, that means it is the price to transfer
one unit of income or expenditure from time t + 1 to time t. In other words, it is
equal to the ratio pi,t/pi,t+1 for any good i.
7 Arbitrage should ensure that
pi,t/pi,t+u = (pi,t/pi,t+v)(pi,t+v/pi,t+u) (3.1)
for any intervals u and v. In other words, the expected yield on a long loan should
be the same as on a series of shorter loans covering the same period. The view that,
because investors have unbiased expectations of future short rates, this arbitrage
condition will be satisfied on average, is referred to as the “expectation hypothesis.”
It is often written in log form as:
int =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
ietj (3.2)
where int refers to the rate on an n period bond and
1
n
∑n−1
j=0 i
e
tj refers to the average
of the expected short rates till period n.The modified version of the expectation
hypothesis adds a pure forward time premium that is constant over time ρm to
account for the risk of holding the long bond to maturity.
3.3.1 Empirical Evidence on the Term Spread
Table 3.2 shows term spreads for three periods: 1954 to 1980, 1981 to 2013, and
1981 to 2003. The third period is included to allow comparisons of the long rate
7As noted above, the existence of a unique interest rate in this framework requires either working
in terms of a single representative good, or assuming no changes in relative prices between periods.
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Table 3.2: Interest Rate Term Premiums Pre- and Post-1980
1954-1980 1981-2013 1981-2003
3-Month Treasury Bill
Mean 4.8 4.6 5.7
Standard Deviation 2.5 3.4 3.0
10-Year Treasury Bond
Mean 5.7 6.5 7.6
Standard Deviation 2.2 3.1 2.8
Mean Yield Premium, 10-Year Bond over 3-Month Bill
Current 0.9 1.9 1.8
Realized -0.1 3.9 3.9
Source: FRED
The realized spread is the difference between the current 10-year bond rate and the geometric
mean of the short rate over the following 10 years.
with the ex post average short rate. The table shows that the spread between current
short and current long rates was almost 2 points wider after 1980 than before 1980,
and the realized spread between long rates and short rates over the length of the loan
averaged almost 4 points higher.
Figure 3.2 shows current interest rates on Treasury securities of various maturities
over the full period. The wider term spreads of the post-1980 period are clearly visible.
The widening applies to the whole term structure, but is more pronounced for the
longer end; during much of the earlier period, there is no term premium for 20-
year bonds over 10-year bonds, and often none for 10-year bonds over 5-year bonds
either. The widening of the term structure is most pronounced during periods in
which short rates are low,which may have implications for the causes of the increase
in term spreads. Figure 3.3 shows the ex post spreads for 10-year Treasury bonds and
corporate bonds, that is, the difference between the current rate and the geometric
mean of the 3-month Treasury rate over the following 10 years. Here the break around
1980 is especially dramatic. In the two decades from 1960 through 1979, there were
only two years in which the realized term premium on 10-year bonds was positive,
and then by less than 0.2 percentage points in each case. By contrast, in every
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single year since 1980 there has been a positive realized term premium of at least one
point in every year, with much larger premiums common. Given the magnitude and
abruptness of this change in realized term premiums, it is not plausible that is simply
reflects increased compensation for interest rate risk, especially given the relatively
modest increase in interest rate variance documented in Table 3.2. It’s also worth
noting from figure 3.3 that realized spreads were highest for bonds issued at the peak
of monetary policy tightening episodes, when short rates were highest. A natural way
to make sense of both this pattern and the long-term increase in term premiums is
that market participants placed too much weight on business-cycle frequency interest
movements, and too little weight on longer frequency movements. So they were
surprised both when interest rates returned to their old levels after a tightening or
loosening episode, and when interest rates failed to return to their old levels after
rising or falling over a longer period. This is consistent with the empirical literature
on expectations in bond markets, as we will see in the next section. The pattern of
high realized term premiums when monetary policy is tight is also consistent with
the idea of interest rate spreads driven by liquidity premiums. If the return on a long
bond is compensation for its relative illiquidity, one would expect that return to be
highest when liquidity is scarce.
Diebold, Rudebusch and Aruoba (2003) note that “severe failures of the expec-
tation hypothesis” have been found in empirical tests ever since the hypothesis was
first formulated in the 1930s. Their own VAR tests find that the yield curve is
strongly affected by recent macroeconomic conditions, but has little predictive power
for conditions in the future. Another review of the empirical literature finds that the
expectations hypothesis “is strongly rejected with US interest rates”; despite consid-
erable efforts to identify biases that might led to false rejections of the hypothesis, “it
remains inconsistent with the data.” (Bekaert and Hodrick, 2001) Numerous studies
have confirmed that both the pure expectations and modified expectations lack em-
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Figure 3.2: Term Structure of Federal Debt, 1953-2013
Source: FRED
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Figure 3.3: Ex Post Term Spreads, 1953-2003
Source: FRED
The figure shows the difference between the current 10-year Treasury and Baa corporate
bond rate, respectively, and the geometric mean of the 3-month Treasury bill rate over
the following 10 years. Note that the average maturity of corporate bonds throughout this
period is close to 10 years.
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pirical backing. (See Guidolin and Thornton (2008) and Sarno, Thornton and Valente
(2007) for more thoroguh reviews). The consensus of the this literature is that the
expectations hypothesis “simply fails empirically.” (Mehrling and Neilson, 2009) As
Froot (1990) observes, “If the attractiveness of an economic hypothesis is measured
by the number of papers which statistically reject it, the expectations theory of the
term structure is a knockout.”
There are a number of ways of making sense of the empirical failure of the expec-
tations hypothesis. For simplicity, we will discuss them in terms of bonds, but the
same logic applies to bank loans and other kinds of debt.
First, it may be that bond market participants are attempting to apply Equation
3.2, but are unable to predict future short rates. Alternatively, Equation 3.2 may not
accurately describe the behavior of bond markets. If debt securities are not always
held to maturity but may be traded in the secondary market, then potential bond
purchasers will take into capital gains or losses that will occur if long rates change
while they hold the bond, as well as the bond’s yield. This means that long rates
will be influenced by expectations of future long rates, which may be independent of
expectations of short rates. The possibility of capital gains or losses is what allows for
the existence of self-sustaining interest rate conventions, and was the basis of Keynes’
conception of the liquidity trap. A third possibility is that bondholders are not simply
seeking to maximize expected return, but are weighing return against liquidity. In
that case, if bonds of different maturities are different in terms of the ease with which
they can be resold, accepted as collateral, or otherwise used to generate cashflows,
then their expected returns will be different even taking account of capital gains.
3.3.2 Do Long Rates Reflect Future Short Rates?
If bond markets correctly anticipate future interest rate movements, then the cur-
rent level of a long bond should be equal to the geometric average of short rates over
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the life of the bond, plus a risk premium. Given the risk premium, there should be
no excess profits from holding long bonds over any particular period. Any systematic
variation over time in excess profits , then, logically can be due to unrealized expec-
tations (i.e the failure of rational expectations), or to a time varying risk premium.
For the most part, explanation of the deviations of expected short rates from the
long rate has been focused on examining differences in risk assessment of market
players. (Campbell and Cochrane, 1995) More recent work however suggests that
forecasts of the long rate are strongly influenced by prevailing short rates and that
the failure to adequately assess future short rates may be the main reasons behind the
failure of the expectations hypothesis. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) note that for
example examine professional forecaster data that historical survey data finds that
“forecasts of interest rates are made as if both the level and the slope of the yield
curve were more persistent than they appear in hindsight.” (Emphasis in original.)
Piazessi and Schneider also note that ”Most asset pricing studies .. assume that
investors’ historical predictions were identical to in-sample predictions derived today
from statistical models, thus ruling the first reason [i.e. unrealized expectations]
out.” Forecasting models used by government and businesses typcially incorporate an
assumption that market participants expect current short rates to be more persistent
than the model itself predicts. For example, the FRBUS model used by the Federal
Reserve in macroeconomic forecasting is able to generate realistic responses to interest
rate shocks only because in its model of expectations, after short rates rise they are
“anticipated to persist at an elevated level far longer than the actual policy model
entails.” (Brayton and Tinsley, 1996)
An explicit test of the short-rate forecasts embodied in long rates find that a
model that uses current long rates to predict future short rates cannot improve on
a random walk. (Guidolin and Thornton, 2008) In other words, long rates include
no information about future short rates. In much of the empirical literature, this
158
failure is explained in terms of an unobseravble, time-varying risk premium. Guidolin
and Thornton (2008) suggest the more natural explanation that market participants
find it impossible to predict future short-term interest rates to any degree. Along
the same lines, (Froot, 1990) uses survey data to compare interest rate forecasts to
observed bond yields, and finds that the behavior of long rates closely follows market
participants’ self-reported forecasts of short rates. This suggests that varying risk
premiums are not an important component of term premiums, and that the failure
of the expectations hypothesis is due to the failure of rational expectations. market
particiaptns do not actively forecast the future (at least beyond a short horizon), but
act as if current conditions will persist indefinitely. )
This seemingly excessive confidence that current short rates will persist is consis-
tent with Keynes’s analysis of the bond market. From his perspective, the expectation
of future rates is contingent, independent of “fundamentals,” and guided by prevail-
ing market conditions.Keynes (1937b) describes the importance of the instability of
expectations and the need to anchor them in current circumstances:
‘We have, as a rule, only the vaguest idea of any but the most direct
consequences of our acts. ... The fact that our knowledge of the future is
fluctuating, vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable
subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. ..... How do
we manage in such circumstances to behave in a manner which saves our
faces as rational, economic men? ..:
(1) We assume that the present is a much more serviceable guide to
the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to
have been hitherto. ...
(2) We assume that the existing state of opinion as expressed in prices
... is based on a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can
accept it as such unless and until something new and relevant comes into
the picture.
This belief that “the present is a ... serviceable guide to the future” can help
explain the increase in term spreads after the early 1980s. From the end of World
War Two through 1980, short rates followed a steadily increasing trend. From 1981
through the present, they have followed a decreasing trend. Anyone who expected
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current rates to persist would have been surprised by both of these trends. Thus,
bond market participants systematically underestimated future rates in the period
of rising rates prior to 1980, and overestimated them in the period of falling rates
since then. Under these conditions, the attempt to behave according to Equation 3.2
would have resulted in greater realized spreads in the second period than in the first
one. In its simplest form, this cannot be the full story, since rates on long bonds
also increased relative to the current short rate. As Table 3.2 shows, the increase in
the term premium over current short rates accounts for about half the increase in
the ex post realzied term premium. Some of this increase might also be explained in
terms of overweighting of the present, if it is not current rates which are expected
to persist but some average of recent periods. While the empirical evidence is clear
that expectations of short rates overweight current weights and do not incorporate
information about future rates, it is doubtful whether the relative weights of current
and past rates in expectation formation can be settled with any precision. So while
the belief that current conditions will be more persistent “ than a candid examination
of past experience would show” is clearly an important factor in the rise in ex post
term spreads and may have contributed to the rise in ex ante term spreads as well,
we should also consider other explanations.
3.3.3 Capital Gains and Self-Sustaining Conventions
The second strand of Keynesian analysis of term spreads is the idea that, like
exchange rates and stock prices, interest rates on long-maturity loans are set in large
part by convention. (Hannsgen, 2004) While convention is often discussed in terms
of mass psychology, conventional prices arise naturally when profit-seeking investors
trade long-lived assets. The reason for this is that, over any time horizon shorter than
the life of the asset, returns will incorporate capital gains or losses as well as yields.
The shorter the horizon relative to the life of the asset, the more important will be
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capital gains or losses due to valuation changes. (So valuation changes are unimpor-
tant for short-term debts, more important for long bonds, and most important for
foreign exchange and equity, which are in effect perpetuities.) Capital gains or losses
depend on changes in the price of the asset, which in turn depend on changes in its
expected returns. But insofar as capital gains or losses are a major component in re-
turns, expected returns depend in turn about expectations of future prices. The price
which profit-seeking investors will pay for an asset is based on whatever they expect
the price to be in the future. So once a given price becomes accepted as “normal,”
rational investors should purchase the asset at any price below that, and sell at any
price above it. Ironically, this kind of self-stabilizing convention is strongest when it
is believed to be based on fundamentals.
As applied concretely to interest rates, the essential point is that bond prices move
inversely with yields. So the holder of a given bond will experience a capital gain
when the market interest rate on that type of bond falls, and a capital loss when the
interest rate rises. In this case, the yield on a long bond should satisfy:
il = is − gel
where il and is are the long and short rates, respectively, and g
e
l is the expected
capital gain from holding the long bond for one period. The capital gain or loss in
turn depends on the expected change in the long interest rate; if that rate is expected
to fall, then holding a long bond implies an expected capital gain, while if long rates
are expected to rise, then holders of long bonds will expect a capital loss. The exact
value of the capital loss depends not only on the interest rate change itself, but on the
maturity of the bond and whether interest is paid at regular intervals, at maturity, or
some combination.8 The general principle, though, can be illustrated by taking the
8In the 19th century, the typical structure of federal bonds was the hybrid case where bonds both
made regular coupon payments and were sold at a discount to face value. (Homer, 1996, ch. 16)
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relatively simple case of a “consol” or perpetual bond. If the annual coupon payment
is c and the prevailing interest rate is ic, then the value of the consol will satisfy:
C =
c
ic
The total return from holding the bond for some period δ will then be given by:
Reδ = ic(1− i
e
c − ic
i2c
)δ (3.3)
where iec is the interest rate that is expected to obtain at the end of the period.
Equation 3.3 formalizes “a notably obscure numerical example” in Chapter 15 of the
General Theory, where the idea of the liquidity trap (though not that term) is first
introduced. (Taylor, 2009) What is clear from Equation 3.3 is that if future long rates
are expected to be even moderately different from current rates, it will take a very
large difference in yield (relative to short rates) to offset the expected capital gain or
loss. For example, suppose that both long and short rates are intiialy at 5%. Now
short rates fall to 0. Investors must now reevaluate their choice between a consol or
in a short-term security. Suppose, for simplicity, that either asset will be held for one
year, and that the investor believes that 5% is the normal consol rate and expects it
to return to that level by the end of the year. What is the minimum rate the investor
will accept on the consol? With short rates at zero, investors should be willing to
accept less than 5% return on the long bond, but the yield must still be sufficiently
high to compensate for the expected capital loss when the long rate returns to 5%
in a year. Solving Equation 3.3 gives a current long rate for this case of 4.76%. In
other words, a five point fall in short rates here leads to only an 0.24 point fall in
long rates – less than one twentieth as much. The small movement in long rates, in
turn, is consistent with the belief that long rates never fall much below 5%. So in
retrospect, investors will not be sorry they did not take advantage of the apparent
arbitrage opportunity presented by the large gap between short and long rates. In
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this way, the belief in a normal level of interest rates can be self-confirming and does
not require any major departure from rational profit-seeking behavior, even if there
is no objective basis for the belief.
In reality, even long bonds are not normally perpetuities, and investors’ belief
about the future levels of long rates are not absolutely fixed. These factors will make
conventions weaker. But on the other hand, the share of capital gains in overall
returns gets larger as the yield itself falls. In Keynes’ terms, “[A] long-term rate of
interest of (say) 2 per cent leaves more to fear than to hope, and offers, at the same
time, a running yield which is only sufficient to offset a very small measure of fear.”
(Keynes, 1936, p. 202) This tends to strengthen the role of conventions as interest
rates fall. Adding to this mathematical fact is the sociological one that beliefs about
“normal” interest rates are less likely to take the form of a point value than of a
range, or of a floor below which rates are not expected to stay for any significant
amount of time. Thus the expectation of a future rise in rates, and associated capital
loss on long bonds, may be important only when current rates fall out of this range
or below this floor. But in principle, strongly rooted expectations of any level of
long rate will produce expectations of capital losses when interest rates fall below
that level; the resulting bond sales will prevent rates from falling much below the
expected level, which will confirm expectations. So while what Taylor (2009) calls the
“Hicks-Krugman liquidity trap” is a distinct phenomenon of the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates, this is not true of the Keynesian expectations-based liquidity
trap: “Any level of interest which is accepted with sufficient conviction as likely to
be durable will be durable.” (Keynes, 1936)
In the summary of Bibow (2005):
The problem Keynes described exists at any level of interest: if open-
market purchases drive up securities prices, their running yields so-reduced
will compensate for less perceived risk of a renewed future rise in interest.
Yet, in a given state of expectations, this risk rises the further the rate
of interest deviates from what is considered a “fairly safe level” in that
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state of expectations. Ceteris paribus investors prefer to move into a
more liquid position ... A limit is reached when selling pressure due to
securities holders’ move into cash fully offsets the [central bank’s] open-
market trades. At that point the central bank has lost effective control:
the system is in a liquidity trap. This condition may arise at any level of
interest.
The stability of conventions about the “normal” level of long rates is significantly
enhanced by political factors. In particular, institutions with portfolios of interest-
bearing assets but whose own liabilities are not-interest bearing, will se their survival
threatened by a fall in interest rates below some threshold. Today, this is primarily
an issue for pension funds, insurance companies and similar institutional investors
with contractualy fixed liabilities. Formerly, it also included banks, which funded
themselves mainly with non-interest-bearing deposits. Opposition from banks for
this reason may have been an important reason that the Fed did not conduct more
expansionary policy in the early 1930s. (Epstein and Ferguson, 1984)
For our purposes, key point is that stability of long rates will mean large gap
between long and short rates when short rates are used for expansionary policy. This
has been more common since 1980 than in the immediate postwar period, in part
because aggregate demand has had a stronger tendency to fall short of potential
output, in part because policy has relied more exclusively on interest rates to close
output gaps.
3.4 Credit Spreads: Risk, Liquidity, Institutions
In addition to the spread between longer and shorter interest rates, there is also
a range of interest rates on securities of the same maturity. This is referred to as
the credit spread. It is common to describe credit spreads as risk premiums. This is
reasonable provided we are clear that there is a wide variety of possible risks being
charged for, and that the observed premium does not necessarily have any relationship
to the true ex post riskiness of the security by any measure. Still, to avoid confusion it
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may be better to prefer the more neutral term credit spread, and reserve risk premium
for that portion of the credit spread that is demonstrably explained by the costs of
bearing default risk.
In general, there are five reasons we might expect positive credit spreads. First is
default losses – the expected return on a risky loan is less than its yield because some
fraction of loans will default, and recoveries in the case of default will generally be less
than the full value of the loan. So to give the same expected return as a riskfree asset
of similar maturity, a risky loan must carry a higher interest rate, with the difference
equal to the expected probability of default, times one minus the recovery rate in the
case of default. This product is referred to as the credit loss rate. Second, since the
incidence of defaults is unpredictable, and because defaults tend to be correlated with
each other and with low returns from other assets, investors will generally require
some compensation for bearing default risk, so the spread will be larger than the
expected default loss. Third, risky bonds typically trade in thinner markets than
Treasuries, so transaction costs will be higher. Compensation for these higher costs is
sometimes referred to as the liquidity premium, but I prefer to reserve that term for
the fourth factor below, and call this an intermediation or transactions-cost premium.
Fourth, the holder of an asset faces a danger that in a situation where current cash
commitments exceed current income, the asset may not be readily convertible into
cash, or only at a substantial discount from its value if held to maturity. This is
sometimes called “liquidation risk.” (Ziegler and Duffie, 2001) This class of risk is
treated in much of mainstream literature as an unimportant or trivial contributor to
credit spreads. (Amato and Remolona, 2003). But from a Keynesian perspective it
is a central factor factor in credit spreads. As discussed in Section 3.2.3 above, from
this perspective the fundamental reason interest is paid as compensaton for giving up
liquidity, that is, the ability to make payments as needed. Finally, to the extent that
lenders enjoy market power vis-a-vis certain classes of borrowers, they will be able
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to set interest rates at a higher markup over funding costs plus the premiums above.
This will create a credit spread between loans to borrowers with relatively less and
more capacity to switch lenders.
The bulk of the literature on credit spreads focuses on the first two factors, which
connect the spread between debt securities of the same maturity as a function of
default risk. Indeed, since the “risk” relevant to debt contracts is normally assumed
to be default risk, the practice of referring to these spreads as “risk premia” treats
this explanation as true by definition. Empirically, however, it is not easy to establish
a connection between credit spreads and default risk.
3.4.1 Interest and Default Rates for Corporate Bonds Historically
Figure 3.4 shows the spread between Aaa and Baa corporate bond rates and the
10-year Treasury rate, and the annual default rates on investment-grade (Baa and
better) corporate bonds and on all rated bonds. Initially, the data in Figure 3.4 might
appear consistent with the idea that credit spreads reflect default risk. The premium
for Baa bonds over the 10-year Treasury rate is of the same order of magnitude as the
overall default rate for corporate bonds, and the two seem to follow a similar pattern
over time, with peaks and troughs coming in the same years. In addition, there has
been a secular increase in both credit spreads and default rates. Between 1946 and
1979, the overall default rate for corporate bonds was only 0.3 percent, and there
were a number of years in which no defaults on rated corporate bonds. By contrast,
the corporate bond default rate has averaged 1.5 percent in the period since 1980.
This apparent fit between credit spreads and default rates may be misleading,
however. In the first place, periods of high default involve bonds of various vintages,
so a rational risk premium should vary less over the cycle than default rates themselves
do. Thus, the tight link between fluctuations in default rates and fluctuations in
credit spreads is evidence against the idea that credit spreads primarily reflect default
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Figure 3.4: Credit Spreads and Default Rates for Corporate Bonds, 1953-2013
Source: FRED, Moody’s, author’s analysis.
The solid and dashed gray lines show annual dollar-weighted default rates for all corporate
bonds and investment-grade corporate bonds, respectively, from Moody’s “Annual Default
Study: Corporate Default and Recovery Rates.” Investment grade includes ratings Baa
and above. The marked black lines show the interest rate premium on Aaa and Baa-rated
corporate bonds, respectively, over the current 10-year Treasury bond rate.
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risk. More generally, there is no reason for rational investors to demand higher
interest rates on newly issued debt at a time when current default rates are high.
Rather, they should demand higher interest rates when there is reason to expect
defaults to be higher in the future. So if periods of high interest rates reflect a
rational judgement that default risk has increased, they should precede periods of
elevated defaults, rather than coinciding with or following them. The anomalous
relationship between defaults and credit spreads is especially noticeable in the most
recent cycle. By the standards of the post-1980 period, credit spreads were relatively
low in the years prior to the financial crisis, giving no indication that bond market
participants anticipated the elevated default rates of 2008-2009. Since the crisis,
however, spreads have remained close to the highest level on record. Yet perhaps
surprisingly, recent default experience is not exceptional by the standards of recent
business cycles. At over 5 percent of bonds outstanding, defaults were very high in
2009. But perhaps due to the exceptional interventions of the Federal Reserve and
other central banks, corporate defaults dropped back to normal levels more quickly
than in other recent recessions. Over the five years 2008-2012, a cumulative total of
9.8 percent of outstanding corporate bonds went into default. This is somewhat more
than double the postwar annual average of 0.9 percent per year. But it is lower than
for the five-year periods of elevated defaults around the previous two business cycle
peaks: 13.7 percent in 1999-2003, and 11.2 percent in 1989-1993.9 Thus, it is hard to
interpret the pattern shown in Figure 3.4 as reflecting a premium for varying levels
of default risk. The credit spread varies too much over the cycle, fails to anticipate
periods of elevated defaults, and is not proportionate to the ex post riskiness of high-
rated corporate bonds. As I will discuss below, these impressions are borne out by the
9These numbers are derived from Moody’s Investor Service, “Annual Default Study: Corporate
Default and Recovery Rates,” various years.
168
empirical literature, which does not in general find that credit spreads are informative
about future default rates.
It is important to realize that defaults are heavily concentrated among corpo-
rations with “speculative-grade” ratings well below Baa, and that a large part of
the long-term rise in the overall default rate represents an increase in the propor-
tion of bonds issued by such risky borrowers, as opposed to an increase in default
risk for borrowers with a given rating. In Moody’s rating system, Baa is the lowest
“investment-grade” rating, and defaults of investment-grade bonds are very rare, av-
eraging less than 0.05 percent for the postwar period as a whole. For higher ratings,
defaults are even rarer. The postwar average dollar-weighted default rate for corpo-
rate bonds rated A and above is 0.01 percent, and no Aaa-rated corporate bond has
defaulted since 1920. These numbers do not give the full picture of the riskiness of
such bonds, however, since defaults are normally preceded by a downgrade. What is
relevant is not the rating at the time of default, but the rating at the time the bond
was issued.
Because defaults of Aaa-rated corporate bonds are exceptionally rare, it is hard
to explain either the size or the trend in these spreads in terms of default risk. In
fact, in the entire period since World War II, the only years in which the bonds of any
corporations rated Aaa at issuance have defaulted, were 1988 and 1991. It is striking
that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 did not produce any such defaults, though it did
of course involve many defaults of Aaa-rated asset-backed securities. (Ou, 2012) Even
more strikingly, for corporate bonds issued with investment-grade ratings, the default
rate was lower over the 2008-2012 period than for the postwar period as a whole – a
fact that has been the source of some surprise to financial market participants.10
10For instance: Deutsche Bank’s 2012 report, “Five Years of Financial Crisis: The Default Bark
Is Far Worse than the Bite.” See also Moody’s Analytics June 2011 report, “If the Default Rate is
So Low, Why Are Credit Spreads So Wide?” The report notes that “credit spreads are too wide
from the perspective of a comparatively low ... default rate,” and attributes the excessive spreads
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(a) Aaa-rate at Issue
(b) Baa-rate at Issue
Figure 3.5: Corporate Bond Interest Premium and Ex Post Default Rate, 1970-2003
Source: FRED, Moody’s, author’s analysis.
The heavy gray lines show the difference between the market interest rate for Aaa- and
Baa-rated corporate bonds, respectively, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate at the time
of issue. The solid black line shows the cumulative default rate for corporate bonds issued
in that year with that rating over the 10 subsequent years. The dotted line shows the
estimated credit loss over the same 10 years, using the average recovery rate for corporate
bonds of 40 percent.
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Figure 3.5 shows the premium on Aaa- and Baa-rated corporate bonds over 10-
year treasury bonds in the year they were issued, and the cumulative default rates on
those bonds over the following decade. (The average corporate bond has a maturity
of just under 10 years.) The figure also shows estimated credit losses, using the
historical average recovery rate in corporate defaults of 40 percent. As can be seen,
the premium on both Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds is much higher than realized default
losses. There have been no defaults for corporate bonds issued after 1985 (or before
1978), yet these bonds continue to carry interest rates one to two points higher than
Treasury bonds of similar maturity.
In principle, the existence of some default risk even for the highest-rated corporate
bonds can help explain the spread between their yields and Treasuries. But on the
face of it, it does not appear that the bond market priced this risk into Aaa yields in a
meaningful way. As can be seen, the 1988/1991 default episodes involved bonds issued
from 1978 through 1985. But bond interest rates in those years were not especially
high, as one might expect if the market price incorporated information about future
default probabilities not incorporated into bond ratings. In fact, the bonds that
would default in 1988 and 1991 were mostly issued at times when the spread between
the Aaa and 10-year Treasury rate was unusually low. Of course, it is possible that
market participants did know the true ex ante distribution of default risk, and that
the late 1980s simply saw an unusually poor draw from that distribution, while the
low spreads in the late 1970s and early 1980s were due to an unusually high level of
risk appetite among bond buyers in that period. It is striking, however, that the Aaa-
10-year Treasury spread reached its highest levels in the later 1990s and 2000s. This
is consistent with the psychologically plausible story that bond market participants
revised upward their beliefs about Aaa default probabilities following 1988-1991. This
to a “perceived reduction in the ability of sovereign governments and central banks to prevent or
remedy economic downturns” and to “much greater financial systemic risk.”
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is not, however, compatible with the view that bond market participants know the
true ex ante distribution of default risk.
Furthermore, the absolute level of the Aaa premium is hard to reconcile with the
realized default rate. Since 1980, the annual default rate on bonds of corporations
with Aaa ratings at issuance, has been approximately 0.05 percent – one twentieth
of one percentage point. And given an average recovery rate of around 40 percent,
the default losses have been even lower. But the premium of Aaa bonds over 10-year
treasuries has been 1.2 percent – around 40 times the expected annual default loss.
The case of Baa bonds is only a little less extreme, with credit spreads averaging about
ten times expected default losses. Even if default risk were largely undiverfisifiable, as
argued by Amato and Remolona (2003), there is no plausible level of risk aversion that
could produce such a premium. And in fact, a large number of financial instruments
exist precisely to allow the hedging of credit risk. One can logically tell a story in
which the market is pricing in the possibility of very low-frequency events with much
larger default rates than observed since World War II – as in the 1870s. (Barro
and Ursa, 2012) It is debatable how much of the higher spreads over the whole 1980
period represented expectations of some chance of 2008-like crisis; there is strong
evidence that the expected ex ante probability of such a crisis was much lower than
even one realization of a 2008-type crisis in two or three decades. (Crotty, 2009)
For the increase in spreads to be a rational response to higher expected default rates,
however, the expected probability of a crisis would have to be much higher than what
has been actually realized. This seems implausible.
3.4.2 The Credit Spread Puzzle
These observations are borne out by much of the empirical work on the “Credit
Spread Puzzle” – the lesser known cousin of the equity premium puzzle. While there
has been little attention paid to the increase in credit spreads since 1980, the larger
172
question of whether expected default risk can explain the existence of large credit
spreads has attracted significant empirical work. As with the term spread, there is a
consensus that the observed pattern of yields across debt classes is inconsistent with
any straightforward model of rational expectations. A survey of the literature con-
cludes that “credit risk cannot possibly explain the observed corporate yield spreads.”
(Huang and Huang, 2002)
The credit spread puzzle refers to the fact that the interest premium on risky bonds
is much higher than expected default losses, and not strongly correlated with them
either over time or across borrowers:“measures of a company’s probability of default
do not seem to be as variable as the credit spread over time.” (Federal Reserve Bank
of San Francisco, 2004) Goldstein (2009) examines the ability of the standard bond-
pricing models to explain observed credit spreads, and finds that “it is difficult for a
basic structural model to explain why credit spreads are as high as they historically
have been, given relatively low historical default rates.” The Baa-treasury spread,
for example, is five times larger than the average annual default losses from Baa
bonds. Chen, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2009) similarly find that conventional
models of bond pricing by risk-averse investors generate spreads between Aaa- and
B-rated bonds of approximately 0.57%, less than half [the] historical value. Amato
and Remolona (2003) find that “across all rating categories and maturities, expected
loss accounts for only a small fraction of spreads.” Over 19997-2003, for example,
B-rated 3-5 year bonds had yields 170 basis points above the riskfree rate, yet annual
default losses averaged only 20 basis points. Similarly, Huang and Huang (2002)
find that “calibrating models with actual default data shows none can explain more
than 20-30% of observed yield spreads.” They note that almost all models that predict
credit spreads similar to those observed, do so by predicting default rates much higher
than observed. When default rates are constrained to historical levels, these models
predict much lower spreads. “Under empirically reasonable parameter choices, .... for
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investment grade bonds of all maturities, credit risk accounts for only a small fraction
– typically 20% – of the observed corporate-Treasury yield spreads.”
While the empirical literature is consistent in finding that credit spreads are,
in general, too large to be explained straightforwardly by default risk, little of the
work in this area is concerned with the variation in spreads over time. One of the
few exceptions is Giesecke et al. (2011), which looks at the relationship between
bond yields and default rates over the whole history of the American corporate bond
market, going back to the mid-19th century. While the default rates of investment-
grade bonds have varied sharply over time – with default rates reaching 35 percent
in the 1870s – bond yields seem completely insensitive to subsequent default rates:
“Changes in credit spreads have no forecast power for realized default rates.” This is
all the more striking since various macro variables do predict future default rates. The
logical conclusion is that expected future default losses is not a useful framework for
thinking about credit spreads, which seem to be driven mainly by “financial market
factors such as illiquidity and risk premia, rather than by fundamentals.”
3.4.3 The Credit Spread as Liquidity Premium
A number of various ad hoc, more or less implausible explanations have been
offered for credit spread puzzle within the standard framework of risk priced by ra-
tional, optimizing agents. There is also a strand of evidence that the premium of
risky bonds should be thought of as compensation of illiquidity rather than risk-
bearing. Analyzing credit spreads in these terms requires the specific Keynesian idea
of liquidity.
In the standard framework decisionmakers are households intertemporally maxi-
mizing utility from consumption. In this framework liquidity typically means simply
the transaction costs associated with taking a position in the asset; in some cases,
it may also imply that the value of the asset will be low in states of the world in
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which the marginal value of consumption is high. (Goldstein, 2009) But the analysis
is always conducted in terms of households maximizing their expected utility from
consumption. The alternative is to see the economy as essentially monetary, and
the question of taking an asset position (particularly for the kinds of units that hold
credit market debt) is not to improve the expected distribution of consumption over
the lifetime, but to achieve positive returns while keeping the probability of being able
to meet all current obligations above some threshold. This is a fundamentally differ-
ent view of liquidity, which is not simply about transaction costs, but more broadly
about the ease and reliability of turning ownership of an asset into command over
money. In this story, economic units are matching cash receipts and cash flows, and
the risk is not facing a suboptimal consumption path, but bankruptcy if contracted
cash payments cannot be made. Critically, here, there is no assumption that the sale
price of an asset is normally equal to its present value if held to maturity; if that were
the case, liquidity would have no meaning, since it refers specifically to the degree to
which an asset can be converted to cash. One important implication of this view is
that demand for liquidity will depend strongly on how likely lenders believe they are
to face the risk of insolvency – which, for banks and other institutions that depend
mainly on short-term funding, largely depends on the perceived chance they will be
subject to self-fulling panics or runs. The larger implication is that the credit spread
may depend less on the financial condition of borrowers, than of lenders; the higher
the probability assigned by banks and other financial institutions to the possibility of
having current cashflows fall short of cash obligations (in the event of a run, for exam-
ple), the greater the premium they will pay for assets that can be reliably converted
to cash in those circumstances.
The idea that liquidity refers specifically to the extent to which holding a given
asset contributes to a unit’s ability to meet its cash obligations is not an unfamil-
iar idea in mainstream economics. Tirole (2011) But it has not been systematically
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applied to questions like the credit spread puzzle, since it is not easily compatible
with a methodology that frames all problems in terms of maximizing the expected
value of lifetime consumption. Nonetheless, there is considerable empirical evidence
that liquidity premia can explain a large part of observed credit spreads. (Perraudin
and Taylor, 2004; Ziegler and Duffie, 2001) One particularly striking recent study
compares yields on various securities guaranteed by the German government, and so
presumably facing identical (very low) default risk, but of differing liquidity as mea-
sured by the depth of the market, etc. (Schwarz, 2010) Extrapolating from this to a
variety of European bonds suggests that over two-thirds of observed credit spreads can
be explained by liquidity premia. Bongaerts, De Jong and Driessen (2012) similarly
find that for US corporate bonds, liquidity (as proxied by trading volume, bond age,
and amount issued) can explain a substantial part of excess credit spreads. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2004) notes that that the large increase in US bond
spreads after the 1998 Russian crisis shows the importance of liquidity effects, since
US defaults did not move (or is there reason to think that the Russian crisis changed
expectations about default rates for US companies.) In a loanable-funds model of
interest rate determination, the Russian crisis should have reduced interest rates for
US borrowers, since they would no longer have to compete with Russian borrowers
for the supply of savings. There is little empirical work looking specifically at the rise
in credit spreads after 1980. But to the extent that the “anomaly” of credit spreads
greatly in excess of expected default loss can in general be explained by liquidity
premia, it is natural to suppose that this also contributed to the rise in credit spreads
after 1980.
In other words, I suggest that increased credit spreads can be understood as a
an increase in the liquidity premium. The institutions that are the direct holders of
most debt securities have placed a greater premium on assets that are “more certainly
realisable at short notice without loss.” That is, the concern is less with the expected
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return on the security, nor with its variance or other moments of the distribution of
returns. Rather, it is with the extent to which the security can be reliably used to
make cash payments as needed. This requires not only a stable market value, low
transactions costs, and thick markets, but that the security be regarded by other
market participants as liquid – and that these conditions can be relied on to hold at
the time that some unplanned-for payment must be made. A security is liquid only
if it is possible to sell it or use it as collateral in any state of the world in which the
holder needs to generate additional cashflow.
In a crisis, a financial institution may need to convert assets into immediate cash
in order to meets its survival constraint. If there is any question about a security’s
saleability, it will be of less value in the face of the possibility of such a crisis. And
to the extent that potential counterparties may also be facing a survival constraint,
this fact in turn makes the asset less reliably saleable. Here we see the essentially
conventional aspect of liquidity. Because demand for a liquid asset is in large part
motivated by the need for certainty that it will always be demanded by others, even
a modest difference in risk can produce a drastic difference in liquidity premiums,
and doubts about the liquidity of an asset can be self-confirming. It has been argued
that this sort of “expectations cascade” was responsible for the collapse of interbank
lending in 2008. (Gorton and Metrick, 2009)
The liquidity-premium story helps explain why high credit spreads coincide with
high default rates, rather than anticipating them. The same conditions that produce
high default rates among borrowers increase the probability that holders of financial
assets will need to generate cash at short notice. During these periods, an asset’s
ability to be immediately sold or borrowed against will be more important than its
returns, since future income from the asset is of no use if the asset’s holder does not
survive to receive it. So it is natural than in these periods, the most readily saleable
assets – Treasury bonds – enjoy the highest relative price, and accordingly the lowest
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interest rate. It also helps explain the persistence of high credit spreads after a crisis.
Liquidity is, in part, a convention, and conventions take time to reestablish themselves
once disrupted.
In this sense, credit spreads do represent compensation for risk, but not risk asso-
ciated with borrowers or (directly) with the real economy. Rather, they compensate
for risk associated with the financial system itself. Credit spreads will be larger in
proportion to the concern that asset holders – financial institutions in particular –
have that they may need to make unplanned payments at short notice. Both the
descriptive evidence presented in Section 3.4.1 and the empirical literature reviewed
in Section 3.4.2 are consistent with the idea that variation in credit spreads over time
is driven mainly by demand for liquidity.
The question of why demand for liquidity might have increased over time is largely
beyond the scope of this essay. But one possible contributor is the decline in the
supply of the most liquid debt securities, Treasury bonds. Compared with the 1950s
and 1960s, holdings of government debt has been a much smaller fraction of financial
system assets in recent decades. Treasury securities made up a full 70 percent of
credit-market assets held by the financial system at the end of World War II, and
remained over 15 percent through the 1960s. By 2007, Treasuries had fallen to just
5 percent of credit market assets held by financial institutions. Treasuries are a
uniquely liquid asset, offering nearly the same security as holding cash itself. So it
seems natural that a fall in the relative supply of this most liquid asset would lead
to a rise in the liquidity premium on other assets. Rising liquidity premia on private
debt as a result of a fall in the supply of public debt is consistent with more formal
models of liquidity and asset prices. (Holmstro¨m and Tirole, 1996)
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3.4.4 Financial Repression
The rise in interest rats faced by ultimate borrowers after 1980 is not so surprising
when one recalls that holding down borrowing costs to maintain high levels of fixed
investment was one of the main goals of New Deal banking legislation. This has
been largely forgotten, with banking reforms usually thought of as being aimed at
crisis prevention, but holding down the interest rates faced by nonfinancial borrowers
was a major concern at the time. (Russell, 2008) In order to achieve this without
unduly depressing lender profits (which could threaten the stability of the banking
system) regulation also aimed at holding down banks’ funding costs. In other words,
banks’ market power was to be restrained vis-a-vis borrowers, but enhanced vis-a-vis
savers, so that holders of assets in the form of claims on banks (middle and upper-
income households, essentially, but not the very rich) were forced to subsidize loans
for productive investment. Thus for instance Senator Glass argued that interest
rate controls on deposits would “put a stop to the competition between banks in
payment of interest, which frequently induces banks to pay excessive interest on
time deposits.” (Quoted in Russell (2008).) These measures included restrictions on
entry to new banks, or existing banks to new markets; bans on interest on checking
deposits; ceilings on interest on time deposits; regulations to limit the ability of
interest-bearing accounts to substitute for checking accounts for transaction purposes;
as well as deposit insurance, to help induce savers to accept lower returns on bank
deposits. While these regulations were perceived as restrictions by individual banks
(and opposed accordingly), their effect, as policymakers like Glass understood, was
to limit competition between banks for deposits and thereby hold down their funding
costs. As Russell (2008) puts it:
This regulatory framework ... inhibited financial capitalist firms ...
from competing with each other ... for access to funds... Meanwhile, in
the market to provide investment capital to productive capitalist firms,
competition could be vigorous... [which] helped to exert downward pres-
sure on the cost of accessing investment capital. ... So long as competition
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was vigorous in the second phase of financial intermediation, New Deal
banking reforms might enhance the profitability of commercial banks in
the first phase of financial intermediation without necessarily subverting
the agenda for the accessibility of investment capital on favorable terms...
Thus New Deal banking reforms simultaneously encouraged competition
among financial intermediaries in one respect [interest rates paid to savers]
while restraining it in another [interest rates charged to borrowers, espe-
cially for fixed investment.] (Russell, 2008)
During the 1980s, however, these regulations were effectively eliminated, and the
funding advantage of commercial banks largely disappeared (though transaction ac-
counts with no or very low interest rates did continue to exist, on a diminishing scale.)
The effect of increased competition among banks for deposits, as well as the shift away
from deposits as a funding source, is shown clearly in Figure 3.6. This figure shows
the average funding cost of commercial banks – computed as total interest payments
divided by total liabilities, and by interest-bearing liabilities, respectively – relative to
the Federal Funds rate. As the figure shows, for most of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s,
commercial banks faced an effective cost of funds two to four points below the Federal
Funds rate. With the disappearance of their privileged access to cheap transactions
balance funding after deregulation in the 1980s (and later with the fall in nominal
rates), this funding advantage diminished, and after 2000 essentially disappeared. In
Russell’s terms, we can say that deregulation raised the cost of borrowing for nonfi-
nancial businesses (and households) through both, first, increased competition among
banks for savings, and, second, reduced competition (because of consolidation, the
combination of commercial and investment banking functions, etc.) among banks
as lenders. But for the commercial bank sector, at least, the evidence of Figure 3.6
suggests that the former effect was quantitatively more important.
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Figure 3.6: Commercial Bank Funding Costs Relative to Federal Funds Rate, 5-Year
Moving Averages
Source: FDIC
3.5 Conclusion
Over the past 50 years interest rate spreads have widened substantially, both
between longer and shorter maturity loans and between loans to riskier and less risky
borrowers. This increase in spreads is hard to explain in conventional models in which
the interest rate is the price of deferred consumption, and spreads between rates for
different borrowers represent rational expectations of risk. The empirical literature
on interest rate spreads consistently finds that long rates do not predict future short
rates, contradicting the expectations hypothesis; and it consistently finds that spreads
between riskier and less risky bonds are too large to explain in terms of default risk,
and carry no information about future defaults. For the orthodox theory, these results
are anomalous. But for a Keynesian approach, they point toward an alternative
framework for thinking about interest rates – one in which the overall level of rates
and the spreads between different rates are the same fundamental phenomenon.
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The Keynesian approach to interest rate determination differs from the orthodox
approach in two essential respects. First, it regards interest as compensation for
illiquidity, rather than for deferring expenditure. And second, it treats expectations
as an independent variable rather than restricting models to those that predict the
same value for xt and for agents’ expectations of xt in all periods prior to t. In
principle, these are two distinct issues. But there is a deep connection between them,
because it is the lack of knowledge of the future that makes liquidity desirable.
This Keynesian perspective provides a useful paradigm to make sense of the pat-
terns of rising term and credit spreads in the post 1980s period. First, from such
a perspective it is not useful to think of expectations, or prices incorporating them,
as representing the true probability distribution of future events; expectations are
essentially conventional and backward looking. Thus, they are likely to overweight
recent changes in short rates – a result consistent with both the empirical literature
and the assumptions of more policy oriented macro models. At the same time, the
importance of capital gains in the returns on longer bonds means that a conventional
level or floor on such rates, once established, will be stabilized by the behavior of
profit-seeking investors. Thus long rates may be quite stable even in the face of large
changes in short rates or other economic data. In an environment where monetary
policy is relied on to maintain full employment and where unemployment is more
common than inflation, this stability of long rates will lead to large term spreads.
Finally, from a Keynesian perspective, liquidity is central to the structure of in-
terest rates. The interest rate is the price of liquidity (not the price of saving) and
depends primarily on developments within the financial system. From a Minskyian
viewpoint, liquidity refers to the capacity to meet cash commitments. This implies a
world where the goal is to manage cashflows so as to make contracted cash payments
where the payment that can be received by sale of hypothecation of an asset is in gen-
eral lower (often much lower, or zero) than the present value of the income expected
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from holding the asset. As Minsky puts it “The fundamental speculative decision
of a capitalist economy centers around how much, of the anticipated cash flow from
normal operations, a firm, household, or financial institution pledges for the payment
of interest and principal on liabilities.” (Minsky, 1975). The extent to which the post
1980s financial system is less liquid than the postwar system, in the sense of having
less reliable cashflows relative to its cash commitments, can help explain the increase
in the credit spread.
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